The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página 8
... possible strengths of the various arguments in isolation, they do not provide empirically based comparative hypothesis testing. Since no project can hope to specify all of the possible variables ex- pected to correlate with the onset of ...
... possible strengths of the various arguments in isolation, they do not provide empirically based comparative hypothesis testing. Since no project can hope to specify all of the possible variables ex- pected to correlate with the onset of ...
Página 10
... possible to include factors from multiple levels of analysis in comparative hypothesis testing, as we described previously and execute subsequently. If variables from any level of analysis are to influence in- ternational affairs, they ...
... possible to include factors from multiple levels of analysis in comparative hypothesis testing, as we described previously and execute subsequently. If variables from any level of analysis are to influence in- ternational affairs, they ...
Página 11
... possible to include a wide range of key variables drawn from multiple levels of analysis be- cause we use the directed dyad-year as the unit of analysis in our model (more on this later). Since it is possible for multiple explanations ...
... possible to include a wide range of key variables drawn from multiple levels of analysis be- cause we use the directed dyad-year as the unit of analysis in our model (more on this later). Since it is possible for multiple explanations ...
Página 18
... possible and to account for the interactive effects present in strategic situations (Signorino 1999, 2000; Lewis and Schultz 2001). Much of the statisti- cal work on international politics essentially ignores the single fixed in ...
... possible and to account for the interactive effects present in strategic situations (Signorino 1999, 2000; Lewis and Schultz 2001). Much of the statisti- cal work on international politics essentially ignores the single fixed in ...
Página 19
... possible inclusion in our vector of variables , X. Intercept Variation : The Changing Nature of Politics over Time and Region Statistical studies of international conflict typically assume that a single intercept ( a ) is adequate . The ...
... possible inclusion in our vector of variables , X. Intercept Variation : The Changing Nature of Politics over Time and Region Statistical studies of international conflict typically assume that a single intercept ( a ) is adequate . The ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus