The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página 6
... units of analysis, and data sets with different dependent vari- ables. Rather than conducting broad tests of multiple theories, most ex- isting tests of various explanations of international politics assess new explanations against a ...
... units of analysis, and data sets with different dependent vari- ables. Rather than conducting broad tests of multiple theories, most ex- isting tests of various explanations of international politics assess new explanations against a ...
Página 11
... unit of analysis in our model (more on this later). Since it is possible for multiple explanations to pre- dict the same events, to sort out the competing arguments, it is critical to evaluate them simultaneously, as we cannot have ...
... unit of analysis in our model (more on this later). Since it is possible for multiple explanations to pre- dict the same events, to sort out the competing arguments, it is critical to evaluate them simultaneously, as we cannot have ...
Página 15
... unit of analysis. A directed dyad-year is a pair of states in a given year, ob- served from the perspective of one of the two states. This distinguishes the identity of a potential conflict's initiator and target. For example, China ...
... unit of analysis. A directed dyad-year is a pair of states in a given year, ob- served from the perspective of one of the two states. This distinguishes the identity of a potential conflict's initiator and target. For example, China ...
Página 16
... unit-level information arguably associated with conflict initiation, such as a potential initia- tor's regime type or rate of democratization. Finally, we can also ex- amine the power of system-level arguments using this unit of ...
... unit-level information arguably associated with conflict initiation, such as a potential initia- tor's regime type or rate of democratization. Finally, we can also ex- amine the power of system-level arguments using this unit of ...
Página 18
... developed classes of models appropriate for data that consist of a pool of cross-unit, cross-time data. A general form of equation (2.2) is the following: Yijt = αjjt + Bijt Xijt + еijt • BijtXijt 18. WAR. the behavioral origins of.
... developed classes of models appropriate for data that consist of a pool of cross-unit, cross-time data. A general form of equation (2.2) is the following: Yijt = αjjt + Bijt Xijt + еijt • BijtXijt 18. WAR. the behavioral origins of.
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus