The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página 1
... approaches and empirical conjectures is not a problem if scholars have a well-founded sense of which explanations or descriptions account for the greatest proportion of events or facts or, more colloquially, which theories.
... approaches and empirical conjectures is not a problem if scholars have a well-founded sense of which explanations or descriptions account for the greatest proportion of events or facts or, more colloquially, which theories.
Página 3
... approach , we end up with relatively more powerful theories , as stronger theories replace weaker ones through a process of " dualistic elimination . " An example of dual- istic elimination - the process of pitting one " theory ...
... approach , we end up with relatively more powerful theories , as stronger theories replace weaker ones through a process of " dualistic elimination . " An example of dual- istic elimination - the process of pitting one " theory ...
Página 5
... approach to the problem of falsification and theory rejection than Popper, we generally follow Lakatos's (1978, 32) standard that we should reject an explanation of past events or a prediction of future events if and only if another ...
... approach to the problem of falsification and theory rejection than Popper, we generally follow Lakatos's (1978, 32) standard that we should reject an explanation of past events or a prediction of future events if and only if another ...
Página 6
... approaches (Huth and Russett 1993) or a selected set of in- ternational system structure variables compared to a set of variables drawn from a dyadic perspective (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1988). Maoz and Russett launched a veritable ...
... approaches (Huth and Russett 1993) or a selected set of in- ternational system structure variables compared to a set of variables drawn from a dyadic perspective (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1988). Maoz and Russett launched a veritable ...
Página 7
... approach has been the target of both theoretical and em- pirical criticism , using both normative arguments and empirical case studies ( e.g. , Jervis , Lebow , and Stein 1985 ) , formal models of interna- tional conflict have received ...
... approach has been the target of both theoretical and em- pirical criticism , using both normative arguments and empirical case studies ( e.g. , Jervis , Lebow , and Stein 1985 ) , formal models of interna- tional conflict have received ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus