The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página ix
... conjectures, and hy- potheses of international conflict in hand, we believe that it is appro- priate and necessary to conduct a thorough empirical appraisal of those arguments. It is also important and necessary to devote significant at ...
... conjectures, and hy- potheses of international conflict in hand, we believe that it is appro- priate and necessary to conduct a thorough empirical appraisal of those arguments. It is also important and necessary to devote significant at ...
Página 1
... conjectures, and normatively grounded assertions that constitute the discipline. The study of international conflict exemplifies these problems. Over the last forty years, the development of models and conjectures pur- porting to ...
... conjectures, and normatively grounded assertions that constitute the discipline. The study of international conflict exemplifies these problems. Over the last forty years, the development of models and conjectures pur- porting to ...
Página 3
... conjectures in international politics . He notes an important caveat to applying his method of elim- ination , arguing that it is appropriate only if a theory may be demon- strably falsifiable , that is , if the theory is “ sufficiently ...
... conjectures in international politics . He notes an important caveat to applying his method of elim- ination , arguing that it is appropriate only if a theory may be demon- strably falsifiable , that is , if the theory is “ sufficiently ...
Página 5
... conjecture is consistent with more than one unique event when controlling for other explanations, thereby suggesting ... conjectures based on ontological rigor or the internal logical consistency of the arguments. Rather, we focus solely ...
... conjecture is consistent with more than one unique event when controlling for other explanations, thereby suggesting ... conjectures based on ontological rigor or the internal logical consistency of the arguments. Rather, we focus solely ...
Página 6
... conjectures, represented by their associated variables and operational indicators. SCIENCE AND CUMULATIVE PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS Clearly, evaluating the relative explanatory power of different empiri- cal assertions and ...
... conjectures, represented by their associated variables and operational indicators. SCIENCE AND CUMULATIVE PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS Clearly, evaluating the relative explanatory power of different empiri- cal assertions and ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus