Before descending into social science double-talk about the tension between theory and contingency, Centeno provides a useful typology of why there have been relatively few interstate wars in Latin America, looking to provide the counterfactual to the epigram that war made the state and the state made war. Essentially, the arguement is that whatever process was creating strong states in Europe was happening in addition to large-scale organized war, which simply accelerated the process, and when looking at the problems of state formation in other regions of the world this suggests that Europe was the special case, not the default model.

As for why the state has been a relatively weak institution in Latin America, and seldom able to muster the resources and generate the enthusiasm needed to go to war (as opposed to engaging in the suppression of internal enemies), Centeno points out a whole series of starting conditions after the fall of the Spanish empire that retarded state formation. However, the one key point seems to be leadership, as elites were more interested in pursuing their internecine feuds, as opposed to creating strong political movements, which would have meant overcoming the social and racial prejudices of time. With a few exceptions, the mass of potential followers were simply to alien to court in regards to larger poltical projects. ( )