Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

every branch of human knowledge to its utmost limit; and who was not very fcrupulous about the means he took to obtain his end. 5.1

[ocr errors]

We ought, however, to do him the juftice to obferve, that although the pride and vanity of the fophift appear too much in his writings in abstract philofophy, yet in natural history the fidelity of his narrations feems to be equal to his industry; and he always diftinguishes between what he knew and what he had by report. And even in abftract philofophy, it would be unfair to impute to Aristotle all the faults, all the obfcurities, and all the contradictions that are to be found in his writings. The greatest part, and perhaps the best part, of his writings is loft. There is reafon to doubt whether fome of those we afcribe to him be really his; and whether what are his be not much vitiated and interpolated. These fufpicions are juftified by the fate of Ariftotle's writings, which is judiciously related, from the best authorities, in Bayle's dictiona'ry, under the article Tyrannion, to which I referi dune

[ocr errors]

His books in logic which remain, are, 1. One book of the Categories. 2. One of Interpretation. 3. First Analytics, two books. 4. Laft Analytics, two books. 5. Topics, eight books. 6. Of Sophifms, one book. Diogenes Laertius mentions many others that are loft. Thofe I have mentioned have commonly been published together, under the name of Aristotle's Organon, or his Logic; and for many ages, Porphyry's Introduction to the Categories has been prefixed to them.

[ocr errors][merged small]

In this Introduction, which is addreffed to Chryfoarius, the author obferves, That in order to understand Ariftotle's doctrine concerning the categories, it is neceffary to know what a genus

is, what a fpecies, what a specific difference, what a property, and what an accident; that the knowledge of these is also very useful in definition, in divifion, and even in demonstration: therefore he proposes, in this little tract, to deliver fhortly and fimply the doctrine of the ancients, and chiefly of the Peripatetics, concerning thefe five predicables; avoiding the more intricate questions concerning them; fuch as, Whether genera and Species do really exist in nature? or, Whether they are only conceptions of the human mind? If they exift in nature, Whether they are corporeal or incorporeal? and, Whether they are inherent in the objects of fenfe, or disjoined from them? Thefe, he fays, are very difficult questions, and require accurate difcuffion; but that he is not to meddle with them.

After this preface, he explains very minutely each of the five words above mentioned, divides and fubdivides each of them, and then pursues all the agreements and differences between one and another through fixteen chapters.

[ocr errors]
[merged small][ocr errors]

!

The book begins with an explication of what is meant by uni vocal words, what by equivocal, and what by denominative. Then it is observed, that what we fay is either fimple, without compofition or structure, as man, horfe; or, it has compofition and structure, as, a man fights, the horse runs. Next comes a diftinction between a fubject of predication; that is, a subject of which any thing is affirmed or denied, and a fubject of inhesion. These things are said to be inherent in a subject, which although they are not a part of the fubject, cannot poffibly exist without it, as figure in the thing figured. Of things that are, fays Ariftotle, fome may be predicated of a fubject, but are in no fubject; as, Y 2

man

man may be predicated of James or John, but is not in any fubject. Some again are in a subject, but can be predicated of no fubject. Thus, my knowledge in grammar is in me as its fub+ ject, but it can be predicated of no fubject; because it is an indi vidual thing. Some are both in a subject, and may be predicated of a subject, as science; which is in the mind as its fubject, and may be predicated of geometry. Laftly, Some things can nei ther be in a fubject, nor be predicated of any fubject. Such are all individual fubftances, which cannot be predicated, becaufe they are individuals; and cannot be in a fubject, because they are fubftances. After fome other fubtilties about predicates and fubjects, we come to the categories themselves; the things above mentioned being called by the schoolmen the anteprædicamenta. It may be obferved, however, that notwithstanding the distinction now explained, the being in a subject, and the being predicated truly of a fubject, are in the Analytics used as fynonymous phrases; and this variation of ftyle has led fome perfons to think that the Categories were not wrote by Aristotle.

Things which may be expreffed without compofition or structure, are, says the author, reducible to the following heads. They are either fubftance, or quantity, or quality, or relatives, or place, or time, or having, or doing, or fuffering. These are the predicaments or categories. The first four are largely treated of in four chapters; the others are flightly paffed over, as fufficiently clear of themselves. As a fpecimen, I fhall give a fummary of what he fays on the category of substance.

..

Subftances are either primary, to wit, individual fubftances, or secondary, to wit, the genera and species of fubstances. Primary fubftances neither are in a fubject, nor can be predicated of a fubject; but all other things that exist, either are in primary substances, or may be predicated of them. For whatever can be predicated of that which is in a fubject, may also be predicated of the

fubject

fubject itself. Primary fubftances are more fubftances than the fecondary; and of the fecondary, the fpecies is more a substance than the genus. If there were no primary, there could be no fecondary fubftances.

The properties of fubftance are these : 1. No fubftance is capable of intension or remiffion. 2. No substance can be in any other thing as its subject of inhefion. 3. No fubftance has a contrary; for one fubftance cannot be contrary to another; nor can there be contrariety between a fubftance and that which is no fubftance. 4. The most remarkable property of fubftance, is, that one and the fame fubftance may, by fome change in itself, become the fubject of things that are contrary. Thus, the fame body may be at one time hot, at another cold,

Let this ferve as a specimen of Aristotle's manner of treating the .categories. After them, we have fome chapters, which the schoolmen call poftprædicamenta; wherein, first, the four kinds of oppofition of terms are explained; to wit, relative, privative, of contrariety, and of contradiction. This is repeated in all fyftems of logic. Laft of all we have diftinctions of the four Greek words which anfwer to the Latin ones, prius, fimul, motus, and habere.

[ocr errors][merged small][ocr errors]

We are to confider, fays Aristotle, what a noun is, what a verb, what affirmation, what negation, what fpeech. Words are the figns of what paffeth in the mind; writing is the fign of 'words. The figns both of writing and of words are different in different nations, but the operations of mind fignified by them are the fame. There are fome operations of thought which are neither true nor falfe. These are expreffed by nouns or verbs fingly, and without compofition.

A

A noun is a found which by compact fignifies fomething without refpect to time, and of which no part has fignification by itfelf. The cries of beasts may have a natural signification, but they are not nouns. We give that name only to founds which have their fignification by compact. The cafes of a noun, as the genitive, dative, are not nouns. Non homo is not a noun, but, for

distinction's fake, may be called a nomen infinitum.

A verb fignifies fomething by compact with relation to time. Thus, valet is a verb; but valetudo is a noun, because its fignification has no relation to time. It is only the present tense of the indicative that is properly called a verb; the other tenfes and moods are variations of the verb. Non valet may be called a verbum infinitum.

Speech is found fignificant by compact, of which fome part is alfo fignificant. And it is either enunciative, or not enunciative. Enunciative speech is that which affirms or denies. As to fpeech which is not enunciative, fuch as a prayer or with, the confideration of it belongs to oratory, or poetry.. Every enunciative fpeech must have a verb, or fome variation of a verb, Affirmation is the enunciation of one thing concerning another. Negation is the enunciation of one thing from another. Contradiction is an affirmation and negation that are oppofite. This is a fummary of the first fix chapters.

The feventh and eighth treat of the various kinds of enunciations or propofitions, univerfal, particular, indefinite, and fingular; and of the various kinds of oppofition in propofitions, and the axioms concerning them. These things are repeated in every system of logic. In the ninth chapter he endeavours to prove, by a long metaphyfical reasoning, that propofitions respecting future contingencies are not, determinately, either true or falfe; and that if they were, it would follow, that all things happen necef

farily,

« AnteriorContinuar »