not taken it bonâ fide or paid value for it, they will be responsible to the loser. (23)

The right to transfer a bill or note is in the payee, or in the person to whom it has been transferred from him.

And if a bill or note be deposited with a banker for a particular purpose, and is endorsed so as to give him the right to transfer it, and he (24) 25) negotiate, or (25) pledge it;

(23) Lovell v. Martin, 4 Taunt. 799. Plaintiff lost a bill accepted payable at defendant's, and immediately gave notice thereof to the acceptor, and the acceptor communicated the notice to defendants with a request that they would not pay or discount the bill they afterwards (probably from inadvertence) discounted it for one Powell, who had it from a child who picked it up; when due they wrote a receipt upon it, and debited the acceptor with the amount. Plaintiff brought trover, and there being no proof that Powell took it bonâ fide or paid value, verdict for plaintiff. Rule nisi for nonsuit, on the ground that plaintiff had not demanded the bill of defendants, and without such demand trover would not lie: but the court held the writing a receipt upon it, and debiting the acceptor with the amount, was a conversion; and rule discharged.

(24) Bolton v. Puller, 1 Bos. and Pull. 539. Forbes and Gregory, traders in London, were also partners in the house of Caldwell and Co. in Liverpool. Bolton dealt with Caldwell and Co. and they prevailed with the house in London to let him make his bills payable there; Bolton kept no account but with the house at Liverpool; and they kept the account with the house in London; and the payments on Bolton's bills, when made, were carried by the house in London to their account with the house in Liverpool; and by the house at Liverpool to their account with Bolton. In Feb. 1793, he accepted bills payable at the house in London, to the value of £19,702; and to enable the Liverpool house to provide for their payment, he endorsed to them (among other bills) a bill for £4000, and another for £398. These two bills they remitted generally, with many others, to Forbes and Gregory, to whom they were considerably indebted; but before the latter bill arrived, both houses became bankrupt. The acceptances were payable before the endorsed bills. Bolton was obliged to pay all his own acceptances; and the assignees of Forbes and Gregory having refused to deliver up these bills, he brought trover for them. A special verdict was found: and after two arguments, the court were unanimously of opinion, that the assignees were entitled to keep the bills. They admitted, that as Forbes and Gregory were partners in the Liverpool house, they were to be considered as privy to the fact that the bills had been endorsed to that house to enable it to provide for Bolton's acceptances; but they held that the application which had been made of these bills, was the very thing which Bolton intended; and that therefore the privity of the London house in the agreement made between him and the house at Liverpool, could have no effect on the transaction, which, as between the two houses, had undoubtedly changed the property in the bills: that for the purpose of providing for Bolton's acceptances, the house at Liverpool was intitled to deal with the bills as it thought fit; that they had therefore a right to remit them to Forbes and Gregory; and as they were indebted

such negotiation or pledging, although it may amount to a gross breach of trust, and defeat the purpose for which the deposit was made, will, as between the person who made the deposit and an innocent holder of the bill or note, be binding upon the former.

[But it has been held that if an agent pass notes belonging to his principal to a third person, as security for collateral liabilities for the agent previously entered into by the person to whom the notes are assigned, the latter cannot retain the notes or their proceeds against the principal. (1)]

to Forbes and Gregory in more than the amount, the assignees of Forbes and Gregory were intitled to keep them. Judgment for the defendants. (25) Collins v. Martin, 1 Bos. and Pull. 648. The plaintiff sent bills endorsed in blank to Messrs. Nightingales, to receive the money upon them they borrowed money of the defendants, and pledged these bills as a security. They afterwards became bankrupt, and the plaintiff brought trover for the bills. There being no evidence that the defendants knew under what circumstances the bills had been left with Messrs. N., or how the plaintiff's account (he being in cash) stood with them, Eyre C. J. thought the action would not lie, and nonsuited the plaintiff. On a rule nisi to set aside the nonsuit, it was urged that though the Messrs. N. might have negotiated the bills, they could not pledge them; but after consideration, the court was unanimous, that they had the power of binding the plaintiff as well by pledging as negotiating the bills, of which they were enabled to hold themselves out to the world as the absolute owners. Rule discharged.

