ture state of rewards and punishments. Whether all men might not have been made angels, and whether more happiness might not have refulted from a different fyftem, lie far beyond the reach of human knowledge. From what is known of the conduct of Providence, we have reason to prefume, that our prefent ftate is the refult of wisdom and benevolence. So much we know with certainty, that the sense we have of Deity and of moral duty, correfpond accurately to the nature of man as an imperfect being; and that these fenfes, were they abfolutely perfect, would convert him into a very different being.

A doctrine espoused by several writers ancient and modern, pretends to compofe the world without a Deity; that the world, composed of animals, vegetables, and brute matter, is felf-existent and eternal; and that all events happen by a neceffary chain of caufes and effects. It will occur even at first view, that this theory is at least improbable: can any fuppofition be more improbable than that the great work of planning and executing this univerfe, beautiful in all its parts, and bound together by the most perfect laws, should be a blind

I

blind work, performed without intelligence or contrivance? It would therefore be a fufficient answer to obferve, that this doctrine, though highly improbable, is however given to the public, like a foundling, without cover or fupport. But af firmatively I urge, that it is fundamentally overturned by the knowledge we derive of Deity from our own nature: if a Deity exift, felf-existence must be his peculiar attribute; and we cannot hesitate in rejecting the fuppofition of a felf-exiftent world, when it is fo natural to fuppose that the whole is the operation of a felf-existent Being, whofe power and wisdom are adequate to that great work. I add, that this rational doctrine is eminently fupported from contemplating the endless number of wife and benevolent effects, difplay'd every where on the face of this globe; which afford complete evidence of a wise and benevolent caufe. As thefe effects are far above the power of man, we neceffarily afcribe them to a fuperior Being, or in other words to the Deity (a).

Many grofs and abfurd conceptions of Deity that have prevailed among rude na

(a) Firft fketch of this third book, Sect. 1.

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tions, are urged by fome writers as an objection against a fenfe of Deity. That objection fhall not be overlooked; but it will be answered to better purpose, after these grofs and abfurd conceptions are examined in the chapter immediately following.

The proof of a Deity from the innate fense here explained, differs materially from what is contained in effays on morality and natural religion (a). The proof there given is founded on a chain of reafoning, altogether independent on the innate fenfe of Deity. Both equally produce conviction; but as fenfe operates intuitively without reafoning, the fenfe of Deity is made a branch of human nature, in order to enlighten thofe who are incapable of a long chain of reafoning; and to fuch, who make the bulk of mankind, it is more convincing, than the most perfpicuous reasoning to a philofopher.

(a) Part 2. fect. 7.

VOL. IV.

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CHAP II.

- Progrefs of Opinions with respect to Deity.

THE

HE fenfe of Deity, like many other delicate fenfes, is in favages fo faint and obfcure as eafily to be biaffed from truth. Among them, the belief of many, fuperior beings, is univerfal. And two caufes join to produce that belief. The first is, that being accustomed to a plurality of vifible objects, men, mountains, trees, cattle, and fuch like, they are naturally led to imagine a like plurality in things not visible; and from that flight bias, flight indeed but natural, is partly derived the fyftem of Polytheism, univerfal among favages. The other is, that favages know little of the connection between caufes and effects, and still lefs of the order and government of the world: every event that is not familiar, appears to them fingular and extraordinary; and if fuch event exceed human power, it is without

without hesitation afcribed to a fuperior being. But as it occurs not to a favage, nor to any person who is not a philofopher, that the many various events exceeding human power and seemingly unconnected, may all proceed from the fame caufe; they are readily afcribed to differ-ent beings. Pliny ascribes Polytheism to the confcioufness men have of their imbecillity: "Our powers are confined within 66 narrow bounds: we do not readily con-"ceive powers in the Deity much more “extensive; and we fupply by number "what is wanting in power*." Poly-. theism, thus founded, is the first stage in the progress of theology; for it is embraced by the rudest favages, who have neither capacity nor inclination to pierce deeper into the nature of things.

This stage is distinguishable from others, by a belief that all fuperior beings. are malevolent. Man, by nature weak and helpless, is prone to fear, dreading

* Plurality of heads or of hands in one idol, is fometimes made to fupply plurality of different idols. Hence among favages the grotesque figure of fome of their idols.