The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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... relative power of competing or complementary theories. We develop an appropriate research design for such analysis. We use a methodology based on block maximum-likelihood tests and relative risk analysis that allows us to assess what ...
... relative power of competing or complementary theories. We develop an appropriate research design for such analysis. We use a methodology based on block maximum-likelihood tests and relative risk analysis that allows us to assess what ...
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... relative ex- planatory power of these various descriptions and (2) reach some sense of consensus about which stories are the most useful or valuable in un- derstanding international political processes. The abandonment of “failed ...
... relative ex- planatory power of these various descriptions and (2) reach some sense of consensus about which stories are the most useful or valuable in un- derstanding international political processes. The abandonment of “failed ...
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... relative power of competing explanations or predictions . We believe this lack of comparative testing to be a main culprit for our current state of affairs . In this volume , we turn to developing such comparative tests . STANDARDS FOR ...
... relative power of competing explanations or predictions . We believe this lack of comparative testing to be a main culprit for our current state of affairs . In this volume , we turn to developing such comparative tests . STANDARDS FOR ...
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... relative likelihood that a decision maker will behave in a particular way . In this book , we focus solely on assessing the empirical content of various arguments purporting to predict or to explain 4 the behavioral origins of WAR.
... relative likelihood that a decision maker will behave in a particular way . In this book , we focus solely on assessing the empirical content of various arguments purporting to predict or to explain 4 the behavioral origins of WAR.
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... relative likelihood of war makes novel contributions to the fit of our statistical models. Second, we can evaluate the relative predictive power associated with each of these variables. This approach allows us to demonstrate that ...
... relative likelihood of war makes novel contributions to the fit of our statistical models. Second, we can evaluate the relative predictive power associated with each of these variables. This approach allows us to demonstrate that ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus