The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página ix
... hypotheses, and conjectures about the sources of international conflict are typically seen as competing explanations for observed behavior. Our advocacy of comparative testing emerges from a different view. We conceive of international ...
... hypotheses, and conjectures about the sources of international conflict are typically seen as competing explanations for observed behavior. Our advocacy of comparative testing emerges from a different view. We conceive of international ...
Página 1
... hypotheses, conjectures, and normatively grounded assertions that constitute the discipline. The study of international conflict exemplifies these problems. Over the last forty years, the development of models and conjectures pur ...
... hypotheses, conjectures, and normatively grounded assertions that constitute the discipline. The study of international conflict exemplifies these problems. Over the last forty years, the development of models and conjectures pur ...
Página 2
... hypotheses or arguments. For example, the com- plete absence of wars between modern liberal democracies after World War II makes it difficult to sort out the competing and often collinear explanations for this important fact. Similarly ...
... hypotheses or arguments. For example, the com- plete absence of wars between modern liberal democracies after World War II makes it difficult to sort out the competing and often collinear explanations for this important fact. Similarly ...
Página 6
... hypotheses, and conjectures, represented by their associated variables and operational indicators. SCIENCE AND CUMULATIVE PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS Clearly, evaluating the relative explanatory power of different empiri- cal ...
... hypotheses, and conjectures, represented by their associated variables and operational indicators. SCIENCE AND CUMULATIVE PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS Clearly, evaluating the relative explanatory power of different empiri- cal ...
Página 11
... hypotheses, we also cannot assess a conjecture's relative pre- dictive power. Of course, there may be limits to what we can learn with this approach. For example, the variables suggested by the competing explanations may be so collinear ...
... hypotheses, we also cannot assess a conjecture's relative pre- dictive power. Of course, there may be limits to what we can learn with this approach. For example, the variables suggested by the competing explanations may be so collinear ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus