The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página 5
... statistical version of Lakatos's perspective. By adopting the maximum likelihood logic of inference (King 1989) we are able to make two sets of judgments. First, we can assess whether a set of indicator variables derived from an ar ...
... statistical version of Lakatos's perspective. By adopting the maximum likelihood logic of inference (King 1989) we are able to make two sets of judgments. First, we can assess whether a set of indicator variables derived from an ar ...
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... statistical tests , particularly against a wide range of alternative explanations or predictors . This dearth of empirical testing led , in part , to Green and Shapiro's blistering critique of rational choice models and their advocates ...
... statistical tests , particularly against a wide range of alternative explanations or predictors . This dearth of empirical testing led , in part , to Green and Shapiro's blistering critique of rational choice models and their advocates ...
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... statistical estimators whose design matches the strategic causal logic of a particular argument. Under some circumstances of strategic choice, particularly in situations where the logic behind signaling games is particularly important ...
... statistical estimators whose design matches the strategic causal logic of a particular argument. Under some circumstances of strategic choice, particularly in situations where the logic behind signaling games is particularly important ...
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... statistical models, we can assess whether the independent variables in our models improve our ability to predict systematically relative change in the risk of conflict be- tween nation-states. For each argument or conjecture we test, we ...
... statistical models, we can assess whether the independent variables in our models improve our ability to predict systematically relative change in the risk of conflict be- tween nation-states. For each argument or conjecture we test, we ...
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... (or some other collinear explanation) is responsible for the ab- sence of war using this type of statistical analysis. If we find that the empirical predictions of an argument do not allow us to 16. WAR. the behavioral origins of.
... (or some other collinear explanation) is responsible for the ab- sence of war using this type of statistical analysis. If we find that the empirical predictions of an argument do not allow us to 16. WAR. the behavioral origins of.
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus