An acceptance is seldom, made before the bill is drawn by any other person than the drawee; afterwards for the purpose either of promoting the negotiation of a bill where. the drawee's credit is suspected, or to save the reputation and prevent the suing of some of the parties where the drawee either cannot be found, is not capable of making himself responsible, or refuses acceptance, it is not uncommon; and it is called an acceptance for the honor of the (10) person on whose account it is made, and enures to the benefit of all the parties subsequent to that person.

Such acceptances for honor as are made with the former view, are considered as made on account of the person in possession of the bill at the time they are made, and such as are made with the latter, unless they declare the contrary, on account of the drawer.

Acceptances for honor may be made by the drawee, or any other person. Thus, if a bill be drawn by A. on account of B, and the drawee be unwilling to accept on account of B, he (11) may accept for the honor of A. and on his

account.

So the drawee may accept for the honor of an endorser.

was drawn on the defendant, and he accepted it to pay £100 part thereof; he was sued upon this acceptance, and on demurrer to the replication, insisted that a partial acceptance was not good within the custom of merchants; but the court held otherwise, and judgment was given for the plaintiff.

Walker v. Atwood, 11 Mod. 190. A bill was drawn on the defendant 8th of April, and no time fixed for its payment; it was presented to defendant 18th of April, and he accepted it to pay 8th of September; this being stated in the declaration, the defendant demurred, and insisted that as no time was prescribed for the payment, the bill was payable at sight, and then a promise to pay two or three months after sight was not an acceptance within the custom of merchants; but the court held, it was an acceptance within the custom, and the demurrer was overruled. Petit v. Benson, Comb. 452. A bill was accepted to be paid, half in money and half in bills; and the question was, whether there could be a qualification of an acceptance; and it was proved by divers merchants that there might, for he that might refuse the bill totally might accept it in part; but that the holder was not bound to acquiesce in such acceptance.

(10) Vide Lutw. 899. Beawes, s. 34. 1st ed. p. 418. s. 40. 42. 1st. ed. p. 419.

(11) Beawes, & 33. 2d ed. p. 421. Marius, 21.

And if the drawee refuse acceptance, or if he accept and afterwards abscond, or (12) become bankrupt, any other person may accept for the honor of the drawer or of an endorser.

But after a general acceptance by the drawee, another person (13) cannot make a second acceptance in order to guaranty the acceptor's credit.

If however such second acceptance be written on the bill, the party for whose benefit it is made (14) may sue the person who made it, as upon a collateral undertaking to guaranty the payment of the bill, if it has the stamp proper for such an undertaking.

A person who accepts for honor, is only liable if the original drawee does not pay. (14)

And to charge such acceptor, there must be a presentment for payment to such original drawee. (14)

And if the acceptor for honor pay, he is (15) entitled to have recourse for repayment to the person for whose honor he made the acceptance, and to all other parties who are liable to that person.

(12) See ex parte Wackerbarth, 5 Ves. 574. and infra, n. (15.)

(13) Jackson v. Hudson, 2 Campb. N. P. C. 447. This was an action on a bill drawn by the plaintiff on I. Irving, and accepted by him; and under his acceptance the defendant wrote "accepted, Jos. Hudson, payable at, &c." The defendant was sued as acceptor. The plaintiff offered to prove that he had had dealings with Irving, and had refused to trust him further, unless the defendant would become his surety; and that the defendant, in order to guaranty Irving's credit, wrote this acceptance on the bill. Lord Ellenborough said, that this was neither an acceptance by the drawee, nor by a person for the honor of the drawer: but that it was a collateral undertaking that the bill should be paid, and ought to have been declared upon as such. Nonsuit.

It seems, however, that after an acceptance supra protest for the honor of one party, there may be a similar acceptance for the honor of another. Beawes, § 72. 2d ed. p. 422.

(14) Hoare v. Cazenove, 16 East. 391. A foreign bill was drawn on Penn & Hanbury; they refused acceptance, and it was protested for non-acceptance. Defendant accepted it for the honor of the first endorsers; but did not pay; action inde, defence, that it had not been presented for payment when due to Penn & Hanbury, nor protested for non-payment by them; and on case and time to consider, the court held such presentment and protest essential, because they considered defendant's acceptance as conditional if Penn & Hanbury did not pay; and Penn & Hanbury might have funds when the bill became due, though they had none before.

(15) Beawes, 47. 49. 2d ed. p. 422. and see ex parte Wackerbarth,

An acceptance of this description is not made on a foreign bill until after a (16) protest (either for non-acceptance, or (where the acceptor absconds or becomes bankrupt) for want of better security), and from this circumstance it is called an acceptance supra protest.

If a bill is drawn on several partners, an acceptance by one, though in his own name only, will bind (17) all; but if drawn on several persons not connected in partnership, an acceptance by one will bind him, but him (17) only.

And if an acceptance by one of several partners be a fraud on the others; or if the one has no authority to bind the others by accepting bills; a person who is (18) privy to such fraud, or who (18) has received notice of such want of authority, cannot, by taking such acceptance, acquire a right to sue the partnership.

On a bill drawn upon a man by the description of servant, a general acceptance will (19) bind him personally.

An acceptance after the bill is drawn may be made even after (20) the time appointed for its payment.

5 Ves. 574. The acceptor of a bill having become bankrupt, and the holders having protested it for better security, Christen and Bowen accepted it for the honor of the drawers; and having paid it, now claimed to be entitled to dividends out of the bankrupt's estate. The chancellor said, that he had spoken to persons in trade on the subject, and that the result was, that the person accepting for the honor of the drawer had a right to come upon the acceptor. He said, however, that the justice of the case required that they should go in the first place against the drawer, if the acceptor had no effects, and directed an inquiry to be made whether the original acceptor or Christen and Bowen had effects of the drawers in hand.

(16) Beawes, 2d ed. p. 421. Marius, p. 21. See Evans on Bills of Exchange, p. 35.

(17) See ante, p. 40, note (17)

(18) See ante, c. 2. p. 41 to 46.

(19) See Thomas v. Bishop, ante, p. 57. n. (38.)

(20) Jackson v. Piggot, Lord Raym. 364. Salk. 127. Carth. 450. 12 Mod. 212. In an action against the acceptor of a bill, the declaration stated, that it was dated 25th March, 1696, payable one month after date, and that in April, 1697, it was shewn to the defendant, and he promised to pay it according to its tenor and effect; after verdict for the plaintiff, it was moved in arrest of judgment, that the promise was void, because as the day of payment was past at the time of the acceptance, it was impossible to pay the bill according to its tenor and effect; but it was answered for the plaintiff, that it amounted to a promise to

In such case an acceptance to pay according to the tenor, will (21) be considered as a general acceptance to pay upon demand.

Upon the acceptance of a bill payable at a given time after sight, if the words of acceptance and the date are in one hand-writing, and the drawee's name under it in the drawee's, the presumption is that the words of acceptance and the date were either upon the bill when he signed his name, or put there afterwards with his consent, because that is the usual course. (22)

A written acceptance is either made upon the bill or (23) elsewhere.

On a written acceptance by the drawee, his name need not appear; and any words written by him upon the bill, not putting a direct negative upon its request, as, "accepted," (24) "presented," "seen," (24) the day of the

pay generally; and of that opinion was the court, and they accordingly gave judgment for the plaintiff.

Mutford v. Walcot, Lord Raym. 574. Salk. 129. 12 Mod. 410. Com. 75. is precisely to the same effect. [See also Grant v. Shaw, ante, p. 98.]

(21) Vide Jackson v. Piggott, and Mutford v. Walcot, supra.

