The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página 2
... potentially damning, lies in the possibility that in the realm of politics there may be no fundamental regularities, or equilibria, to predict. William Riker (1980, 443) suggests that the pros- pects for theoretical advancement in ...
... potentially damning, lies in the possibility that in the realm of politics there may be no fundamental regularities, or equilibria, to predict. William Riker (1980, 443) suggests that the pros- pects for theoretical advancement in ...
Página 9
... potentially confounding explanations could even reverse the direction of the previous findings (Gowa 1999; Mansfield and Snyder 1995). Finally, the lack of large-scale comparative testing has led to recurring and fruitless arguments ...
... potentially confounding explanations could even reverse the direction of the previous findings (Gowa 1999; Mansfield and Snyder 1995). Finally, the lack of large-scale comparative testing has led to recurring and fruitless arguments ...
Página 15
... the two states. This distinguishes the identity of a potential conflict's initiator and target. For example, China-Japan in 1990 is one observation, while Japan-China in 1990 15 2. Comparative Hypothesis Testing and Some Limits to ...
... the two states. This distinguishes the identity of a potential conflict's initiator and target. For example, China-Japan in 1990 is one observation, while Japan-China in 1990 15 2. Comparative Hypothesis Testing and Some Limits to ...
Página 16
... potential initia- tor's regime type or rate of democratization. Finally, we can also ex- amine the power of system-level arguments using this unit of analysis. If the international system in one period is more conflict prone than in ...
... potential initia- tor's regime type or rate of democratization. Finally, we can also ex- amine the power of system-level arguments using this unit of analysis. If the international system in one period is more conflict prone than in ...
Página 19
... potentially varying by unit and across time . Econometricians have developed models specifically de- signed to deal with variations in the intercept ( a ) across units and vari- ations in coefficients ( B ) across units and time ...
... potentially varying by unit and across time . Econometricians have developed models specifically de- signed to deal with variations in the intercept ( a ) across units and vari- ations in coefficients ( B ) across units and time ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus