The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
Dentro del libro
Resultados 1-5 de 48
Página 1
... simply accumulate with little regard paid to the explanatory power of new accounts versus those previously advanced. This has re- sulted in the multitude of models, untested hypotheses, conjectures, and normatively grounded assertions ...
... simply accumulate with little regard paid to the explanatory power of new accounts versus those previously advanced. This has re- sulted in the multitude of models, untested hypotheses, conjectures, and normatively grounded assertions ...
Página 2
... simply is insufficient data for re- searchers to test their hypotheses or arguments. For example, the com- plete absence of wars between modern liberal democracies after World War II makes it difficult to sort out the competing and ...
... simply is insufficient data for re- searchers to test their hypotheses or arguments. For example, the com- plete absence of wars between modern liberal democracies after World War II makes it difficult to sort out the competing and ...
Página 4
... simply describe conditions where some factor supposedly influenced the likelihood or nature of some past international conflict . In other cases , we see arguments about some fac- tor ( such as economic interdependence ) that supposedly ...
... simply describe conditions where some factor supposedly influenced the likelihood or nature of some past international conflict . In other cases , we see arguments about some fac- tor ( such as economic interdependence ) that supposedly ...
Página 6
... simply broad-brush descriptions based on the observation of small numbers of events rather than carefully deduced explanations of political behavior. Many of the existing empirical studies fall short in another dimen- sion as well ...
... simply broad-brush descriptions based on the observation of small numbers of events rather than carefully deduced explanations of political behavior. Many of the existing empirical studies fall short in another dimen- sion as well ...
Página 10
... simply miss the point. A more fruitful question to ask is how much, or when, or under what conditions does each con- jecture appear most consistent with some aspect of international conflict behavior. Our second prior is that, while no ...
... simply miss the point. A more fruitful question to ask is how much, or when, or under what conditions does each con- jecture appear most consistent with some aspect of international conflict behavior. Our second prior is that, while no ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus