The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página 4
... decision making , and , finally , to the effects of actors making their decisions based on rational expectations in the setting of strategic choice . From this perspective , where chance plays a powerful role in de- termining the events ...
... decision making , and , finally , to the effects of actors making their decisions based on rational expectations in the setting of strategic choice . From this perspective , where chance plays a powerful role in de- termining the events ...
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... rational choice models and their advocates in Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory ( 1994 , 7 ) . There they find weak empirical support for rational choice theory gen- erally and suggest that , " Despite its enormous and growing ...
... rational choice models and their advocates in Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory ( 1994 , 7 ) . There they find weak empirical support for rational choice theory gen- erally and suggest that , " Despite its enormous and growing ...
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... rational choice proponents argue that expected utility maximizing behavior ex- plains the critical part of international conflict behavior, with formal theorists claiming that mathematically deduced theory is superior to more informal ...
... rational choice proponents argue that expected utility maximizing behavior ex- plains the critical part of international conflict behavior, with formal theorists claiming that mathematically deduced theory is superior to more informal ...
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... rational choice models of international conflict are sig- nificant . As we show there , variation in ẞ over space and time proves important . An interesting implication of this is that the distinction be- tween international politics ...
... rational choice models of international conflict are sig- nificant . As we show there , variation in ẞ over space and time proves important . An interesting implication of this is that the distinction be- tween international politics ...
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Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus