The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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... peace proposition. We include key variables from these popular theories of conflict in a multi- nomial logit analyses of dispute and war behavior. We find that many theories suggest factors that contribute in important ways to both the ...
... peace proposition. We include key variables from these popular theories of conflict in a multi- nomial logit analyses of dispute and war behavior. We find that many theories suggest factors that contribute in important ways to both the ...
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... peace between po- tentially warring nations. Balance of power and other realpolitik argu- ments appear before students in much the same way as they have for decades, unaffected in many classrooms by careful logical analysis ...
... peace between po- tentially warring nations. Balance of power and other realpolitik argu- ments appear before students in much the same way as they have for decades, unaffected in many classrooms by careful logical analysis ...
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... peace proposition against a variety of control variables (Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001). Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) tested their expected utility predictions along with other predictions drawn from power ...
... peace proposition against a variety of control variables (Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001). Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) tested their expected utility predictions along with other predictions drawn from power ...
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... peace or war remains in dis- pute, even though many policymakers assume that an equal balance of capabilities makes international stability more likely. In the absence of such testing and rejection of unsupported arguments, advocates of ...
... peace or war remains in dis- pute, even though many policymakers assume that an equal balance of capabilities makes international stability more likely. In the absence of such testing and rejection of unsupported arguments, advocates of ...
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... Peace 7. Expected Utility 8. Geographic Contiguity 9. Nuclear Deterrence 10. Power Transition II . Rational Deterrence 12. Trade Interdependence International System Level of Analysis 13. Economic Cycles/Kondratieff Waves 14. 12 the ...
... Peace 7. Expected Utility 8. Geographic Contiguity 9. Nuclear Deterrence 10. Power Transition II . Rational Deterrence 12. Trade Interdependence International System Level of Analysis 13. Economic Cycles/Kondratieff Waves 14. 12 the ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus