The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página 1
... appear almost as frequently as the events themselves, new ideas rarely supersede those previously developed. In- stead, they simply accumulate with little regard paid to the explanatory power of new accounts versus those previously ...
... appear almost as frequently as the events themselves, new ideas rarely supersede those previously developed. In- stead, they simply accumulate with little regard paid to the explanatory power of new accounts versus those previously ...
Página 3
... appears in the simulation used by Robert Axelrod in The Evolution of Cooperation ( 1984 ) . There , in round - robin fashion , Axelrod pitted one computer simulation strategy after another against the competition until an overall winner ...
... appears in the simulation used by Robert Axelrod in The Evolution of Cooperation ( 1984 ) . There , in round - robin fashion , Axelrod pitted one computer simulation strategy after another against the competition until an overall winner ...
Página 5
... appear before students in much the same way as they have for decades, unaffected in many classrooms by careful logical analysis demonstrating the logical flaws of the “theory.” With the hope that unimpeachable empirical regularities may ...
... appear before students in much the same way as they have for decades, unaffected in many classrooms by careful logical analysis demonstrating the logical flaws of the “theory.” With the hope that unimpeachable empirical regularities may ...
Página 8
... appear quite sensible. However, the lack of broader com- parative testing has had several unintended consequences. Because of ad hoc variations in sets of control variables and the populations of cases across studies, we continue to be ...
... appear quite sensible. However, the lack of broader com- parative testing has had several unintended consequences. Because of ad hoc variations in sets of control variables and the populations of cases across studies, we continue to be ...
Página 10
... appear most consistent with some aspect of international conflict behavior. Our second prior is that, while no single factor is adequate to ex- plain international conflict, we believe that with careful empirical tests we can show that ...
... appear most consistent with some aspect of international conflict behavior. Our second prior is that, while no single factor is adequate to ex- plain international conflict, we believe that with careful empirical tests we can show that ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus