The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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... region- ally or temporally distinct paths to war. While some scholars have long argued that multiple factors affect international politics (Waltz 1959), debate continues over what level of analysis, approach, or theory pro- vides the ...
... region- ally or temporally distinct paths to war. While some scholars have long argued that multiple factors affect international politics (Waltz 1959), debate continues over what level of analysis, approach, or theory pro- vides the ...
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... Region Statistical studies of international conflict typically assume that a single intercept ( a ) is adequate . The estimate of a reflects the baseline proba- bility , frequency , or rate of conflict . However , if a varies so that ...
... Region Statistical studies of international conflict typically assume that a single intercept ( a ) is adequate . The estimate of a reflects the baseline proba- bility , frequency , or rate of conflict . However , if a varies so that ...
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... region may be reasonable if we believe that states in particular regions engage in different patterns of international behavior by virtue of culture , shared colonial experience , learned interaction pat- terns , or peculiar regional ...
... region may be reasonable if we believe that states in particular regions engage in different patterns of international behavior by virtue of culture , shared colonial experience , learned interaction pat- terns , or peculiar regional ...
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... Regions and Periods A second type of misspecification suggested in equation ( 2.3 ) occurs if the coefficients in ẞ vary over units and time . If a conjecture " works " or a hypothesis holds up for only some dyads , or for only some ...
... Regions and Periods A second type of misspecification suggested in equation ( 2.3 ) occurs if the coefficients in ẞ vary over units and time . If a conjecture " works " or a hypothesis holds up for only some dyads , or for only some ...
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Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus