Upon a bill or note payable on demand or at sight, and given for cash by a person who makes the profit by the money on such bills or notes a source of his livelihood, it is difficult to say what length of time such person shall be entitled to consider unreasonable; but upon such bills or notes given by way of payment, or paid into a banker's, any time beyond what the common course of business warrants, (38) is.

Upon a bill or note of this kind given by way of payment, the course of business seemed formerly to allow the party to keep it, if it was payable in the place where it was given, until the (39) morning of the next day of business after its

See also Field v. Nickerson, ante, p. 141; and Haddock v. Murray, 1 N. Hamp. R. 140; and Whitwell v. Johnson, 17 Mass. R. 453.

In another case in New York, Spencer J. said, "What is reasonable notice, is a mixed question of law and fact; but when the facts are ascertained it becomes purely a question of law." Bryden v. Bryden, 11 Johns. R. 187.

But in Pennsylvania, what is reasonable notice appears to have been considered a question of fact, on which the jury were to decide. Robertson v. Vogle, 1 Dall. R. 252; Steinmitz v. Currie, 1 Dall. R. 234 and 269; Bank of North America v. Pettit, 4 Dall. R. 127; Bank of North America v. M'Knight, 2 Dall. R. 158; Warder v. Bell, 1 Yeates, 531; Gurly v. Gettysburg Bank, 7 Serg. & Raw. 324.]

(37) See Fry v. Hill, ante, p. 138, note (28). and Goupy v. Harden, ante, p. 139.

(38) See Turner v. Mead, infra, note (39).

(39) Ward v. Evans, Ld. Raym. 928. Á banker's note was paid to the plaintiff's servant at noon, and presented for payment the next morning, at which time the banker stopped payment. On a case reserved, the court held it was presented in time; and judgment was given for the plaintiff.

Moor v. Warren, Str. 415. The defendant gave the plaintiff a banker's note at two o'clock in the afternoon, and he tendered it for payment the next morning at nine: the banker stopped a quarter of an hour before; and Pratt C. J. told the jury the loss should fall on the defendant, there being no laches in the plaintiff, who had demanded the money as soon as was usual in the course of dealing, and that keeping the note till next morning, could not be construed giving a new credit to the banker; and the jury found for the plaintiff. In Holmes v. Barry, Str. 415. the circumstances were the same; and King C. J. of the Common Pleas, gave a similar direction, and the jury found accordingly.

Fletcher v. Sandys, Str. 1248. A banker's note was paid to the plaintiff after dinner, and he sent it for payment the next morning, but the banker had stopped payment; and Lee C. J. ruled that there were no laches in the plaintiff, and that in all these cases there must be a reasonable time allowed, consistent with the nature of circulating paper. Turner and others v. Mead, Str. 416. The defendants paid the Sword Blade Company (the plaintiffs) two banker's notes at three

receipt, and till the next post, if payable elsewhere; but (40) not longer.

Thus where a note of this kind, payable in London, was given there in the morning, a presentment the next morning

o'clock in the afternoon; and the next morning their servant left them at the banker's in order to call for the money in the evening, it then being the custom with the plaintiffs and the bank to send out their notes in the morning and to call for the money in the afternoon. The plaintiffs' servant called for the money between four and five in the afternoon, and the banker had just stopped payment; and because the plaintiffs had done nothing more than was usual in leaving the notes in the morning without taking the money, Pratt C. J. directed the jury to find for them, which they did.

Hoar v. Da Costa, Str. 910. The defendant paid the plaintiff a banker's note at twelve: he put it into the bank at one, and at ten the next morning the runner from the bank carried it with other notes, and left them, as was then usual, to call again for the money: he called at eleven, and was told the banker's servant was gone to the bank: he called again at two, when the banker said he was going to stop, and refused payment; but he paid small notes till four o'clock. The defendant gave notice to the plaintiff the next morning: the question was, whether this note was payment to the plaintiff. It was insisted for the defendant, that if the note had been tendered by itself it would have been paid; and for the plaintiff, that if there had been no demand there would have been no laches, being within a day after the receipt. Raymond C. J. said there was no standing rule, and left it to the jury, who found for the plaintiff.

(40) Manwaring v. Harrison, Str. 508. On Saturday the 17th of September, about two o'clock, Harrison gave Manwaring a banker's note, dated the 5th of September, and payable to Harrison or order on demand; Manwaring paid it away the same afternoon to J. S., and he presented it for payment on the Tuesday morning as soon as the shop was open but the banker stopped payment at that time. Manwaring paid the money to J. S., and brought this action to recover it from Harrison. Pratt C. J. left it to the jury, whether there had been any neglect; and observed, that as Harrison had kept it eleven days, he probably would not have demanded payment sooner than J. S. did. The jury wished to leave it to the court whether there had been a reasonable time: but the Chief Justice told them they were the judges of that; upon which they found for the defendant, and gave it as their opinion, that a person who did not demand a banker's note in two days, took the credit on himself.

East India Company v. Chitty, Str. 1175. At half past eleven in the morning of the 18th of January, the defendant paid the East India Company's cashier a banker's note, and they did not send it for payment till the next day at two, at which time the banker stopped payment. The question was, who should bear the loss? and upon examining the merchants, it was held, that the company had made it their own by not sending it out the afternoon they received it, or at farthest the next morning; and the jury found accordingly for the defendant.

was held (41) sufficiently early; a presentment at two the next afternoon too (42) late.

In (43) a later modern case, where a similar note was given in London at one, and not presented till the next morning, two juries held the delay unreasonable, but it was against the opinion of the court.

But in a very recent case, where such a note payable in London was given in the country, it was held that the person receiving it was not bound to send it to London till the following day. (44)

And that the person receiving it in London was not bound to present it till the next day. (44)

A bill or note of this kind, given by way of payment to a banker, must (45) be presented by him as soon as if it had been paid into his hands by a customer.

(41) Ward v. Evans, Moore v. Warren, Holmes v. Barry, Fletcher v. Sandys, ante, p. 144. note (39).

(42) East India Company v. Chitty, supra.

(43) Appleton v. Sweetapple, B. R. M. 23 Geo. 3. A bill payable in London on demand was given to the plaintiff in London at one o'clock in the afternoon, and he did not present it till the next morning; the question was, whether he presented it in time? Lord Mansfield left the point to the jury, who found for the defendant; but the court granted a new trial, because the question was a matter of law upon which the judge should have decided; the jury found again for the defendant, but against the judge's direction; a second new trial was granted, and the jury again found for the defendant; and then the court refused to interfere.

(44) Williams v. Smith, Pasch. 1819, 2 Barnew. and Ald. 496. At ten o'clock on Friday morning, defendant paid plaintiff at Wantage, (eighteen miles from Newbury,) 450l. in Newbury bank notes, payable at Newbury or London: plaintiff sent them to the Wantage bank the same day, to remit to London, but they declined on account of the risk, and halves of them were sent to London by Saturday's coach, and the other halves by Sunday's post: they were presented for payment on the Tuesday, but no Newbury notes were paid in London after the Monday, nor at Newbury after the Saturday. Newbury is a two-days' post from Wantage, and the post for London leaves Wantage at half after five in the evening; on case, it was urged for defendant, that plaintiff should have sent the notes to London by the Friday's post, or if not that they should have been presented for payment the day they arrived in London, in either of which cases they would have been paid; but the court held, plaintiff had till the day after they were received, i. e. till Saturday, to send them to London, and the banker there had till the day after be received them, i. e. till Tuesday, to present them, and postea to plaintiff.

(45) Hankey v. Trotman, Blackst. 1. The plaintiff was a banker, and

And it has been held that a bill or note of this kind if payable at the place where the banker lives, must be presented the next time the banker's clerk goes (45) his rounds.

But if a London banker receive a check by the general post, he is not bound to present it for payment (46) until the following day.

And where a person in London received a check upon a London banker between one and two o'clock, and lodged it soon after four with his banker, and the latter presented it between five and six, and got it marked as a good check, and the next day at noon presented it for payment at the clearing house; the court held that there had been no unreason

had a bill on the defendant, for which the defendant paid him a draught upon another banker at twelve at noon, and the plaintiff got it marked for acceptance that night; before the next morning the banker on whom it was drawn stopped. The question was, whether the plaintiff or defendant should bear the loss? The jury found a verdict for the defendant, and upon a rule to shew cause why there should not be a new trial, and cause shewn, the court (Wright J. dubitante) held that it was a question of fact, whether the plaintiff had sufficient time for receiving the money, of which the jury were the proper judges; and the verdict stood.

But see the cases of Rickford v. Ridge, and Robson v. Bennett, in the two following notes. In the last-mentioned case, Mansfield C. J. said, that Hankey v. Trotman had been overruled by Appleton v. Sweetapple. See 2 Taunt. 394.

(46) Rickford and others v. Ridge, 2 Campb. N. P. C. 537. The plaintiffs, bankers at Aylesbury, gave the defendant cash for a check upon Smith and Co., bankers in London; and in an action to recover this money, it appeared that they took the check on the 13th of June, but instead of sending it to London by the post of that day, which they might have done, they sent it by a morning coach on the 14th; and their bankers, to whom it was directed, received it between three and four o'clock on the same day, and presented it at Smith's house at noon on the 15th, when payment was refused. It was proved that bankers to the west of St. Paul's, where the plaintiffs' bankers resided, sent out checks and bills for payment only once in the day, and that generally before the arrival of the post; and therefore such as arrived by the post on one day generally remained with them until the following morning; so that had this check arrived by the post on the 14th, it would not have been presented until the 15th. The question therefore was, whether such practice were reasonable. It was admitted that a different practice prevailed to the east of St. Paul's. Lord Ellenborough said he could not hear of any arbitrary distinction between one part of the city and another. That in towns where posts arrived at different hours, it would be impossible, or at least unreasonable, to require that bankers should present bills and checks on the same day on which they were

able delay, either by the (47) holder in not presenting it for payment on the first day, which he might have done, or by his (47) banker in presenting it at the clearing house only, on the following day at noon: it being proved to be the ùsage among such bankers, not to pay checks presented by one banker to another after four o'clock, but only to mark them if good, and to pay them the next day at the clearing house. (a)

received. That the practice here proved, that checks received in the course of one day should be presented on the following day, appeared to him to be subservient to general convenience, and consistent with the law merchant, which merely required checks to be presented with reasonable diligence. Verdict for the plaintiffs.

(47) Robson v. Bennett, 2 Taunt. 388. On the 11th of September, between one and two o'clock, the defendants gave the plaintiffs a checkupon Bloxam and Co., their bankers, in payment for goods. The plaintiffs lodged the check with Messrs. Harrisons, their bankers, a few minutes after four; and they presented it between five and six to Bloxam and Co., who marked it as good. It was proved to be the usage. among London bankers, not to pay any check presented by or on behalf of another banker after four o'clock, but merely to mark it if good, and pay it the next day at the clearing house. On the 12th at noon, Harrisons' clerk took this check to the clearing house; but no person attended for Bloxam and Co., who stopped payment at nine on that morning, and the check was therefore treated as dishonored. The plaintiffs in going with the check to Harrisons' passed Bloxam's house. On a case stating these facts, the court held, that there had been no laches in the plaintiffs in not presenting the check to Bloxam and Co. on the 11th for payment; or in his bankers in not presenting it at the banking house, but merely at the clearing house; and therefore gave judgment for the plaintiffs.

See also Reynolds v. Chettle, 2 Campb. N. P. C. 596.

[(a) A check on a bank is in form and reality a bill of exchange; and a demand of payment at the bank must be made in order to charge the drawer of the bill. Cruger v. Armstrong, 3 Johns. Cas. 5.

But though it is a general rule that a check on a bank must be presented at the bank within a reasonable time; yet where a check is presented at the bank a long time after the date, and payment is refused for want of funds of the drawer, and not on account of the insolvency of the bank, the drawer is still liable to the holder of the check.

A check drawn by Warren on a bank in New York 28th March, 1800, payable to bearer, was presented at the bank 20th October, 1800, for payment, which was refused, for want of sufficient funds of Warren, he having in the meantime drawn large sums from the bank. The court held that he was liable for the amount of the check to the holder. Kent J. "In the case of Cruger v. Armstrong I considered it a settled rule that a check must be presented for payment in a reasonable time, otherwise the holder takes upon himself the risk of the banker's responsibility; and that drawing a check was an appropriation of as much money as it amounted to in the hands of the bank. In the present