Discharging one endorsement and inserting another, is altering the endorsement; (9)

And forging it.

If a bill or note import to be payable at any of several places, substituting a new place for one of those named, if with intent to defraud, is a forgery. (10)

Substituting the new place by introducing over the old

objections; first, that the charge should have been for altering; and secondly, that this being a bill, not a note, could not legally be reissued without a new stamp. Prisoner was convicted, and the judges held the conviction right.

Rex v. Elsworth, Pasch. 1781. An indictment stated that a bill was drawn for 87.; that persons unknown feloniously did alter it by falsely forging and adding a cipher to the 81. and a y to the eight; that the prisoner had in his possession the said false, forged, altered, and counterfeitod bill, and that he feloniously did utter as a true bill, the said false, forged, altered, and counterfeited bill with intent, &c., and knowing, &c. Motion in arrest of judgment, on the ground that the forgery was stated to be by persons unknown, and that the statement should have been that they feloniously forged, not that they feloniously altered; the statute 2 Geo. 2. c. 25. s. 1. making it capital to forge, but saying nothing as to altering; but it was answered that the altering was forging, and the judges were unanimous that the conviction was right. And see Rex v. Post, ante, p. 7.

(9) Rex v. Birkitt, July, 1813. After conviction generally upon a bank indictment, it appeared there was one count only upon which the conviction could be supported; that count stated that the prisoner had in his possession a bank bill of exchange with a falsely altered endorsement thereon, and that he disposed thereof. The genuine endorsement was by Grant, Burbey, and Co., to Ladbrooke and Co.; the prisoner discharged the whole of that endorsement, and wrote de novo, “ Grant, Burbey, and Co. ;" the judges thought this alteration made the bill what the indictment described it, and that on this count the conviction was right.

Rex v. Bigg, 3 P. Wm. 419. By 8 and 9 W. 3. c. 20. s. 36. altering or rasing any endorsement on any bank bill or note of any sort is made felony, without clergy. Upon a bank note for 1007. the bank paid 901. and wrote upon the face of the note in red ink, "paid ninety pounds;" this writing the prisoner discharged by some liquid, probably lemon-juice: indictment thereon. The indictment stated that quoddam scriptum, anglice an endorsement, on the said note was duly made, specifying that 90%. was paid, and that the prisoner feloniously erased that endorsement: special verdict, finding inter al. that at the time of the act and till the 28th Nov. 1696, the only way used for endorsing bank notes, was by writing in black ink on the back side of the notes, but from the 28th Nov. 1696, it was by writing in front in red ink; special verdict. Many objections were taken; one that this was not an endorsement: after argument, the judges differed, but the majority held the conviction right. The prisoner was transported, not executed. (10) See Rex v. Treble, ante, p. 61.

place a piece of paper containing the new one, is a forgery. (10)

Adding a false addition to a fictitious name to delude a party to present a second time a bill he had before presented without success, under pretence that it was for want of that addition that the bill had been before dishonored, is a forgery. (11)

If there are two persons of the same name, but of different descriptions or additions, and one signs his name with the description or addition of the other, it is a forgery. (12)

Thus, if a bill be addressed to A. B. of London, merchant, and A. B. not of London, or not a merchant, accept it, the acceptance will be a forgery, if there be any A. B. of London, merchant; (12)

If there be no person of that name, description, and addition, not. (12)

So if a man of the same name as the payee or special endorsee of a bill or note endorse the bill or note, such endorsement is a forgery, because an endorsement by any other person than the right, is a false endorsement. (13)

But if the real payee or endorser of a bill or note endorse his own name thereon, without any false description

(11) Rex v. Francis, Mich. 1811. John Francis took a lodging in the name of Cooke; and in less than a month passed to his landlord's wife a draft he drew on Praeds and Co. for 157., and she gave him a bank note for it to that amount. It was returned, on the ground that no person of that name kept cash there: the prisoner said it was a mistake for want of his adding "jun." to his name; which he accordingly added, and the note was again taken to Praeds, who again refused payment; but before it was brought back the prisoner absconded. Chambre J. left it to the jury whether he did not assume the name of Cooke, or at least of Cooke, jun., with intent to defraud his landlord; and the jury thought he did, and he was convicted. On case, the conviction was held right.

