The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página 8
... international conflict by focus- ing on a single argument or approach (e.g. ... international conflict are most likely valid. For example, the basic question of whether a rela- tively equal ... politics. 8. WAR. the behavioral origins of.
... international conflict by focus- ing on a single argument or approach (e.g. ... international conflict are most likely valid. For example, the basic question of whether a rela- tively equal ... politics. 8. WAR. the behavioral origins of.
Página 9
... politics. Readers should examine closely claims by those who have ap- parently identified novel explanations of international politics, as these claims frequently have minimal empirical (and sometimes logical) ref- erent (e.g., Van ...
... politics. Readers should examine closely claims by those who have ap- parently identified novel explanations of international politics, as these claims frequently have minimal empirical (and sometimes logical) ref- erent (e.g., Van ...
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... politics approaches are “best” simply miss the point. A more fruitful question to ask is how much, or when, or under what conditions does each con- jecture appear most consistent with some aspect of international conflict behavior. Our ...
... politics approaches are “best” simply miss the point. A more fruitful question to ask is how much, or when, or under what conditions does each con- jecture appear most consistent with some aspect of international conflict behavior. Our ...
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... international politics as “international relations theory.” Few so-called theories of international politics contain deduc- tively formal logic or even careful attention to internal consistency and instead pose loosely specified ...
... international politics as “international relations theory.” Few so-called theories of international politics contain deduc- tively formal logic or even careful attention to internal consistency and instead pose loosely specified ...
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... international politics . We end with the conclusion that the field of international politics is under- theorized , particularly in terms of the dynamic linkages between exist- ing models and arguments . In the remainder of this book ...
... international politics . We end with the conclusion that the field of international politics is under- theorized , particularly in terms of the dynamic linkages between exist- ing models and arguments . In the remainder of this book ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus