The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página 1
... problems. Over the last forty years, the development of models and conjectures pur- porting to explain the incidence and ... problem if scholars have a well-founded sense of which explanations or descriptions account for the greatest ...
... problems. Over the last forty years, the development of models and conjectures pur- porting to explain the incidence and ... problem if scholars have a well-founded sense of which explanations or descriptions account for the greatest ...
Página 2
... problem we face, and one that is potentially damning, lies in the possibility that in the realm of politics there may be no fundamental regularities, or equilibria, to predict. William Riker (1980, 443) suggests that the pros- pects for ...
... problem we face, and one that is potentially damning, lies in the possibility that in the realm of politics there may be no fundamental regularities, or equilibria, to predict. William Riker (1980, 443) suggests that the pros- pects for ...
Página 5
... problem of falsification and theory rejection than Popper, we generally follow Lakatos's (1978, 32) standard that we should reject an explanation of past events or a prediction of future events if and only if another explanation ...
... problem of falsification and theory rejection than Popper, we generally follow Lakatos's (1978, 32) standard that we should reject an explanation of past events or a prediction of future events if and only if another explanation ...
Página 8
... problem of international conflict by focus- ing on a single argument or approach (e.g., Midlarsky 1992, 2000). While these works help us understand the logic and possible strengths of the various arguments in isolation, they do not ...
... problem of international conflict by focus- ing on a single argument or approach (e.g., Midlarsky 1992, 2000). While these works help us understand the logic and possible strengths of the various arguments in isolation, they do not ...
Página 9
... problems discussed previously, we start with three pri- ors about comparative hypothesis testing and the evaluation of the rela- tive predictive power of international politics explanations. First, we be- lieve (and demonstrate later) ...
... problems discussed previously, we start with three pri- ors about comparative hypothesis testing and the evaluation of the rela- tive predictive power of international politics explanations. First, we be- lieve (and demonstrate later) ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus