Therefore in the case of a foreign bill it (103) is sufficient to send it by the first regular ship bound for the place to which it is to be sent ; and (103) it is no objection, that if sent by a ship bound elsewhere, it would by accident have arrived sooner, though the holder wrote other letters by that ship to the place to which the notice was to be sent. (a)

be notified usually resorts for his letters, is sufficient, although he resides in a different town in which there is also a post-office. Reid v Payne, 16 Johns. R. 218

Where the mail to the place of residence of the party to be notified, is sometimes sent by one route, and sometimes by another, a notice sent by either route is sufficient.

The endorser of a note owned by the Bank of Utica, payable at a bank in the city of New York, resided at Peterborough. Notice of non-payment to Smith was enclosed at New York to the cashier of the Utica Bank, who took it from the post-office in Utica, and put it into the post-office in Utica again the same day directed to the endorser at Peterborough, in season to go by the same mail as if it had been originally directed to Peterborough and not taken out of the office at Utica, There is another mail route to Peterborough, and had the letter gone by that route, it would probably have reached Peterborough a day or two sooner than it did. The court held the notice sufficient. Spencer C. J. delivered the opinion of the court. "I consider the mode adopted in this case, in the same light as if the notary had sent a notice directed to the defendant via Utica; in which case I can conceive no possible objection to the notice, for it is expressly in proof, that it was as usual to send letters to the defendant by the way of Utica, as by the other route. The law does not exact of the holder of a note or bill that he shall give the earliest possible notice of its dishonor. It requires of him only reasonable diligence." Woodworth J. dissented. Bank of Utica v. Smith, 18 Johns. R. 230.

The Hartford Bank held a note payable at the Middletown Bank. After a presentment for payment by a notary and refusal, he enclosed a notice directed to the endorser without any place of residence, in a letter to the cashier of the Hartford Bank requesting him to complete the dir ction. The cashier received the letter from the post-office at Hartford, and the endorser residing at that place returned the notice to the post-office after adding the word "Hartford." The notice was held to be sufficient to charge the endorser. Hartford Bank v. Stedman, 3 Conn. R. 89.]

(103) Muilman v. D'Eguino, ante, p. 138, note (31). To debt on bond conditioned to pay certain bills drawn on India at sixty days' sight, in case they should be returned protested; defendant pleaded that he had not notice so soon as he should have had. It appeared that notice was sent by the first English ships, but that by the accidental conveyance of a foreign ship not bound for England, and by which the holder wrote to England upon other matters, notice might have been sent sooner, and would have arrived sooner; but Eyre C. J. told the jury, that notice by the first regular ships bound for England was sufficient, and that it was not necessary to send notice by the chance conveyance of a foreign ship. The jury found for the plaintiff, and the court was satisfied with the verdict, and refused a new trial.

[(a) But where a bill drawn in the United States upon London was

And it is not essential the notice should be sent by the post where there is one; sending to an agent by a private conveyance, that he may give the notice, will be sufficient, if the agent give the notice, or take due steps for the purpose, without delay. (104)

And it will be of no consequence though the notice by the agent is not quite so early as notice by the post would have been. (104)

Where it is not known where a party lives, due diligence must in general be used to find out. (105) (106)

And where such diligence is unsuccessful, it will excuse want of notice. (105)

protested in London for non-payment June 3d. and a notice with the protest forwarded June 19th, by which delay it appeared that the opportunity of a packet was lost: the court held that this was an inexcusable delay unless satisfactorily accounted for. Lenox v. Leverett, 10 Mass. R. 1.]

(104) See Bancroft v. Hall, ante, p. 177.

(105) Bateman v. Joseph, 12 East's Rep. 433. In an action by an endorsee against the payee and first endorser of a bill, it appeared that the plaintiff received notice of its dishonor on the 30th of September, in time to have given notice to the defendant on that day; he gave no notice however until the 4th of October; to excuse which, his clerk proved that the plaintiff did not know the defendant's residence until that day. Lord Ellenborough left it to the jury, whether the plaintiff had used due diligence to find the defendant's residence. They found for the plaintiff; and on motion for a new trial, the court refused the rule, saying, whether due notice had been given was a question of law, but whether due diligence had been used to discover the place of residence of a person entitled to notice, was a question of fact.

[Action against the drawers of a bill dated at New York, and drawn upon a house in that place. The defendants resided in Petersburg (Va.) The clerk of the notary who protested the bill made diligent inquiry for the drawers' place of residence at the banks and elsewhere, and being informed that they resided in Norfolk, (Va.) he sent a notice by post directed to them at that place, and another addressed to them at New York. It was held, that as it did not appear that the holder knew of their residence, he had used due diligence, and that the drawers were chargeable. Chapman v. Lipscombe, 1 Johns. R. 294.

See also Reid v. Payne, 16 Johns. R. 218.

Where the drawer of a foreign bill had been absent from the State for several years, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts thought that evidence of notice having been left at his former place of residence, would support an averment of due diligence in the declaration. Blakely v. Grant, 6 Mass. R. 386. But it does not appear from the case as reported, why a notice might not have been sent to the drawer, or that he had not some known domicil or place of business in the foreign country where he drew the bill.]

But merely inquiring at the house where a bill is payable, is not due diligence for finding out an endorser. (106)

Inquiry should be made of some of the other parties to the bill or note, and of persons of the same name. (106)

Calling on the last endorser, and last but one, the day after the bill becomes due, to know where the drawer lives, and on his not being in the way calling again the next

(106) Beveridge v. Burgis, 3 Campb. 262. In an action by the endorsee of a bill against the endorser, the excuse for not giving notice to defendant was, that plaintiff did not know his residence, but the only inquiry he proved was at the house where the bill was made payable. Sed per Lord Ellenborough, how could he expect information there? he might have inquired of other parties to the bill, or of persons of the same name in the directory: ignorance may excuse notice, but reasonable diligence must be used to obtain knowledge. Nonsuit.

[In a case in which the residence of the drawer of a bill was in a different place from that in which the bill was drawn, and no notice was given to the drawer of the dishonor of the bill, and no inquiry made to ascertain his residence, it was held that he was discharged.

In this case the counsel for the plaintiff contended that the place where the bill is drawn must be taken to be the residence of the drawer, and not being there when the bill was dishonored, notice was dispensed with. But Tilghman C. J. said he could find no such principle. Fisher v. Evans, 5 Binn. 541.

A different opinion seems to be expressed in a case in South Carolina. Action against the endorser of a note dated at Charleston. A notice to the endorser was left at a house where he usually lodged when in town, he then being absent. The case however does not state whether Charleston was his usual residence or not. Bay J. delivered the opinion of the court. "Charleston, being the place where the note was drawn and endorsed, shall be presumed to be the residence of both (maker and endorser) for every mercantile purpose; and the use of due diligence; to find out either of them there will answer the demands of the law upon this subject." Moodie v. Morrall, 1 S. Car. R. 307.

Action against the drawer of a bill drawn at Alexandria, D. C. on New York. The bill being protested for non-payment, two letters containing notice were immediately after put into the post-office at New York, one directed to the drawer at New York, and the other to him at Alexandria; and a third notice for him was left at the counting-house of the acceptors. It did not appear that any inquiries were made as to the drawer's place of residence. He in fact resided at Fairfield in Connecticut, and this was publicly known, and particularly to one of the acceptors of the bill. It was held that the notice given was not sufficient; and that the drawer was discharged, because due diligence had not been used to ascertain his place of residence. Barnwell v. Mitchell, 3 Conn. R. 101.

Action against the endorser of a promissory note payable at the Bank of Utica. When the note fell due, notice of its non-payment was given by a letter put into the post-office, directed to the defendant at Canandaigua. The defendant in fact lived at Ovid, in the county of Seneca, and had resided there for ten years previous. It was proved

day, and then giving the drawer notice, may be sufficient. (107) (a)

But if a party when he passes a bill or note declines saying where he lives, and undertakes to call upon the acceptor to see if the bill is paid, he cannot complain of want of notice. (108)

Notice to one of several partners, is notice to all: and when a bill has been drawn by a firm upon one of the partners, and by him accepted and dishonored, it is (109) unnecessary to give notice of such dishonor to the firm; for this must necessarily be known to one of them, and the knowledge of one is the knowledge of all.

that the book-keeper who gave the notice was informed by the cashier and some of the directors of the bank, that the defendant resided at Canandaigua. Spencer J. delivered the opinion of the court. "The notice is bad. With ordinary diligence the place of his abode might have been ascertained; and it must be the plaintiff's loss, not the defendant's, that the notice was not given." Judgment for defendant, Bank of Utica v. De Mott, 13 Johns. R. 432.]

(107) Browning v. Kinnier, Gow. 81. Defendant endorsed to Newman, Newman to Maberly, Maberly to Chesterman, and Chesterman to plaintiff; the bill became due 23d November; on the 24th plaintiff applied to Chesterman to know where defendant lived; Chesterman could not tell, and referred him to Maberly; he called on Maberly at 4 P. M., but Maberly not being at home, he did not repeat his call till the next morning, and then Maberly gave him the information, and he gave defendant notice. Dallas C. J. thought reasonable diligence had been used, but he left the question to the jury, who were of the same opinion. [(a) So where the traveller of a house receives a bill or note, he is not bound when he passes it to his principals to inform them of the places of residence of the parties to the instrument; and if the bill is dishonored, it is sufficient for the holders to send and obtain the requisite information as soon as possible from their traveller, and afterwards to notify the parties they intend to charge, even if a delay of several days takes place in obtaining this information. Baldwin v. Richardson, 2 Dow. & Ryl. 285; 1 Barn. & Cres. 245.]

(108) Phipson v. Kneller, 4 Campb. 285. 1 Stark. 116. Plaintiff, the holder of a bill, asked defendant, the drawer, where he lived; he said, he had no regular residence, but lived amongst his friends, and he would call himself upon the acceptor, and see if the bill was paid. Lord Ellenborough held that this dispensed with all notice, and threw it upon defendant to inquire; and plaintiff had a verdict.

(109) See Porthouse v. Parker and another, post, in which Lord Ellenborough held that the plaintiff was not bound to prove that the defendants had received express notice of the dishonor of the bill, assigning the reason mentioned in the text.

[But where a note was made payable to, and endorsed by, two persons not partners, it was held that the written acknowledgement of one of

[So where the drawer of a bill is a partner in the house on which it is drawn, he is chargeable without any notice being given him of the dishonor of the bill. (a) (b)]

If the holder gives due notice of the bill's dishonor, but intimates that he expects it will be paid in a given time, and that he will keep it that time without putting more expense upon it unless the person written to objects, it will be no answer to an action afterwards against the person written to, that he had no notice upon the expiration of the extended time of non-payment. (110)

The law does not require a second notice when the extended time expires. (110)

But if the party written to, sustain any damage from not having such notice, he may perhaps be entitled to bring an action on that account. (110)

them that he had received due notice, was not sufficient to charge them both. Shepard v. Hawley, 1 Conn. R. 368.

See also Dwight v. Scovil, ante, p. 205.

Where the selectmen of a town drew an order upon the treasurer of the town, the court held that a presentment was necessary before an action could he brought against the town, but seemed to think that in case of presentment and non-payment, it would not be necessary to give notice to the selectmen. Varner v. Noble, 2 Greenleaf, 121.]

[(a) In an action against J. Jackson, as drawer of a bill, on which due notice of non-acceptance had not been given, it was proved that the drawer was a partner in the firm of Jackson and Brothers, the drawees. It was held that he was chargeable without any notice. Spencer C. J. delivered the opinion of the court. "In the absence of all other proof, the bill must be considered as drawn by one partner of the firm on the firm itself, in relation to the partnership business; and if so, then a knowledge of one of the firm of the dishonor of the bill, is, in point of law, knowledge by the whole firm. D. Jackson, the partner in London, had notice that the bill was refused acceptance, for he was the person who had refused. Although J. Jackson is alone sued on the bill, yet it must be deemed a partnership transaction; and a knowledge by one of the firm of the dishonor of the bill, is all that ought to be required." Gowan v. Jackson, 20 Johns. R. 176.]

[(b) Where the second of a set of exchange was accepted and protested for non-payment; and the protest together with the first of the set was sent back and presented to an endorser, and payment requested of him, it was held that the notice was sufficient. Kenworthy v. Hopkins, 1 Johns Cas. 107.]

(110) Foster v. Jurdison, 16 East. 105. Endorsee against drawer. When payment was refused, plaintiffs apprised defendants thereof, but added, they had reason to believe a friend would advance the money for the acceptor in a few days, that they would therefore hold it till the end of the week without putting more expense upon it, unless they heard from defendant to the contrary; the bill was not paid, but no further