The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página 1
... interstate war appear almost as frequently as the events themselves, new ideas rarely supersede those previously developed. Instead, they simply accumulate with little regard paid to the explanatory power of new accounts versus those ...
... interstate war appear almost as frequently as the events themselves, new ideas rarely supersede those previously developed. Instead, they simply accumulate with little regard paid to the explanatory power of new accounts versus those ...
Página 8
... interstate war. Vasquez similarly makes no overall empirical comparison of the various theories or conjectures that he identiaes. Numerous other edited volumes on international conbict exist as well that take a generally similar ...
... interstate war. Vasquez similarly makes no overall empirical comparison of the various theories or conjectures that he identiaes. Numerous other edited volumes on international conbict exist as well that take a generally similar ...
Página 12
... interstate conbict while we simultaneously control for several alternative and frequently competing predictors of violent interstate conbict. They include the following: State Level of Analysis 1. Democratization 2. Polity Change and ...
... interstate conbict while we simultaneously control for several alternative and frequently competing predictors of violent interstate conbict. They include the following: State Level of Analysis 1. Democratization 2. Polity Change and ...
Página 14
... interstate conbict that can take into account a multitude of factors from multiple levels of analysis. We conclude with observations about the nature of research across multiple levels of analysis and a demonstration that we can ...
... interstate conbict that can take into account a multitude of factors from multiple levels of analysis. We conclude with observations about the nature of research across multiple levels of analysis and a demonstration that we can ...
Página 23
... what we can and cannot know about the initiation of interstate conbict. If we are unable to eliminate U (which by deanition we cannot), then there is an upper bound to the 23 Comparative Hypothesis Testing and Some Limits to Knowledge.
... what we can and cannot know about the initiation of interstate conbict. If we are unable to eliminate U (which by deanition we cannot), then there is an upper bound to the 23 Comparative Hypothesis Testing and Some Limits to Knowledge.
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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alliance approach argue arguments arms races arst axed-effects balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal coefacients compute conbict behavior conbict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable difacult directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors game theoretic game tree hypotheses inbuence increase initiation and escalation interaction international conbict international politics international system interstate leaders levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons omitted variable bias Outcome Prob percent periods politically relevant dyads potential power transition problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conbict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores speciac Stam state’s statistically signiacant suggest system power concentration target taub theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force versus