The Behavioral Origins of WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2009 M04 9 - 280 páginas In The Behavioral Origins of War, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam analyze systemic, binary, and individual factors in order to evaluate a wide variety of theories about the origins of war. Challenging the view that theories of war are nothing more than competing explanations for observed behavior, this expansive study incorporates variables from multiple theories and thus accounts for war's multiplicity of causes. While individual theories offer partial explanations for international conflict, only a valid set of theories can provide a complete explanation. Bennett and Stam's unconventional yet methodical approach opens the way for cumulative scientific progress in international relations. D. Scott Bennett is Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. |
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Página xi
... Bueno de Mesquita's long discussions and assistance to Bennett , the project would never have gotten off the ground . Joshua Goldstein's advice about the im- portance of careful replication was both wise and heeded to the best of our ...
... Bueno de Mesquita's long discussions and assistance to Bennett , the project would never have gotten off the ground . Joshua Goldstein's advice about the im- portance of careful replication was both wise and heeded to the best of our ...
Página 6
... de- velopment and testing, in practice most studies of international politics have failed to follow this model. Most ... (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1988). Maoz and Russett launched a veritable cottage industry based on pitting the ...
... de- velopment and testing, in practice most studies of international politics have failed to follow this model. Most ... (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1988). Maoz and Russett launched a veritable cottage industry based on pitting the ...
Página 7
... ( Bueno de Mesquita 1980 ; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992 ; Smith 1996a , 1999 ; Signorino 2000 ; Filson and Werner 2001 ) . There are a few noteworthy attempts to execute a comparative analysis of the empirical literature on ...
... ( Bueno de Mesquita 1980 ; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992 ; Smith 1996a , 1999 ; Signorino 2000 ; Filson and Werner 2001 ) . There are a few noteworthy attempts to execute a comparative analysis of the empirical literature on ...
Página 13
... Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2001; Reiter and Stam 2002). The purpose of this book is not so much to test the theoretical explanations for the facts as we know them but rather to more carefully establish the facts for which we need to ...
... Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2001; Reiter and Stam 2002). The purpose of this book is not so much to test the theoretical explanations for the facts as we know them but rather to more carefully establish the facts for which we need to ...
Página 16
... Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) present their International Interaction Game (IIG) as an essentially complete data-generating process, but this is so only in the context of the as- sumptions they need to develop their theory. Even ...
... Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) present their International Interaction Game (IIG) as an essentially complete data-generating process, but this is so only in the context of the as- sumptions they need to develop their theory. Even ...
Contenido
15 | |
The Practice and Pitfalls of Comparative Hypothesis Testing | 35 |
4 Arguments and Operational Measures | 70 |
5 Findings | 107 |
6 Assessing a Models Reliability across Space and Time | 165 |
7 Conclusion | 200 |
EUGene | 223 |
Appendix B Measuring Expected Utility | 232 |
Notes | 249 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Index | 277 |
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Términos y frases comunes
alliance approach argue arguments arms races balance of power baseline Bueno de Mesquita capabilities causal compute conflict behavior conflict initiation conjectures contiguity correlate data set decision defense pacts democracy democratic peace dependent variable Deterrence directed dyad directed dyad-year dispute initiation disputes that escalate dyadic Dyads No Dispute empirical equilibrium predictions estimate EUGene expected utility theory explanations factors fixed-effects game theoretic game tree hypotheses increase initiation and escalation interaction international conflict international politics international system interstate leaders Lemke levels of analysis logic logit measures Mesquita and Lalman military multinomial logit multiple NATO nondirected nuclear weapons Oneal outcomes percent periods Politically Relevant Dyads Polity Change potential power transition Prob problem rational choice theory Reciprocated Force region relative risk risk of conflict risk of disputes risk ratios Russett scores Stam suggest system power concentration target theoretical tion tional trade dependence Unilateral Force values versus