The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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... Russett read multiple drafts and tolerated numerous long - winded and one - sided discussions about the deeper meaning of our results . Stam remains gratefully indebted to Russett for his constant support in this and many other ...
... Russett read multiple drafts and tolerated numerous long - winded and one - sided discussions about the deeper meaning of our results . Stam remains gratefully indebted to Russett for his constant support in this and many other ...
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... Russett launched a veritable cottage industry based on pitting the democratic peace proposition against a variety of control variables (Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001). Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) tested their ...
... Russett launched a veritable cottage industry based on pitting the democratic peace proposition against a variety of control variables (Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001). Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) tested their ...
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... Russett 1999a ) . In none of these cases , however , do the authors attempt a comprehensive examination of competing explanations , nor do they systematically assess the strength of the various arguments ' predictive power . In the ...
... Russett 1999a ) . In none of these cases , however , do the authors attempt a comprehensive examination of competing explanations , nor do they systematically assess the strength of the various arguments ' predictive power . In the ...
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... Russett 1993; Gartzke 1998; Gowa 1999; Schultz 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2001; Reiter and Stam 2002). The purpose of this book is not so much to test the theoretical explanations for the facts as we know them but rather to ...
... Russett 1993; Gartzke 1998; Gowa 1999; Schultz 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2001; Reiter and Stam 2002). The purpose of this book is not so much to test the theoretical explanations for the facts as we know them but rather to ...
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Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus