The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página xi
... able methodological advice . We presented various sections of the book at political science de- partments around the country , where numerous critical ( and even some constructive ) comments improved the final product . These talks ...
... able methodological advice . We presented various sections of the book at political science de- partments around the country , where numerous critical ( and even some constructive ) comments improved the final product . These talks ...
Página 4
... able to conclude that one ex- planation is clearly superior in all circumstances , as no single observa- tion is sufficient to falsify a theory in a probabilistic world . By " proba- bilistic " we mean that there is a stochastic ...
... able to conclude that one ex- planation is clearly superior in all circumstances , as no single observa- tion is sufficient to falsify a theory in a probabilistic world . By " proba- bilistic " we mean that there is a stochastic ...
Página 5
... able to make two sets of judgments. First, we can assess whether a set of indicator variables derived from an ar- gument about the relative likelihood of war makes novel contributions to the fit of our statistical models. Second, we can ...
... able to make two sets of judgments. First, we can assess whether a set of indicator variables derived from an ar- gument about the relative likelihood of war makes novel contributions to the fit of our statistical models. Second, we can ...
Página 15
... able to examine and evaluate indicators drawn from multiple levels of analysis by focusing on the directed dyad-year as our unit of analysis. A directed dyad-year is a pair of states in a given year, ob- served from the perspective of ...
... able to examine and evaluate indicators drawn from multiple levels of analysis by focusing on the directed dyad-year as our unit of analysis. A directed dyad-year is a pair of states in a given year, ob- served from the perspective of ...
Página 17
... able to explain 100 percent of the ob- served variation in our dependent variable. While we draw from this behaviorist well, we nevertheless believe that there are several reasons 17 Comparative Hypothesis Testing and Some Limits to ...
... able to explain 100 percent of the ob- served variation in our dependent variable. While we draw from this behaviorist well, we nevertheless believe that there are several reasons 17 Comparative Hypothesis Testing and Some Limits to ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus