The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página 6
... vari- ables. Rather than conducting broad tests of multiple theories, most ex- isting tests of various explanations of international politics assess new explanations against a null model or a small and carefully selected set of ...
... vari- ables. Rather than conducting broad tests of multiple theories, most ex- isting tests of various explanations of international politics assess new explanations against a null model or a small and carefully selected set of ...
Página 16
... vari- ables such as those from balance of power approaches that require in- formation on two states. It allows us to include unit-level information arguably associated with conflict initiation, such as a potential initia- tor's regime ...
... vari- ables such as those from balance of power approaches that require in- formation on two states. It allows us to include unit-level information arguably associated with conflict initiation, such as a potential initia- tor's regime ...
Página 19
... vari- ations in coefficients ( B ) across units and time . Recently , scholars in in- ternational politics have also focused attention on the error term Cijt and suggested that due to the strategic nature of political decision making ...
... vari- ations in coefficients ( B ) across units and time . Recently , scholars in in- ternational politics have also focused attention on the error term Cijt and suggested that due to the strategic nature of political decision making ...
Página 20
... vari- ation on the dependent variable . This implies we can learn nothing about what leads to peace by studying the dyads that have never gone to war . In a fixed - effects model , independent variables that do not change over time add ...
... vari- ation on the dependent variable . This implies we can learn nothing about what leads to peace by studying the dyads that have never gone to war . In a fixed - effects model , independent variables that do not change over time add ...
Página 22
... vari- ables , thereby controlling for this source of bias . For instance , we could account for an argument linking the effects of bipolar international sys- tems to the behavior of just the great powers by including an interac- tion ...
... vari- ables , thereby controlling for this source of bias . For instance , we could account for an argument linking the effects of bipolar international sys- tems to the behavior of just the great powers by including an interac- tion ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus