The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página 16
... period is more conbict prone than in another, this will be rebected in a higher probability of multiple states choosing to initiate conbict.1 This process of comparative hypothesis testing helps to address several important problems ...
... period is more conbict prone than in another, this will be rebected in a higher probability of multiple states choosing to initiate conbict.1 This process of comparative hypothesis testing helps to address several important problems ...
Página 19
... period to another, so that the intercept in one year differs from that in another, then a single is again inappropriate. The intercept may even vary by both time and space, so that the baseline level of conbict differs by dyad (or ...
... period to another, so that the intercept in one year differs from that in another, then a single is again inappropriate. The intercept may even vary by both time and space, so that the baseline level of conbict differs by dyad (or ...
Página 21
... period. Spatially, groupings by state or state type may be called for (for instance, if individual states are more dangerous by virtue of regime type or economic ... Periods A 21 Comparative Hypothesis Testing and Some Limits to Knowledge.
... period. Spatially, groupings by state or state type may be called for (for instance, if individual states are more dangerous by virtue of regime type or economic ... Periods A 21 Comparative Hypothesis Testing and Some Limits to Knowledge.
Página 22
... periods, and not for others, then assuming that a single is appropriate for all members of X is again a potential ... period of bipolarity. Situations where the effects of variables change smoothly over time are more difacult but ...
... periods, and not for others, then assuming that a single is appropriate for all members of X is again a potential ... period of bipolarity. Situations where the effects of variables change smoothly over time are more difacult but ...
Página 24
... periods, countries, or other spatial and temporal aggregations of actors that are prone to conbict with some frequency. That is, we may be able to identify the times and places where the risk of conbict is roughly afty-afty compared to ...
... periods, countries, or other spatial and temporal aggregations of actors that are prone to conbict with some frequency. That is, we may be able to identify the times and places where the risk of conbict is roughly afty-afty compared to ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races arst axed-effects balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal coefacients compute conbict behavior conbict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable difacult directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors game theoretic game tree hypotheses inbuence increase initiation and escalation interaction international conbict international politics international system interstate leaders levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons omitted variable bias Outcome Prob percent periods politically relevant dyads potential power transition problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conbict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores speciac Stam state’s statistically signiacant suggest system power concentration target taub theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force versus