[(a) Bay employed Randolph and Savage to sell a schooner for him, with orders to take good notes in payment, and transmit them to him. They sold the vessel and took endorsed negotiable notes from the purchasers. Before Bay could get possession of the notes R. and S. became insolvent, and delivered these notes with others to J. J. and J. C. Coddington, without any request from them, to secure them for certain endorsements and responsibilities which they were then under for R. and S. No new credit was given to R. and S. in consequence of the delivery of the notes. Bay brought a bill in chancery against R. and S. and the Coddingtons, praying that they might be decreed to deliver up, and account to him for, the notes. The Coddingtons did not know that the notes were the property of Bay when they received them; and had disposed of them for cash before being informed of it. The Chancellor, Kent, decreed that the Coddingtons were not entitled to the notes or their proceeds as against Bay, who was the lawful owner of them when they were transferred to the Coddingtons; "inasmuch as they did not receive the notes in the course of business, nor in payment in whole or in part of any then existing debt, nor for cash or property advanced, or debt created, or responsibility incurred on the credit of the notes;" and decreed that they should pay the amount of the notes and interest to Bay. This decree was afterwards affirmed in the Court of Errors. Bay v. Coddington, 5 Johns. Ch. R. 54; Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. R.

An endorsement by a person of the same name with the person entitled to transfer it is (26) void (except against the person endorsing it, and the subsequent endorsers) though the person entitled to transfer it was not particularly described upon the bill or note.

On a bill or note payable to A. for the use of B., the (27) right to transfer is in A.

On a bill or note payable to several persons, not in partnership, the right to transfer it is in all collectively, not (28) in any individually.

[After the dissolution of a copartnership, one partner cannot by his endorsement in the partnership name vest in the endorsee the title to a bill or note payable to the partnership. (a)]

(26) Mead v. Young, 4 Term Rep. 28. A bill payable to Henry Davis or order, was sent by the post, and got into the hands of a wrong Henry Davis, who endorsed it to the plaintiff: there was no description of Henry Davis in the bill, or addition to his name, nor was any fraud imputable to the plaintiff. This was an action against the acceptor, and on his offering evidence to shew that the Henry Davis who endorsed the bill was not the person in whose favor it was drawn, Lord Kenyon was of opinion that the evidence was inadmissible, and he retained that opinion after cause shewn against an application for a new trial; but Ashhurst, Buller, and Gross, Js. held, that unless the endorsement was made by the person to whom the bill was really payable, it was a forgery, and could confer no title, and that therefore it was competent for the defendant to shew that the person who endorsed the bill was not the person in whose favor it was made, and a new trial was accordingly granted.

(27) Evans v. Cramlington, Carth. 5. 2 Vent. 307. Skinn. 264. A bill was payable "to Price or order, for the use of Calvert." Price endorsed it to Evans, after which an extent issued against Calvert, and the money due upon it was seized to the use of the King. These facts appearing upon the pleadings, two points were made upon demurrer; the one, whether Calvert had such an interest in the money as might be extended; and the other, whether Price had power to endorse the bill, or whether he had only a bare authority to receive the money for the use of Calvert; and the Court of King's Bench, and afterwards the Exchequer Chamber, held that Calvert had not such an interest as could be extended, and that Price had power to endorse the bill, and judgment was given for the plaintiff.

(28) See Carvick v. Vickery, ante, p. 40; [and Smith v. Whiting, ante, p. 40.]

[(a) Sanford brought an action against Mickles and Foreman, as makers of a note payable to Brown and Olmstead. When the partnership of Brown and Olmstead was dissolved, Olmstead was authorized to take the stock, and collect debts and pay debts due from the company, but no authority was given him to endorse notes. He afterwards endorsed the note to Sanford, "Wm. Olmstead for the late firm of Brown

[A partnership may by endorsement transfer the title to a bill or note to one partner; even where the partner claiming as endorsee of the partnership was the person who made the endorsement. (a)

The directors of an incorporated bank, as usually constituted in the United States, may by their vote, without the corporate seal, or by their power of attorney, authorize their president or any other person to endorse a bill or note payable to the bank, and the endorsement by the person thus authorized will pass the property, in the bill or note. (b)]

If the right to transfer a bill or note be in a feme sole, and she marry, it (29) devolves upon her husband.

and Olmstead." Yates J. delivered the opinion of the Court. "It would be a peculiar hardship to put a partner retired from the whole concern, so completely in the power of the other, as to charge him by negotiating bills given during the partnership. This power being denied, it follows that they must all join in the transfer of a bill negotiable after the dissolution, for the purpose of vesting the title in the endorsee." Sanford v. Mickles, 4 Johns. R. 224.]

