The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página xii
... decisions. The advice from numerous anonymous reviewers at these journals and at the University of Michigan Press was enormously helpful. While critical reviews are not always pleasant to read, they make for a much better final product ...
... decisions. The advice from numerous anonymous reviewers at these journals and at the University of Michigan Press was enormously helpful. While critical reviews are not always pleasant to read, they make for a much better final product ...
Página 3
... deciding that one model of the world supersedes or replaces another . For example , one method we might apply is Popper's ( 1968 ) " method of elimination . " Using his approach , we end up with relatively more powerful theories , as ...
... deciding that one model of the world supersedes or replaces another . For example , one method we might apply is Popper's ( 1968 ) " method of elimination . " Using his approach , we end up with relatively more powerful theories , as ...
Página 4
... decision making , and , finally , to the effects of actors making their decisions based on rational expectations in the setting of strategic choice . From this perspective , where chance plays a powerful role in de- termining the events ...
... decision making , and , finally , to the effects of actors making their decisions based on rational expectations in the setting of strategic choice . From this perspective , where chance plays a powerful role in de- termining the events ...
Página 10
... decisions of individual actors in the system. Even system-level factors must ulti- mately influence the outcomes we observe by affecting the decisions of states' leaders since the system is not an autonomous actor, somehow acting on its ...
... decisions of individual actors in the system. Even system-level factors must ulti- mately influence the outcomes we observe by affecting the decisions of states' leaders since the system is not an autonomous actor, somehow acting on its ...
Página 19
... decision making there may be an upper limit to how much we can explain using meas- urable variables included in either a or B ( Gartzke 1999 ) . Next , we ex- plore each of these modeling perspectives and approaches before turn- ing to ...
... decision making there may be an upper limit to how much we can explain using meas- urable variables included in either a or B ( Gartzke 1999 ) . Next , we ex- plore each of these modeling perspectives and approaches before turn- ing to ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus