The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página ix
... data sets and findings, and a lack of cumulation in our understanding of in- ternational relations. With a plethora of theories, conjectures, and hy- potheses of international conflict in hand, we believe that it is appro- priate and ...
... data sets and findings, and a lack of cumulation in our understanding of in- ternational relations. With a plethora of theories, conjectures, and hy- potheses of international conflict in hand, we believe that it is appro- priate and ...
Página x
... set of theories is valid and on the relative explanatory power of those ... set of theories of international conflict or the relative power of competing or ... data necessary for the analysis we advocate, to allow precise replication ...
... set of theories is valid and on the relative explanatory power of those ... set of theories of international conflict or the relative power of competing or ... data necessary for the analysis we advocate, to allow precise replication ...
Página 3
... set of rules to play the game of interest ( Prisoners ' Dilemma ) , with each strategy having a clear and unique ... data used to test them are well specified and precise . In his work , Popper presents an example of disproving Kepler's ...
... set of rules to play the game of interest ( Prisoners ' Dilemma ) , with each strategy having a clear and unique ... data used to test them are well specified and precise . In his work , Popper presents an example of disproving Kepler's ...
Página 6
... data, data cast at different units of analysis, and data sets with different dependent vari- ables. Rather than ... set of competing claims. Typically, an author presents a contrasting set of explanations where one argument is of primary ...
... data, data cast at different units of analysis, and data sets with different dependent vari- ables. Rather than ... set of competing claims. Typically, an author presents a contrasting set of explanations where one argument is of primary ...
Página 18
... data set (data that tracks dyads across both space and time) where i and j represent different states (and so ij represents a particular directed dyad) and t represents time (ijt is the dyad ij at time t), our regression equation ...
... data set (data that tracks dyads across both space and time) where i and j represent different states (and so ij represents a particular directed dyad) and t represents time (ijt is the dyad ij at time t), our regression equation ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus