The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página 10
... leads to our final prior. We believe that it is appropriate, neces- sary, and possible to include factors from multiple levels of analysis in comparative hypothesis testing, as we described previously and execute subsequently. If ...
... leads to our final prior. We believe that it is appropriate, neces- sary, and possible to include factors from multiple levels of analysis in comparative hypothesis testing, as we described previously and execute subsequently. If ...
Página 11
... lead to more of Y.” The lack of internal logic and conceptual clarity is particularly trou- bling to scholars who argue that most models of international politics are actually, or should be, theories of strategic interaction (e.g., Sig ...
... lead to more of Y.” The lack of internal logic and conceptual clarity is particularly trou- bling to scholars who argue that most models of international politics are actually, or should be, theories of strategic interaction (e.g., Sig ...
Página 14
... leads us to conclude that we should turn our attention to searching for more interactive and dy- namic explanations of interstate conflict that can take into account a multitude of factors from multiple levels of analysis. We conclude ...
... leads us to conclude that we should turn our attention to searching for more interactive and dy- namic explanations of interstate conflict that can take into account a multitude of factors from multiple levels of analysis. We conclude ...
Página 20
... leads to peace by studying the dyads that have never gone to war . In a fixed - effects model , independent variables that do not change over time add nothing to the model's overall fit to the data , since they cor- relate perfectly ...
... leads to peace by studying the dyads that have never gone to war . In a fixed - effects model , independent variables that do not change over time add nothing to the model's overall fit to the data , since they cor- relate perfectly ...
Página 21
... lead aj to vary for some different dyads or groups of dyads . That is , by spec- ifying the factors that cause different dyads to have a different baseline level of conflict . The solution to this thorny empirical problem is more and ...
... lead aj to vary for some different dyads or groups of dyads . That is , by spec- ifying the factors that cause different dyads to have a different baseline level of conflict . The solution to this thorny empirical problem is more and ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus