The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página vii
... Expected Utility Notes Bibliography Index ix I 15 35 70 107 165 200 223 232 249 257 277 PREFACE & ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The study of international conflict suffers from CONTENTS.
... Expected Utility Notes Bibliography Index ix I 15 35 70 107 165 200 223 232 249 257 277 PREFACE & ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The study of international conflict suffers from CONTENTS.
Página ix
... expected utility theory of war. Empirical tests of variants of expected utility the- ory have been executed in very limited settings, despite expansive claims about the theory's power and scope. Given the limited tests of most theories ...
... expected utility theory of war. Empirical tests of variants of expected utility the- ory have been executed in very limited settings, despite expansive claims about the theory's power and scope. Given the limited tests of most theories ...
Página x
... expected utility theory of war than has been executed before. In particular, we evaluate the relative strength of sixteen different ex- planations for international conflict drawn from the system, dyadic, and monadic levels of analysis ...
... expected utility theory of war than has been executed before. In particular, we evaluate the relative strength of sixteen different ex- planations for international conflict drawn from the system, dyadic, and monadic levels of analysis ...
Página xii
... expected utility theory models and exploring the importance of fundamental research design decisions. The advice from numerous anonymous reviewers at these journals and at the University of Michigan Press was enormously helpful. While ...
... expected utility theory models and exploring the importance of fundamental research design decisions. The advice from numerous anonymous reviewers at these journals and at the University of Michigan Press was enormously helpful. While ...
Página 6
... expected to correlate with conflict behavior. While many researchers pay lip service to Lakatos and his principles ... expected utility predictions along with other predictions drawn from power - based stories 6. WAR. the behavioral origins ...
... expected to correlate with conflict behavior. While many researchers pay lip service to Lakatos and his principles ... expected utility predictions along with other predictions drawn from power - based stories 6. WAR. the behavioral origins ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus