The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página ix
... believe that it is appro- priate and necessary to conduct a thorough empirical appraisal of those arguments. It is also important and necessary to devote significant at- tention to several important theories of international relations ...
... believe that it is appro- priate and necessary to conduct a thorough empirical appraisal of those arguments. It is also important and necessary to devote significant at- tention to several important theories of international relations ...
Página 2
... believe that there is a third critical problem hindering scientific advancement in the study of international conflict behavior, namely, the paucity of systematic comparative testing that would allow us to examine , judge , and 2. WAR.
... believe that there is a third critical problem hindering scientific advancement in the study of international conflict behavior, namely, the paucity of systematic comparative testing that would allow us to examine , judge , and 2. WAR.
Página 3
... believe this lack of comparative testing to be a main culprit for our current state of affairs . In this volume , we turn to developing such comparative tests . STANDARDS FOR COMPARATIVE HYPOTHESIS TESTING When testing an empirical ...
... believe this lack of comparative testing to be a main culprit for our current state of affairs . In this volume , we turn to developing such comparative tests . STANDARDS FOR COMPARATIVE HYPOTHESIS TESTING When testing an empirical ...
Página 7
... believe that this claim can be defended across the board . ” While formal rational choice models are not the only arguments that suffer from a lack of systematic empirical testing , advocates of the ra- tional choice approach make ...
... believe that this claim can be defended across the board . ” While formal rational choice models are not the only arguments that suffer from a lack of systematic empirical testing , advocates of the ra- tional choice approach make ...
Página 10
... believe that with careful empirical tests we can show that some variables have substantially larger predictive power associated with them than others do. While we conclude that there is no single dominant explanation of international ...
... believe that with careful empirical tests we can show that some variables have substantially larger predictive power associated with them than others do. While we conclude that there is no single dominant explanation of international ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus