[And where a bill or note is sent by the holder to his agent for him to obtain payment, and he gives seasonable notice to his principal of its dishonor, he does all that he is required to do; and a notice from the principal will be sufficient to charge the prior parties to the bill or note, though a notice sent directly by the agent would have reached them much sooner. (a)]

refused a rule. Lord Alvanley, however, said, that if a bill be returned to a banker, he is bound to give notice to his principal that very day, if he can do so by using ordinary diligence.

Scott v. Lifford, 9 East's Rep. 347. A bill due on the 4th of June, was presented on that day, by Down and Co. the plaintiff's bankers, who lived in London; the plaintiff lived in London also, and they gave him notice on the 5th. The defendant (the drawer) lived at Shadwell; and on the 6th the plaintiff sent notice to him by the twopenny post. Lord Ellenborough left it to the jury, whether the plaintiff had communicated the notice in reasonable time; and they thought he had. And on a motion for a new trial, Lord Ellenborough said, he could not say that the plaintiff, omissis omnibus aliis negotiis, was bound to post off immediately with notice; it was sufficient if reasonable diligence had been used. The court thought the verdict right, and refused a rule.

Langdale v. Trimmer, 15 East. 291. Plaintiff paid a note into Drummonds, his bankers; it became due 25th February, was presented and dishonored; they presented it again the 26th, a little before five, and payment being again refused, they gave notice directly to plaintiff, who lived in Holborn; by the next day's post, plaintiff gave notice to defendant, who lived at Farnham. Lord Ellenborough thought both notices in time, and after verdict for plaintiff, and motion for a new trial, the court agreed with him; they thought the banker was to be considered as a distinct holder, not as identified with his customer, and that the banker had till the next day to give notice to his customer, and the customer till the day following; and the rule was refused.

[(a) Noble, the defendant, master of an American ship, being at Madras and bound to Portsmouth in New Hampshire, the place of his residence, endorsed to the plaintiffs, residents at Madras, a bill of exchange drawn in New South Wales, and payable in London. They sent it to their agents in London to obtain payment of the drawees. The bill was duly protested for non-acceptance and non-payment, and within a reasonable time returned with the protests to the plaintiffs at Madras. The plaintiffs sent seasonable notice to Noble at Portsmouth. But their agents in London might have sent him notice much earlier. The court held that the notice was sufficient to charge Noble as endorser. Parsons C. J. giving the opinion of the court, said, " a person appointed a factor to cause a bill to be presented, is entrusted with no other powers, and it is his duty to notify his principal. The factor may not know to which of the prior parties to the bill the principal intends to resort, and if he does, he may not know their domicils, as he has no interest in the bill, or privity with the parties." He said that the principal was not bound to give this information to his factor. "There is no difference between the cases of a bill sent to a factor to procure acceptance, and of a bill remitted to a correspondent in payment, if the bill be dishonored." Colt v. Noble, 5 Mass. R. 167.

It is no excuse for not giving notice the next day after a party receives one, that he received his notice earlier than the preceding parties were bound to give it; and that he gave notice within what would have been proper time if each preceding party had taken all the time the law allowed him. The time is to be calculated according to the period when the party in fact received his notice. (99) (a)

Nor is it any excuse that there are several intervening parties between him who gives the notice and defendant to whom it is given; and that if the notice had been passed through those intervening parties, and each had taken the time the law allows, the defendant would not have had the notice sooner. (99) (b)

So in a case in New York the court held that the duty of an agent who had received a bill to procure payment, "extended no farther than to give notice to his principal, of the non-acceptance and non-payment, and to transmit the reqnisite protests, in order that the holder might give notice" to the prior parties. Tunno v. Lague, 2 Johns. Cas. 1.] (99) Turner v. Leech, 4 Barnew. 451. Plaintiff was the eleventh endorser to a bill, defendant the eighth; plaintiff endorsed it to Bennett, Bennett to Fletcher, Fletcher to Hordem, and Hordem to Sansom and Co.; it was dishonored Saturday, 30th August, and on Monday, 1st September, Sansom gave notice to Hordem; this reached Hordem the 2d, and the same day he gave notice to Fletcher; Fletcher sent notice to Bennett on the 3d, and this notice reached Bennett on the 4th; he did nothing till the 8th, and then he gave notice to plaintiff, who paid the bill. Plaintiff sued defendant, and on case plaintiff urged that Bennett's laches had not discharged defendant, because defendant had notice as soon as he would, had each party between him and Sansom taken the time the law allowed them; but the court was clear that defendant was discharged, and judgment for defendant.

[It was held in a case in New York, where an agent had received a bill in order to procure payment, that if the agent himself undertook to give notice to the drawer, it would be sufficient, if it was given as soon as it could have been received from the holder; although the notice would not have been sufficiently early, if the agent had been the proprietor of the bill. Tunno v. Lague, 2 Johns. Cas. 1.]

[(a) In a case in New York it was held that the prevalence of a malignant fever which put a stop to all business at the place of residence of the drawer of a bill, was a sufficient excuse for not giving notice to him until November of a protest for non-payment made in September. Tunno v. Lague, 2 Johns. Cas. 1. But Van Ness J. in a subsequent nisi prius case, ruled that the prevalence of an epidemic was no excuse for not giving notice during its continuance. Roosevelt v. Woodhull, Anth. N. P. 35.]

[(b) In case of a note payable on demand, it seems that although the holder is not required to make an immediate demand on the maker, yet when he has made a demand and payment is refused, immediate notice must be given to an endorser in order to charge him. See Shaw v. Griffith, 7 Mass. R. 494.]

[It is not necessary that notice to an endorser should be given within the hours of business. (a)]

Sending a verbal notice to a merchant's counting-house (100) is sufficient; and if no person be there in the ordinary hours of business, it is (100) not necessary to leave or send a written one.

Sending a verbal notice to a man's place of business, at a time when he or some of his people might reasonably be expected there, is sufficient; it is not necessary to leave or send a written notice, or to send to the house where he lives. (101) (b)

[(a) Jameson v. Swinton, 2 Taunt. 224. In an action on a bill by the plaintiff, who was the endorsee of Elsham, against an endorser, the defence was, that due notice of the dishonor, which took place on the 10th of July, had not been given. Elsham (the last endorser) who lived at Back-hill, Holborn, received notice on the 10th at four o'clock in the afternoon, and he gave notice on the 11th, between eight and nine o'clock at night, to the defendant, who lived at Islington, Lawrence J. held, that this was sufficient to entitle Elsham to recover from the defendant, and therefore sufficient to enable the plaintiff, who received the bill from Elsham, to recover. Verdict for the plaintiff; and on motion to set it aside, it was urged, that the notice should have been given within the hours of business, but the court held the notice sufficient: Rule refused.]

(100) Goldsmith and al. v. Bland and al. at Guildhall, cor. Lord Eldon, 1 March, 1800. The plaintiffs sued the defendants as endorsers of two foreign bills, and to prove notice the plaintiffs shewed that they sent a clerk to the defendants' counting-house, near the exchange, between four and five o'clock in the afternoon; nobody was in the counting-house; the clerk saw a servant girl at the house, who said, that nobody was in the way, and he returned, having left no message with her. Lord Eldon told the jury, that if they thought the defendants ought to have had somebody in the counting-house at the time, he was of opinion, that the plaintiffs had done all that was necessary by sending their clerk; that the notice was in law sufficient, if the time was regular, whether the defendants were solvent at the time or not. The jury thought that the defendants ought to have had somebody in the counting-house at the time, and that the plaintiffs had done all that was necessary. Verdict for the plaintiffs for 16337.

(101) Cross v. Smith, 1 Maule, 545, Smith and Co. had a bill for 31764. drawn by Fea and Co. accepted by Tuke, payable at Smith, Payne, and Smith's, due 12th of April, 1810; this bill they remitted to Smith, Payne, and Smith, their correspondents. Tuke banked with Smith and Co.; 6th of April Tuke directed Smith and Co. to write to Smith, Payne, and Smith, not to pay this bill; they did so, and when the bill was due it was protested, and sent to Smith and Co. at Hull. Fea and Co. had a counting-house at Hull, where they were merchants, and one lived within a mile, and the other within ten of Hull. The morning after Smith and Co. received the bill, their clerk went to give notice, and called at the counting-house of Fea and Co. about half after

But telling a man's attorney that a bill is dishonored, is no notice, unless the attorney has more than usual powers. (101) (b)

Though the endorser of a bill receive directions from the acceptor, to send word to the house at which it is payable to forbid its payment, and he does so, he is not bound to give any notice of those directions to any of the parties to the bill. (101)

And he is entitled to act as though he had received no such directions. (101)

ten; he found the outward door open, the inner one locked; he knocked so that he must have been heard had any one been there; waited two or three minutes and went away; on his return he saw Fea and Co.'s attorney, and told him. The next morning he went again at the same hour, but with no better success. No written notice was left, nor was any notice sent to the residence of any of the partners. Fea and Co. became bankrupts, and their assignces insisted that Smith and Co. had made this bill their own, and were not entitled to carry it to the debit of Fea and Co.; first, because they ought to have given notice of the directions they received from Tuke, to prevent payment by Smith, Payne, and Smith; and secondly, because calling at the counting-house without leaving a written notice, and without sending one to the resi dence of some one of the partners, was not sufficient notice of the bill's dishonor. On case, and time to consider, the court thought the notice to the attorney nothing, because he was not the proper person to receive such a notice; but they held, that Smith and Co. were not bound to give notice of the directions they had received, and that it would have been a breach of confidence in them to have done so; and they held, that going to the counting-house at a time it should have been open, was sufficient; and that it was not necessary to leave a written notice, or to send to the residence of any of the parties; postea to defendants.

