...thinking, doubting, believing, " reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of " our own minds, which we being conscious of, and observing " in ourselves, do from them receive into our understandings " as distinct ideas as we do from the bodies affecting our " senses."...

...thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds, which we, being conscious of, and observing...ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings ideas as distinct as we <lo from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas frfry man has wholly...

...confounded with a species of perception which Locke denoted by the name, " reflection." He says of it, " though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called 'internal sense.'"1 He implies that attention is essential...

...confounded with a species of perception which Locke denoted by the name, " reflection." He says of it, " though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called ' internal sense.' "l He implies that attention is essential...

...all the different actings of our own minds, which we being conscious of, and observing in our selves, do from these receive into our Understandings as distinct...nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called Internal Sense. But as I call the other Sensation, so...

...powers of perception are all called "senses." This is the language of Locke who wrote of reflection that "this source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be '• Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, I, 84. " Ibid., I, 69. not sense, as having nothing to do with...

...Thinking, Doubting, Believing, Reasoning, Knowing, Willing, and all the different actings of our own minds; which we being conscious of and observing in...nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other sensation, so...

...sensation as being the more familiar mode of observation, for he explains reflection in terms of it. "Though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense'.2 He accepts unquestioningly that both...

...consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas which could not be had from things without This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself;...nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called 'internal sense' By reflection, then ...I would be understood...

...productive of fresh ideas about 'the operations of our own minds,' and asserted that though reflection 'be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it , and might properly enough be called internal sense' (Locke, vol. 1, p. 78). Yet Locke saw...