The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página 1
... examples of what they characterize as theories of international relations. If we counted variations on familiar themes and arguments developed since, the number would be much higher. Having an array of theoretical approaches and ...
... examples of what they characterize as theories of international relations. If we counted variations on familiar themes and arguments developed since, the number would be much higher. Having an array of theoretical approaches and ...
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... example, the complete absence of wars between modern liberal democracies after World War II makes it difacult to sort out the competing and often collinear explanations for this important fact. Similarly, tests of explanations focusing ...
... example, the complete absence of wars between modern liberal democracies after World War II makes it difacult to sort out the competing and often collinear explanations for this important fact. Similarly, tests of explanations focusing ...
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... example, one method we might apply is Popper's (1968) “method of elimination.” Using his approach, we end up with relatively more powerful theories, as stronger theories replace weaker ones through a process of “dualistic elimination ...
... example, one method we might apply is Popper's (1968) “method of elimination.” Using his approach, we end up with relatively more powerful theories, as stronger theories replace weaker ones through a process of “dualistic elimination ...
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... example, consider balance of power theory. Niou, Ordeshook, and Rose (1989) conducted an excruciatingly careful and nuanced evaluation of the logical underpinnings of classical balance of power arguments and found them sorely lacking ...
... example, consider balance of power theory. Niou, Ordeshook, and Rose (1989) conducted an excruciatingly careful and nuanced evaluation of the logical underpinnings of classical balance of power arguments and found them sorely lacking ...
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... example, rational deterrence hypotheses compared to variables drawn from psychological approaches (Huth and Russett 1993) or a selected set of international system structure variables compared to a set of variables drawn from a dyadic ...
... example, rational deterrence hypotheses compared to variables drawn from psychological approaches (Huth and Russett 1993) or a selected set of international system structure variables compared to a set of variables drawn from a dyadic ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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alliance approach argue arguments arms races arst axed-effects balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal coefacients compute conbict behavior conbict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable difacult directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors game theoretic game tree hypotheses inbuence increase initiation and escalation interaction international conbict international politics international system interstate leaders levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons omitted variable bias Outcome Prob percent periods politically relevant dyads potential power transition problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conbict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores speciac Stam state’s statistically signiacant suggest system power concentration target taub theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force versus