(22) Glossop v. Jacob, 4 Campb. 227. 1 Stark. 70. Action against acceptor on bill payable sixty days after sight; the acceptance was, "Accepted, 25th October, 1814. B. Jacob." The signature only was Jacob's; whose the other words were did not appear: but it was proved to be usual for a clerk to write "accepted," and the date, and for the drawee then to subscribe his name; and Lord Ellenborough, on objection, said he should leave it to the jury to presume the words were written with defendant's privity when he accepted the bill, unless defendant could give some other date to the transaction. The jury presumed accordingly, and verdict for plaintiff.

(23) Vide Pillans v. Van Mierop, Mason v. Hunt, Powell v. Monnier, and Pierson v. Dunlop, ante, p. 96, 97. [See also Goodrich v. Goodwin, and Coolidge v. Payson, post, p. 106.]

(24) Anon. Comb. 401. per Holt C. J. If the drawee underwrites a bill presented such a day, or only the day of the month," it is such an acknowledgment of the bill as amounts to an acceptance; and this was declared by the jury to be the common practice.

Powell v. Monnier, 1 Atk. 611. A bill was sent by the post to the drawee for acceptance; he entered it in his bill-book (which was his practice with all bills he received whether he meant to accept them or not), wrote upon it the number of the entry, and kept it ten days; on the tenth he wrote upon it the day of the month, and returned it, saying he could not accept it; and per Lord Hardwicke, "It has been said to be the custom of merchants, that if a man underwrites any thing, be it

month, or a (25) direction to a third person to pay it, is primâ facie a complete acceptance.

It has indeed been said, (26) that an express refusal to accept, written on a bill, is an acceptance; but this is not the case, unless it is accompanied with a conduct which shows an intent to create a belief that it is accepted.

On a written acceptance on the bill by any other person than the drawee, it should seem essential that his name should appear.

A promise to accept an existing bill, if made upon an (27) executed consideration, or if it (28) influence any per

what it may, it amounts to an acceptance; but if there were nothing more than this in the case, I should think it of little avail to charge the defendant;" but he decided that a letter the drawee had written, amounted to an acceptance. Vide ante, p. 97.

(25) Moor v. Whitby, B. R. Tr. 10 Geo. 3. Bull. Ni. Pri. 270. A bill drawn by Newton on Whitby, was presented for acceptance, and Whitby wrote upon it, “Mr. Jackson, please to pay this note, and place it to Mr. Newton's account. R. Whitby." It was insisted that this was no acceptance, but merely a direction to Jackson to pay it out of a particular fund, and if there was no fund there was to be no payment; sed per cur. this is a direction to Jackson to pay the money, and it signifies not to what account it is to be placed; that is between Jackson and Whitby only, this is clearly an acceptance.

(26) In Ann. 75. is this note: "Underwriting or endorsing a bill thus, 'I will not accept this bill,' is held by the custom of merchants a good acceptance;" but by Lord Mansfield in Peach v. Kay, in sittings after Trinity Term, 1781. "It was held by all the judges that an express refusal to accept, written on the bill, where the drawee apprized the party who took it away what he had written, was no acceptance; but if the drawee had intended it as a surprise upon the party, and to make him consider it as an acceptance, they seemed to think it might have been otherwise."

(27) Vide Pillans v. Van Mierop, ante, p. 96.

(28) Vide Pierson v. Dunlop, and Mason v. Hunt, ante, p. 96, 97. [The doctrine stated in the text is recognized by the court in M'Evers v. Mason, 10 Johns. R. 207.]

Clarke and others v. Cock, 4 East's Rep. 57. Woodward authorized the defendant to receive certain African bills, of which he sent him a list, and apprized him that he had drawn upon him for the amount. The defendant, by letter, acknowledged the receipt of the list, and assured Woodward that the bills he had drawn on him "should meet with due honor." The plaintiffs, who were Woodward's bankers, and greatly in advance to him, having refused to give him further credit, he endorsed to them the bills which he had so drawn upon the defendant, and at the same time either communicated the purport of the defendant's letter, or else represented his having made an absolute promise to accept, but did not show the letter itself: and the plaintiffs, on the faith of defend