that when he had employed only four chapters in difcuffing one hundred and ninety-two modes, true and falfe, of pure fyllogifins, he should employ fifteen upon modal fyllogifins.

I am very willing to excufe myself from entering upon this great branch of logic, by the judgement and example of those who cannot be charged either with want of refpect to Ariftotle, or with a low esteem of the fyllogiftic art.

it

Keckerman, a famous Dantzican profeffor, who fpent his life in teaching and writing logic, in his huge folio fyftem of that science, published ann. 1600, calls the doctrine of the modals the crux logicorum. With regard to the fcholaftic doctors, among 'whom this was a proverb, De modalibus non guftabit afinus, he thinks very dubious, whether they tortured most the modal fyllogifms, or were most tortured by them. But thofe crabbed geniuses, fays he, made this doctrine so very thorny, that it is fitter to tear a man's wits in pieces than to give them folidity. He defires it to be obferved, that the doctrine of the modals is adapted to the Greek language. The modal terms were frequently ufed by the Greeks in their difputations; and, on that account, are fo fully handled by Aristotle: but in the Latin tongue you fhall hardly ever meet with them. Nor do I remember, in all my experience, fays he, to have obferved any man in danger of being foiled in a difpute, through his ignorance of the modals.

This author, however, out of respect to Aristotle, treats pretty fully of modal propofitions, fhewing how to distinguish their subject and predicate, their quantity and quality. But the modal fyllogifms he paffes over altogether.

Ludovicus Vives, whom I mention, not as a devotee of Ariftotle, but on account of his own judgement and learning, thinks that the doctrine of modals ought to be banished out of logic, and remitted to grammar; and that if the grammar of the Greek tongue had been brought to a system in the time of Ariftotle, that

moft

moft acute philofopher would have faved the great labour he has bestowed on this fubject.

Burgersdick, after enumerating five claffes of modal fyllogifms, obferves, that they require many rules and cautions, which Ariftotle hath handled diligently; but as the use of them is not great, and their rules are very difficult, he thinks it not worth while to enter into the difcuffion of them; recommending to those who would understand them, the most learned paraphrafe of Joannes Monlorius, upon the first book of the First Analytics.

All the writers of logic for two hundred years back that have fallen into my hands, have paffed over the rules of modal fyllogifms with as little ceremony. So that this great branch of the doctrine of fyllogifm, fo diligently handled by Ariftotle, fell into neglect, if not contempt, even while the doctrine of pure fyllogifms continued in the highest efteem. Moved by these authorities, I fhall let this doctrine reft in peace, without giving the least disturbance to its afhes.

SECT. 7. On Syllogifms that do not belong to Figure and Mode.

Ariftotle gives fome obfervations upon imperfect fyllogifms: fuch as, the Enthimema, in which one of the premises is not expreffed but understood: Induction, wherein we collect an univerfal from a full enumeration of particulars: and Examples, which are an imperfect induction. The logicians have copied Aristotle upon thefe kinds of reafoning, without any confiderable improveBut to compenfate the modal fyllogifms, which they have laid adde, they have given rules for several kinds of fyllogifm, of which Ariftotle takes no notice. These may be reduced to two

ment.

firft clafs comprehends the fyllogifms into which any exclu

five,

five, restrictive, exceptive, or reduplicative propofition enters. Such propofitions are by fome called exponible, by others imperfectly modal. The rules given with regard to these are obvious, from a juft interpretation of the propofitions.

The second class is that of hypothetical fyllogifins, which take that denomination from having a hypothetical propofition for one or both premises. Moft logicians give the name of hypothetical to all complex propofitions which have more terms than one fubject and one predicate. I ufe the word in this large sense; and mean by hypothetical fyllogifms, all thofe in which either of the premifes confifts of more terms than two. How many various kinds there may be of fuch fyllogifins, has never been ascertained. The logicians have given names to fome; fuch as, the copulative, the conditional, by fome called hypothetical, and the dif junctive.

Such fyllogifins cannot be tried by the rules of figure and mode. Every kind would require rules peculiar to it. Logicians have given rules for fome kinds; but there are many that have not fo much as a name.

The Dilemma is confidered by most logicians as a fpecies of the disjunctive fyllogifm. A remarkable property of this kind is, that it may fometimes be happily retorted: it is, it seems, like a hand-grenade, which, by dextrous management, may be thrown back, fo as to spend its force upon the affailant. We fhall conclude this tedious account of fyllogifms, with a dilemma mentioned by A. Gellius, and from him by many logicians, as infoluble in any other way.

“Euathlus, a rich young man, defirous of learning the art of pleading, applied to Protagoras, a celebrated fophift, to inftruct him, promising a great fum of money as his reward; one half "of which was paid down; the other half he bound himself to pay as foon as he should plead a caufe before the judges, and VOL. II.

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"gain it. Protagoras found him a very apt scholar; but, after "he had made good progrefs, he was in no hafte to plead cau" fes. The mafter, conceiving that he intended by this means tò "fhift off his fecond payment, took, as he thought, a fure me"thod to get the better of his delay. He fued Euathlus before "the judges; and, having opened his cause at the bar, he pleaded to this purpose. O most foolish young man, do you not fee, "that, in any event, I must gain my point? for if the judges give fentence for me, you must pay by their sentence; if against me, the condition of our bargain is fulfilled, and you "have no plea left for your delay, after having pleaded and gained a caufe. To which Euathlus answered. O most wise master, "I might have avoided the force of your argument, by not pleading my own caufe. But, giving up this advantage, do you not fee, that whatever sentence the judges pass, I am safe? "If they give sentence for me, I am acquitted by their sentence; "if against me, the condition of our bargain is not fulfilled, by my pleading a cause, and losing it. The judges, thinking the arguments unanswerable on both fides, put off the cause to a "long day."

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Account of the remaining books of the Organon.

SECT. I. Of the Laft Analytics.

N the First Analytics, fyllogifms are confidered in respect of their form; they are now to be confidered in respect of their matter. The form lies in the neceffary connection between the premises and the conclufion; and where fuch a connection is wanting, they are faid to be informal, or vicious in point of form.

But where there is no fault in the form, there may be in the matter; that is, in the propofitions of which they are compofed, which may be true or falfe, probable or improbable.

When the premises are certain, and the conclufion drawn from them in due form, this is demonstration, and produces science. Such fyllogifms are called apodictical; and are handled in the two books of the Last Analytics. When the premises are not certain, but probable only, fuch fyllogifins are called dialectical; and of them he treats in the eight books of the Topicks. But there are fome fyllogifms which feem to be perfect both in matter and form, when they are not really fo: as, a face may feem beautiful which is but painted. These being apt to deceive, and produce a false opinion, are called fophiftical; and they are the subject of the book concerning Sophifms.

To return to the Laft Analytics, which treat of demonstration