(12) Rex v. Webb, Mich. 1819. A bill was addressed to Thomas Bowden, baize manufacturer, Rumford, and prisoner uttered it with an acceptance thereon made by a Thomas Bowden, who did not live at Rumford, and was not a baize manufacturer; and on indictment for uttering a forged acceptance, it appeared that there was no such baize manufacturer at Rumford; and on case, the majority of the judges held that the adopting a false description and addition, where a false name was not assumed, and where there was no person answering that description or addition, was not a forgery; and the prisoner was pardoned. (13) See Mead v. Young, ante, p. 76.

or addition, his assuming at the time he utters it to be a different person of the same name, but with a different description or addition, will not make his signature a forgery, nor his uttering a capital offence.

If the signatures to a bill or note are genuine, a false pretence by the person who utters it that he bears a character he does not, will not make him liable to a prosecution for forgery. (14)

So as to any other genuine signatures upon a bill or note, though they may be intended to be passed as and for the signatures of other persons, and are passed accordingly, yet if there be nothing upon the bill or note to apply them to those persons, they are not forgeries.

A signature in an assumed name is a forgery if the name was assumed to defraud in that particular instance. (15)

(14) Rex v. Hevey, Hil. 1782. The prisoner uttered a bill purporting to be payable to Bernard M'Carthy or order, and having the endorsement" B. M'Carthy," thereon, he was indicted for forging that endorsement, and uttering it knowing it to be forged: the jury found that there was such a man as B. M'Carthy, and that the endorsement was his handwriting, but that the prisoner passed himself off as that B. M'Carthy when he uttered the bill: and on case, the judges were unanimous that as the endorsement was not forged, the prisoner was not liable to be convicted.

(15) Rex v. Marshall, R. Michaelmas, 1804. Prisoner was paying away a bill payable to Ward, or order, and endorsed by Ward, and was desired to put his name upon it, and he wrote, Luke Marsden, when his real name was Thomas Marshall: he paid the bill to Harland for a horse Harland did not know him before, but supposed from his writing it that Luke Marsden was his name. Question for the judges whether

this was forgery, and they held it was.

Rex v. Whiley, Trinity, 1805. Whiley assumed the name of Milward 27th of December, and ordered goods of Thurston in that name : on 5th January following he gave Thurston a draft in the name of Milward, on Stephenson and Co., for ten guineas more than the amount of the goods, and Thurston gave him the difference. Thurston would have trusted the prisoner equally if he had used his own name: the draft was not paid, and prisoner was indicted as for a forgery. Thomson B. left it to the jury whether the prisoner assumed the name of Milward, when he ordered the goods and gave the note, with intent to defraud the prosecutor: they found that he did, and on case, the judges held the conviction right.

Rex v. Dunn, Michaelmas, 1765. Indictment that prisoner forged a note for payment of money, the tenor of which is as follows: "London, 27th July, 1765. I promise to pay Mr. Edward Hooper the sum of three pounds thirteen shillings and sixpence, or order, seven days after date, value received by me Mary Wallace, her mark," with intent to defraud

Or for a system of fraud within which that signature fell. (16)

And it makes no difference, though the bill or note would have been equally taken had the party used his own name. (17)

And though it was taken upon the credit of other names upon the bill or note, not upon the fictitious name. (18)

And though the party had passed for some time by that name. (19)

Edward Hooper: it appeared that her real name was Dunn; that she assumed the name of Wallace to represent herself as a seaman's widow; that she got three guineas and a half of Cooper, a navy agent, under that pretence, and that he wrote the note in question as security for it, and she put her mark to it; that he then asked her what name he should put to her mark, and she said " Mary Wallace;" upon which he wrote "Mary Wallace, her mark." The recorder doubted whether this addition after her signature could be deemed part of the note she forged; but Perrot B. and Aston J. held it was. Case on the ground that this was the prisoner's own note, and offered as her own; and nine judges against Aston J. held it a case within 2 G. 2. c. 25., and that the prisoner was properly convicted.

Rex v. Toft, Pasch. 1777. A bill of exchange for 150l. endorsed in blank, was stolen at Leicester; the same night the prisoner got cash for it at the Harboro' bank; but before it was cashed he was told it was the rule of the house that the person for whom they cashed a bill should endorse it, and he wrote the name John Williams; his real name was Toft. The jury found him guilty, and the judges were of opinion it was forgery.

Rex v. Peacock, Pasch. 1814. Prisoner went to Nuneham, in Gloucestershire, with intent to defraud by getting money upon bills he should draw: he went in the name of White, and in that name he drew a bill; he was indicted for forging this bill, and it was proved that his real name was Peacock; but it was not proved by what name he had passed for six years before he went to Nuneham: the jury found that he assumed that name, and went to Nuneham under it with a view to get money on bills he should draw in that name; and on case the judges held his conviction right; and that if he had used the name of White before he went to Nuneham, it was incumbent on him to prove it.

And see Rex v. Francis, ante, p. 385.

(16) See Rex v. Whiley, p. 386. and Rex v. Peacock, supra.

(17) See Rex v. Marshall, Rex v. Whiley, (ante, p. 386.) and Rex v. Francis, ante, p. 385.

Rex v. Shepherd, Michaelmas, 1781. The prisoner bought some things at a silversmith's, and uttered a forged check in payment: the silversmith took it as his draught, and he knew it. On conviction a doubt was entertained, as much as the silversmith gave credit to the prisoner, not to the draught, for he supposed it to be the prisoner's check; but on point saved the judges were unanimous the conviction was right.

(18) See Rex v. Hough, post, p. 391.

(19) See Rex v. Whiley, ante, p. 386.

But a signature in an assumed name will not be a forgery though the name were assumed for concealment or fraud, if it were not assumed with a view to that transaction, or for a system of which that is part.

Signing a mark in an assumed name, and suffering the assumed name to be ascribed to the mark, is forging the name. (20)

And it makes no difference, though the assumed name is not ascribed to the mark till after the mark is made, if it be ascribed to it in the prisoner's presence. (20)

Procuring a man to forge a bill or note is a capital offence.(21)

Procuring to utter, a common law felony only. (21)

But procuring to utter, if the person procured is ignorant of the forgery, and therefore free from crime, may make the procurer chargeable for the uttering, and subject him to an indictment capitally on that charge.

Shewing a man forged notes to raise a false idea in him of the party's substance, would probably not be an uttering within 2 G. 2.; it has been held not to be an uttering of the sham notes to which 13 G. c. 3. 79. applies. (22)

Nor would the leaving them sealed up, under color that he may take charge of them as being too valuable to be carried about. (22)

(20) See Rex v. Dunn, ante, p. 386.

(21) Rex v. Morris, Pasch. 1814. The prisoner was convicted of procuring his wife to utter a forged order for payment of money, and the judges held he could only be punished as for a common law felony; but they held that had he been found guilty of procuring her to forge it, the offence would have been capital.

(22) Rex v. Shuckard, Michaelmas, 1811. Prisoner had two sham notes for paying 550d., but the numbers were in white letters on a black ground, so that they had the appearance of bank notes for 5501. he shewed them to J. S. with intent to make him suppose he was a man of fortune, but they were folded up so that the numbers only were visible he then said he did not like to carry so much property about him, sealed them up in a cover, and delivered them to J. S. that he might take charge of them for the prisoner; the prisoner was afterwards suspected; J. S. opened the cover, discovered what the notes were, and the prisoner was indicted on 13 G. 3. c. 79. for uttering and publishing them; but on case, the judges held, that what he had done did not amount to an uttering or publishing within the statute, and that the conviction was wrong.