Bancroft v. Hall, Holt, 476. Endorsee of bill against drawer. Plaintiff received notice of the bill's dishonor at Manchester, 24th of May; the same day he sent a letter by a private hand to his agent at Liverpool, to give defendant notice; the agent called at defendant's countinghouse about six or seven, P. M., but the counting-house was shut up, and defendant did not receive notice till the morning of the 27th, Monday. Two points were ruled, that sending by a private hand to an agent to give notice was sufficient; secondly, that it was sufficient for the agent to take the ordinary mode to give notice; the ordinary time of shutting was eight or nine.

[(a) Where the endorser of a note shut up his house in town soon after the note was made, and before it became due, and retired to his house in the country, intending however only a temporary residence in the country; it was held that a notice left at his house in town, being put into the keyhole, was sufficient to charge him. Stewart v. Eden, 2 Cain. R. 121.]

[(b) Where the holder of a note payable on demand, gave it to an endorser for him to collect the money of the maker, this was held not

And it is the same if the holder of the bill receive those directions.

Sending (102) notice by the post is sufficient though it is not received; and where there is no post, it is sufficient to send by the ordinary mode of conveyance. (a)

to be sufficient notice to charge the endorser. Agan v. M'Manus, 11 Johns. R. 180.]

(102) Saunderson v. Judge, ante, p. 128. note (13). The holder of a note wrote to the defendant, who was one of the endorsers, to say it was dishonored, and put the letter in the post, but there was no evidence that it ever reached the defendant, and the court held, that sending the letter by the post was quite sufficient. S. P. Kufh v. Weston, 3 Esp. N. P. C. 54. See also Scott v. Lifford, 9 East's Rep. 347. and 1 Campb. N. P. C. 246. In this case the parties lived in London and its vicinity, within reach of the twopenny post; and notice of the dishonor of a bill was sent by that conveyance, and the court of king's bench held that it was sufficient. The notice however must appear to have been put in in due time. Hilton v. Fairclough, 2 Campb. 633.

[So it has been held that putting a notice into the postoffice is conclusive evidence of notice; even if the party to whom it is directed can prove that he never received it. Shed v. Brett, 1 Pick. 401. See also Munn v. Baldwin, 6 Mass. R. 316.]

[(a) The sufficiency of a notice sent by the mail is well established in the United States, where the person to be charged resides in a different town or place from that in which the presentment is made. Munn v. Baldwin, 6 Mass. R. 316; Lincoln and Kennebec Bank v. Hammatt, 9 Mass. R. 159; Bussard v. Levering, 6 Wheat. R. 102; Linderberger v. Beall, 6 Wheat. R. 104; Shepard v. Hall, 1 Conn. R. 329.

But where he resides in the same place, a notice to him put into the post-office is not sufficient; but the notice to him must be personal, or left at his residence or place of business. Ireland v. Kip, 10 Johns. R. 501, and S. C. 11 Johns. R. 231; Smedes v. Utica Bank, 20 Johns. R. 372; Shepard v. Hall, 1 Conn. R. 329.

In an action against the endorser of a note, who resided within the limits of the city of New York, at Kip's Bay about three and a half miles from the post-office, a place to which the letter carriers do not carry letters, it was held that a notice for him put into the post-office was not sufficient. Ireland v. Kip, 10 Johns. R. 501.

In a new trial of the same case, the plaintiff offered to prove besides the putting the notice in the post-office that the defendant had given directions to the letter carriers of the post-office, to leave all letters that came to the post office for him at a broker's in Frankfort street in the city of New York, that the letter carriers called at the post-office three or four times every day, and took out and delivered all letters left there, and that the defendant usually called or sent every day for his letters to the house in Frankfort street. It was held this evidence was not sufficient to maintain the action, without proof that the notice was actually delivered. Ireland v. Kip, 11 Johns. R. 231.

Where there is no post-office in the town in which the party resides, perhaps a notice sent to the nearest post town would be sufficient. Shed v. Brett, 1 Pick. 401; Ireland v. Kip, 11 Johns. R. 231.

And a notice sent directed to the post-office, to which the person to