[(a) Russell v. Swan, 16 Mass. R. 314; Kirby v. Cogswell, i Cain.

R. 505.1

[(b) See Spear v. Ladd, 11 Mass. R. 94; Fleckner v. U. S. Bank, 8 Wheat. 339.

The directors of the Berkshire Bank authorized Larned, one of the directors, by a power of attorney signed by the president and three other directors, to assign any negotiable promissory notes belonging to the bank, to the attorney of the Northampton Bank. Larned endorsed his name as attorney upon a note made by Pepoon, payable to the Berkshire Bank, and the Northampton Bank sued Pepoon as maker of the note. Parker C. J. delivered the opinion of the Court. "We are satisfied that the directors might by their vote or power of attorney authorize the president or any other officer of the bank, to assign over the promissory notes payable to the company." And the court decided that the plaintiffs might fill up the endorsement so as to give effect to it. Northampton Bank v. Pepoon, 11 Mass. R. 288.]

(29) Connor v. Martin, Str. 516. cited 3 Wils. 5. A bill was made payable to Susan Connor, or order, while she was sole: she married, and during her coverture endorsed it to the plaintiff, and upon demurrer and argument the Court of Common Pleas held, that the feme covert could not assign the note, because by the marriage it became the sole right and property of the husband; and by Parker C. J. in Miles v. Williams, 10 Mod. 246, if a note be payable to a feme sole or order, and she marries, her husband is the proper person to endorse it.

M'Neilage v. Holloway, 1 Barnw. and Ald. 218. A bill was payable to a feme sole or order; she married before it became due; her husband brought an action upon it in his own name; and on a rule to shew cause why the judgment should not be arrested on the ground that the wife should have joined in the action, the court held that as this was

If a bill or note be made payable to a feme covert, the right to transfer it is in the husband; the wife cannot transfer unless as agent to him.

But if she do, and the husband promise to pay, it will be evidence (30) that she had authority from her husband to transfer.

If a bill be payable to an infant, an endorsement by him will convey (31) no interest, as against himself; but if he draw the bill, it may against the acceptor. (31)

If the person who has the right to transfer a bill or note die, it (32) devolves upon his personal representative; if he becomes bankrupt, and he holds the bill or note in his own right, on his assignees.

And if the right to a bill or note be in several partners, and some of them become bankrupt, and afterwards endorse it, such endorsement, though made to a creditor of the partnership, will confer (33) no title on the indorsee.

And if the creditor receive the money due upon the bill or note, the solvent partners, together with the assignees of the bankrupts, (33) may recover back the money so received.

a negotiable security, the marriage transferred the property to the husband. and entitled him, if he thought fit, to sue alone.

(30) See Cotes v. Davis, ante, p. 35.

(31) See Taylor v. Croker, 4 Esp. N. P. C. 187. ante, p. 33.

(32) Rawlinson v. Stone, 3 Wils. 1. Str. 1260. 2 Barnes, 137. A note was payable to A. B. or order: A. B. died intestate, and his administrator endorsed it to the plaintiff. These facts appearing upon the declaration, the defendant demurred, and contended that the personal representative of the payee had no power to endorse a note; but the Court of Common Pleas, after three arguments; and the Court of King's Bench, upon error brought, were unanimously of opinion that he had; and each court said, it was every day's practice, and the constant usage for executors and administrators to endorse bills and notes payable to the order of their testators or intestates.

(33) Thomason and others v. Frere and others, 10 East's Rep. 418. Thomason, Underhill, and Guest, were partners in trade at Birming ham; and being debtors to the defendants to the amount of £1800, anu creditors upon Gamble and Co. for £1450, Underhill and Guest, on the 11th October, 1807, without the consent or knowledge of Thomason, (who was abroad,) endorsed to the defendants a bill drawn by the firm of Thomason, Underhill, and Guest, upon, and accepted by, the agents of Gamble and Co. for this £1450. Underhill and Guest had, on the 7th October, 1807, committed acts of bankruptcy; upon which separate commissions issued on the 19th. The bill for £1450 became due on the 6th December, and was then paid. And to recover this money the