The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
Dentro del libro
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Página ix
... dated and not helpful in understanding actual behavior. Instead, while some theories are independent, others are overlapping. Multiple theories purporting to explain a single phenomenon (such as war) may be Preface & Acknowledgments.
... dated and not helpful in understanding actual behavior. Instead, while some theories are independent, others are overlapping. Multiple theories purporting to explain a single phenomenon (such as war) may be Preface & Acknowledgments.
Página 6
... independent variables expected to correlate with conflict behavior. While many researchers pay lip service to Lakatos and his principles of progressive scientific research based on careful theory de- velopment and testing, in practice ...
... independent variables expected to correlate with conflict behavior. While many researchers pay lip service to Lakatos and his principles of progressive scientific research based on careful theory de- velopment and testing, in practice ...
Página 15
... independent variables in our models improve our ability to predict systematically relative change in the risk of conflict be- tween nation-states. For each argument or conjecture we test, we derive one or more independent variables ...
... independent variables in our models improve our ability to predict systematically relative change in the risk of conflict be- tween nation-states. For each argument or conjecture we test, we derive one or more independent variables ...
Página 16
... independent. Commonly, the independent variables marking separate arguments correlate to some degree, particularly since many of the vari- ables constructed by theorists draw their inspiration from the same un- derlying sets of cases ...
... independent. Commonly, the independent variables marking separate arguments correlate to some degree, particularly since many of the vari- ables constructed by theorists draw their inspiration from the same un- derlying sets of cases ...
Página 18
... independent variables in X. We must cor- rectly specify this set of independent variables in order to operational- ize the critical aspects of a given theory or conjecture in order to measure the concept(s) in question with as little ...
... independent variables in X. We must cor- rectly specify this set of independent variables in order to operational- ize the critical aspects of a given theory or conjecture in order to measure the concept(s) in question with as little ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus