Giving time to the payee will not discharge the drawer, for indulgence to the payee cannot affect the drawer: he may nevertheless pay and enforce his remedies. (25)

Giving time to the acceptor will not discharge the drawer, if the acceptance was to accommodate the drawer, and the drawer, as between him and the acceptor, is the person to pay the bill. (26)

Discharging any of the endorsers will be a discharge of all (27) subsequent, though not of prior, endorsers.

An agreement between holder, drawer, and acceptor, that the acceptor shall pay, discharges the drawer, if the acceptor is to pay to a limited extent only;

As the bill without expenses. (28)

[(6) James v. Badger, 1 Johns. Cas. 131. See also Lynch v. Reynolds, post.

In an action against one of several joint promisers of a note, it was held to be no bar, that one of the others had paid his share or proportion of the money, and that in consideration thereof the payee had acquitted all the promisers. Ruggles v. Patten, 8 Mass. R. 480.]

(25) Claridge v. Dalton, 4 Maule, 226. Endorsee against drawer. Defence, that plaintiff's agent had given time to the payee: it did not appear that plaintiff had authorized him so to do: but on rule nisi for a nonsuit, and cause shewn, the court expressed a clear opinion, that if he had it would not affect the drawer or give him any ground of defence, the con and rule discharged.

(26) Collott v. Haigh, 3 Campb. 281. In an action against the drawer of a bill, it appeared that plaintiffs had given time for some weeks to the acceptor, but it appearing also that the acceptance was an accommodation acceptance, without value, Lord Ellenborough was clear that the drawer continued liable; for the reason why indulgence to the acceptor without the drawer's consent discharges the drawer is because it may affect his remedy over against the acceptor; and that reason does not apply where he is not entitled to a remedy over. Verdict for plaintiff.

(27) Smith v. Knox, 3 Esp. N. P. C. 46. Per Lord Eldon, "It is said that the holder may discharge any of the endorsers after taking them in execution, and yet have recourse to the others. I doubt of the law as stated so generally; I am disposed to be of opinion, that if the holder discharge a prior endorser, he would find it difficult to recover against a subsequent one."

So also in English v. Darley, 2 Bos. and Pull. 62. Lord Eldon, after adverting to the inaccuracy of the marginal abstract of the case of Hayling v. Mulhall, said, had the plaintiff first sued a prior endorser and discharged him from execution, it would have afforded a sufficient objection to an action against a subsequent endorser. See Hayling v. Mulhall, ante, p. 221, n. (15).

(28) De la Torre v. Barclay, 1 Stark. 7. The drawers of a bill having become bankrupts, an agreement was entered into between their assignees, the holder (plaintiff), and the acceptor, by which the ac

Taking the separate notes of one of several partners, at distant dates, as a collateral security, will not discharge the others, if the party insists at the time it shall not prejudice his claim upon the partnership, and he does not bind himself to wait till the notes are due; (29)

Though the partnership is dissolved before such notes are given: (29)

Otherwise, if he do bind himself to wait. (29)

Receiving dividends under a commission of bankruptcy is a satisfaction pro tanto only. (a)

[But where a person took up a note for the honor of an endorser, and afterwards assented to the discharge of the maker as an insolvent, signed his petition, and made affidavit of his debt as being money paid to the use of the maker; it was held that the endorser was discharged. (a)]

ceptor agreed to pay the amount of the bill, provided he were not called upon to pay more: the agreement recited the bill, the acceptance, and the probability it would be sent back for non-payment. Plaintiff having afterwards sued the drawers, Lord Ellenborough held this new agreement, which varied the condition of the acceptor, was a waiver of the right of action against defendants, who were represented by their assignees, and nonsuit.

(29) Bedford v. Deakin, Bickley, and Hickman, 2 Stark. 178. Defendants were drawers of a bill, which was dishonored; they dissolved partnership, and Hickman became bankrupt: Bickley afterwards proposed to give his own notes at four, eight, and twelve months as a security, and one Rushbury added his name as surety: plaintiff, who held the bill, agreed to take the notes, reserving to himself the security he held from the three, and he retained the bill. Interest was calculated on the notes till they would become due. In an action afterwards upon the bill against the three, it was urged, that the taking these notes discharged Deakin and Hickman: Lord Ellenborough said, he should have acceded to the objection had plaintiff agreed to postpone his remedy upon the bill, but as he had not, and on the contrary, had retained the bill, and expressly reserved to himself that security, he thought the taking the notes did not alter the original liability of the three defendants; and the plaintiff had a verdict.

[(a) D. Lynch, Jr., as agent of J. Lynch, sold goods to Reynolds, for which he took his note, endorsed it, and had it discounted. Reynolds failing, D. Lynch, Sen. took up the note for the honor of the endorser, and afterwards assented to the discharge of the maker, signed his petition, and made affidavit of his debt as being money paid to the use of the maker in taking up the note. After the discharge, J. Lynch paid D. Lynch, Sen. the amount of the note, and then sued Reynolds for money paid to his use. Per Curiam. If the holder of a bill or note, compounds with the acceptor or maker, without the assent of the other parties to it, he thereby discharges them from their liability. Taking a sum of money in part payment and accepting a dividend, would not

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After a partial satisfaction, the holder must (30) not in an action take a verdict for more than the sum remaining due ; if he do, the court will (31) either make him correct the verdict, and pay any expense the mistake may have occasioned, or grant a new trial.

Satisfaction of a bill or note, as to one of several partners, is a satisfaction as to all; and if a person is a partner in two

produce the same effect; for these acts are advantageous to the other parties. But if the holder does an act which takes away and destroys the remedy of the other parties against the maker, upon the very note, he forfeits his right to call upon the endorsers. Here the holder took upon himself, in effect, to discharge the maker of the note from his liability to pay the debt; and we have a right to intend, that the defendant could not have obtained a discharge under the insolvent act, unless D. Lynch, Sen. had united in his petition. D. Lynch, Sen. must have considered himself as having no further claim upon the other party, for he swears that the money was paid for the use of the defendant. We are of opinion that the payment made by the plaintiff to D. Lynch, Sen. was made in the plaintiff's own wrong, it could not have been enforced at law and therefore cannot be the basis of a suit against the defendant." Lynch v. Reynolds, 16 Johns. R. 41.]

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(30) Bacon v. Searles, 1 H. Bl. 88. Upon a bill for £95, 10s. the drawer paid the plaintiff £60, 10s. and on an action against the acceptor, he, the acceptor, paid the residue with the interest into court; the plaintiff however proceeded, and after a verdict for the defendant, with liberty to the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict for him, he contended that the acceptance having made the defendant liable for the whole, and a personal contract not being divisible, he was entitled to recover, and to stand as a trustee for the drawer, but the court held otherwise, and the verdict stood.

Pierson v. Dunlop, Cowp. 571. In an action against the acceptor upon a bill for £300, the plaintiff took a verdict for the whole sum: the defendant filed a bill against him in the Exchequer, and he admitted in his answer that he had previously received £180 from the drawer; this (among others) was urged as a ground for a new trial, and after cause shewn, Lord Mansfield said, "The verdict is certainly taken for £180 more than was due; there was no admission of this payment at the trial, which was very wrong, and has been the occasion of filing a bill in the Exchequer, therefore there ought to be a deduction of the money received, and a proportionable part of the interest, together with all the costs in the Exchequer;" and though the court discharged the rule for a new trial, they made the plaintiff remit the £180 with interest upon it from the time it was paid, and pay the costs of the bill and answer in the Exchequer.

However, in Johnson v. Kennion, 2 Wils. 262., the defendant drew a bill for £1000 in favor of Benson or order, and Benson endorsed it to the plaintiff; Benson paid the plaintiff £232, notwithstanding which he took a verdict against the defendant for the whole £1000, and upon a rule nisi for a new trial upon this ground, the court are represented to have held that he did right; but in Bacon v. Searles, supra, Wilson J. considered the report inaccurate, and the authority questionable. (31) See Pierson v. Dunlop, supra.

firms, satisfaction as to one firm is (32) so as to both. What would bar one firm will bar the other, and it will make no difference though one common partner is, in fact, ignorant of the circumstances which constitute the satisfaction.

Thus if one house receive funds from the drawer to take up a bill, and misapply them, no other house to which any member of the first house belongs can sue the drawer;

Or if he stands in the place of the drawer, the acceptor. (32)

In an action upon a bill or note, the plaintiff is in general entitled to recover the money payable thereby, with (33) interest, (e) and (34) all incidental expenses occasioned by non-acceptance or non-payment.

The interest is, in general, to be computed from the time the bill or note would regularly have been payable, and it is, in general, to be carried down to the time when final judgment may be signed. (35)

(32) Jacaud and Gordon v. French and others, 12 East's Rep. 317. Jacaud was in partnership with Blair in Ireland, and with Gordon here. Jacaud and Gordon had a bill drawn by Farrell and Co. on defendants, and Farrell and Co. had supplied Jacaud and Blair with funds to pay this bill: Blair misapplied those funds, and on an action on the bill by Jacaud and Gordon, the defence was, that the misapplication by Blair was a misapplication by Jacaud also, and that after being guilty in one house of disappointing payment by misapplying the payment-fund, he could not endeavor to enforce payment in another and on case the court was of that opinion, and the postea was awarded to the defendants.

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(33) D. Mar. 2d ed. 13. Blaney v. Bradley, Blackst. 761. By the court. "Interest is due on all bills of exchange and notes of hand payable at a day certain, or after demand, if payable on demand." See also Bunb. 129. 2 Term Rep. 58.

((a) In an action for three years' interest upon a note with interest payable annually, interest was allowed in Massachusetts on each year's interest from the time it became payable to the time of the judgment. Greenleaf v. Kellogg, 2 Mass. R. 568.

So in New Hampshire, in an action on a note with interest payable annually, though the court refused to allow compound interest, yet they allowed simple interest on the annual interest. Pierce v. Rowe, 1 N. Hamp. R. 179.

But in another case, in Massachusetts, in an action on a note with interest payable annually, the court refused to allow interest on the annual interest. Hastings v. Wiswall, 8 Mass. R. 455.]

(34) Vide Mar. 2d ed. 13. In Simmonds v. Parminter, ante p. 213. note (1), the plaintiff recovered interest, exchange, and re-exchange; and in Auriol v. Thomas, (post, p. 238. n. (45.) 10s. per pagoda in lieu of interest, exchange, and all other charges.

(35) Robinson v. Bland, Burr. 1077. In an action upon a bill of ex

Thus, upon a bill or note payable on presentment, interest (36) must be computed from the presentment.

But if a bill or note payable at a given time after date be for a specified sum, "bearing interest," interest shall be computed from the date. (37)

It has, indeed, been held (38), that if a party entitled to notice of the dishonor of a bill or note, offer to pay it within a reasonable time after the notice is given, he is not liable for interest from the time of the dishonor: but perhaps there might be risk in acting upon that decision.

change, and for money lent, a case was reserved, and the court was of opinion that the plaintiff could not recover upon the bill, but that he might for the money lent; but they took time to consider, with a view to settle the future practice, to what time the interest upon money lent should be computed, and afterwards determined that it should be computed to the time of giving judgment.

(36) Blaney v. Bradley, ante, p. 232. note (33). Cotton v. Horsemanden, Pract. Reg. 357. The court held, that in actions upon promissory notes, payable on demand, interest should be given from the time of the demand proved; but in this case, where it appeared upon the face of the note to be for money lent, interest should be given from the date of the note. 9 Mod. 138. By the court, interest upon a bill of exchange commences from demand made.

(37) Kennerly v. Nash, 1 Stark. 452. Action on bill at four months after date for £25, 4s. bearing interest; and per Lord Ellenborough, these words entitle plaintiff to interest from the date of the bill; without them, he would have been entitled to it from the time it became due. Hopper v. Richmond, 1 Stark. 507. By the terms of a note defendant undertook to pay legal interest on demand: Lord Ellenborough held, that must mean from the date of the note.

(38) Walker v. Barnes, 5 Taunt. 240. A bill for £10, due 11th June, was presented for payment on that day, and dishonored. On the 12th notice was sent by letter to the drawer, and early on the 13th he tendered the £10; the £10 was not accepted, and on an action against the drawer, it was urged for the plaintiff, that the tender was insufficient, for that defendant ought to have tendered the interest from the 11th to the 13th; but on the point being reserved, the court held it sufficient, if the drawer, within a reasonable time after the notice, tendered the principal without the interest; and judgment was given for the defendant.

Note, the interest would have been under three farthings,—one fifteenth part of ten pence. But quære, whether non-payment by the drawee was not a breach of the drawer's contract, and whether the holder was not entitled to interest for not receiving on the 11th what defendant undertook he should receive on that day. It may be observed, however, in support of this decision, that the constant form in assumpsit against a drawer or endorser, makes him promise only for the amount of the money mentioned in the bill. It is silent as to interest. It is, however, silent also as to expenses.