out regard to private confcience, would be a plan unworthy of our Maker. It is clear, that to reward one who is not confcious of merit, or to punish one who is not confcious of demerit, cannot answer any good end; and in particular, cannot tend either to improvement or to reformation of manners. How much more like the Deity is the plan of nature, which rewards no man who is not confcious that he merits reward, and punishes no man who is not confcious that he merits punishment! By that plan, and by that only, rewards and punishments accomplifh every good end, a final cause most illuftrious!

The rewards and punishments that attend the primary and fecondary virtues, are finely contrived for fupporting the diftinction between them fet forth above. Punishment must be confined to the tranfgreffion of primary virtues, it being the intention of nature that secondary virtues be entirely free. On the other hand, fecondary virtues are more highly rewarded than primary: generofity, for example, makes a greater figure than justice; and magnanimity, heroifm, undaunted cou

rage,

rage, a ftill greater figure. One would imagine at first view, that the primary virtues, being more effential, fhould be intitled to the first place in our esteem, and be more amply rewarded than the fecondary; and yet in elevating the latter above the former, peculiar wisdom and forefight are confpicuous. Punishment is appropriated to enforce primary virtues; and if thefe virtues were alfo attended with the highest rewards, fecondary virtues, degraded to a lower rank, would be deprived of that enthufiaftic admiration which is their chief support: self-interest would univerfally prevail over benevolence; and would banish thofe numberlefs favours we receive from each other in fociety, which are beneficial in point of intereft, and still more fo by generating affection and friendship.

In our progress through final caufes, we come at last to reparation, one of the principles destined by Providence for redreffing wrongs committed, and for preventing reiteration. The final caufe of this principle where the mifchief arifes from intention, is clear: for to protect individuals in fociety, it is not fufficient that the delinquent

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delinquent be punished; it is necessary over and above, that the mischief be repaired.

Secondly, Where the act is wrong or unjuft, tho' not understood by the author to be fo, it is wifely ordered that reparation fhould follow; which will thus appear. Confidering the fallibility of man, it would be too fevere never to give any allowance for error. On the other hand, to make it a law in our nature, never to take advantage of error, would be giving too much indulgence to indolence and remiffion of mind, tending to make us neglect the improvement of our rational faculties. Our nature is fo happily framed, as to avoid these extremes by distinguishing between gain and lofs. No man is confcious of wrong, when he takes advantage of an error committed by another to fave himself from lofs: if there must be a lofs, common fenfe dictates, that it ought to rest upon the person who has erred, however innocently, rather than upon the person who has not erred. Thus, in a competition among creditors about the estate of their bankrupt debtor, every one is at liberty to avail himself of an erVOL. IV. M

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For committed by his competitor, in order to recover payment. But in lucro captando, the moral fenfe teacheth a different leffon; which is, that no man ought to lay hold of another's error to make gain by it. Thus, an heir finding a rough diamond in the repofitories of his ancestor, gives it away, miftaking it for a common pebble: the purchafer is in confcience and equity bound to restore, or to pay a juft price.

Thirdly, The following confiderations refpecting the precaution that is necessary in acting, unfold a final caufe, no lefs beautiful than that laft mentioned. So ciety could not fubfift in any tolerable manner, were full fcope given to raíhness and negligence, and to every action that Atrictly speaking is not criminal; whence it is a maxim founded no lefs upon utility than upon juftice, That men in fociety ought to be extremely circumfpect, as to every action that may poffibly do harm. On the other hand, it is alfo a maxim, That as the profperity and happincfs of man depend on action, activity ought to be encouraged, instead of being discouraged by dread of confequences. Thefe

maxims,

- 9i maxims, feemingly in oppofition, have natural limits that prevent their encroaching one upon the other. There is a certain degree of attention and circumfpection that men generally beftow upon affairs, proportioned to their importance: if that degree were not fufficient to defend against a claim of reparation, individuals would be too much cramped in action; which would be a great difcouragement to activity if a lefs degree were fufficient, there would be too great fcope for rafh or remifs conduct; which would prove the bane of fociety. Thefe limits, which evidently tend to the good of fociety, are adjusted by the moral fenfe; which dictates, as laid down in the fection of Reparation, that the man who acts with forefight of the probability of mischief, or acts rafhly and uncautiously without fuch forefight, ought to be liable for confequences; but that the man who acts cautioufly, without forefeeing or fufpecting any mifchief, ought not to be liable for confequences.

In the fame fection it is laid down, that the moral fenfe requires from every man, not his own degree of vigilance and attention,

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