parent; for, as Mr. Locke observes, (9) "The bulk of mankind have not leisure nor capacity for demonstration, nor can they carry a train of proofs; but as to the worker of Miracles, all his commands become principles, there needs no other proof of what He says, but that He said it, and there needs no more than to read the inspired books to be instructed." Having thus shewn, that miracles are possible-that under certain circumstances their reality may be ascertained-that when accompanied by other circumstances which we have also mentioned, they are connected with a definite end, and connect themselves with the Divine Mission of those who perform them and with the truth of their doctrine-that as facts they are the subjects of human testimony, and that credible testimony respecting them lays a competent foundation for our belief in them, and in those Revelations which they are clearly designed to attest,the way is prepared for the consideration of the miracles recorded in scripture. PROPHECY is the other great branch of the External Evidence of a Revelation; and the nature and force of that kind of evidence may fitly be pointed out before either the miracles or prophecies of the Bible are examined: for by ascertaining the general principles on which this kind of evidence rests, the consideration of particular cases will be rendered more easy and satisfactory. No argument à priori against the possibility of prophecy can be attempted by any one who believes in the existence and infinitely perfect nature of God. The Infidel author of "The Moral Philosopher," indeed, rather insinuates than attempts fully to establish a dilemma with which to perplex those who regard prophecy as one of the proofs of a Divine Revelation. He thinks that either prophecy must respect " events necessary, as depending upon necessary causes, which might be certainly foreknown and predicted;" or that, if human actions are free, and effects contingent, the possibility of prophecy must be given up, as it implies foreknowledge, which, if granted, would render them necessary. The first part of this objection would be allowed, were there no predictions to be adduced in favour of a professed Revelation, except such as related to events which human experience has taught to be dependent upon some cause, the existence and necessary operation of which are within the compass of human (9) Reasonableness of Christianity. knowledge. But to foretell such events would not be to prophesy any more than to say, that it will be light to-morrow at noon, or that on a certain day and hour next year there will occur an eclipse of the Sun or Moon, when that event has been previously ascertained by astronomical calculation. If, however, it were allowed, that all events depended upon a chain of necessary causes, yet, in a variety of instances, the argument from prophecy would not be at all affected; for the foretelling of necessary results in certain circumstances is beyond human intelligence, because they can only be known to him by whose power those necessary causes on which they depend have been arranged, and who has prescribed the times of their operation. To borrow a case, for the sake of illustration, from the Scriptures, though the claims of their predictions are not now in question; let us allow that such a prophecy as that of Isaiah respecting the taking of Babylon by Cyrus was uttered, as it purports to be, more than a century before Cyrus was born, and that all the actions of Cyrus and his army, and those of the Babylonian Monarch and his people were necessitated; is it to be maintained, that the chain of necessitating causes running through more than a century could be traced by a human mind, so as to describe the precise manner in which that fatality would unfold itself, even to the turning of the river, the drunken carousal of the inhabitants, and the neglect of shutting the gates of the city? This being by uniform and universal experience known to be above all human apprehension, would therefore prove that the prediction was made in consequence of a communication from a superior and divine intelligence. Were events therefore subjected to invincible fate and necessity, there might nevertheless be prophecy. The other branch of the dilemma is founded on the notion, that if we allow the moral freedom of human actions, prophecy is impossible, because certain foreknowledge is contrary to that freedom, and fixes and renders the event necessary. To this the reply is, that the objection is founded on a false assumption, the Divine foreknowledge having no more influence in effectuating, or making certain any event, than human foreknowledge in the degree in which it may exist; there being no moral causality at all in knowledge. This lies in the will, which is the determining acting principle in every agent; or, as Dr. Samuel Clarke has expressed it in answer to another kind of objector, "God's infallible judgment concerning contingent truths does no more alter the nature of the things and cause them to be necessary, than our judging right at any time concerning a contingent truth, makes it cease to be contingent; or than our science of a present truth is any cause of its being either true or present. Here, therefore, lies the fallacy of our author's argument. Because from God's foreknowing the existence of things depending upon a chain of necessary causes it follows, that the existence of the things must needs be necessary; therefore from God's judging infallibly concerning things which depend not on necessary but free causes, he concludes, that these things also depend not upon free but necessary causes. Contrary, I say, to the supposition in the argument, for it must not be first supposed, that things are in their own nature necessary; but from the power of judging infallibly concerning free events, it must be proved that things otherwise supposed free, will thereby unavoidably become necessary." The whole question lies in this, is the simple knowledge of an action a necessitating cause of the action? And the answer must be in the negative, as every man's consciousness will assure him. If the causality of influence, either immediate, or by the arrangement of compelling events, be mixed up with this, the ground is shifted; and it is no longer a question which respects simple prescience. as a This metaphysical objection having no foundation in truth, the force of the evidence arising from predictions of events, distant, and out of the power of human sagacity to anticipate, and uttered authentications of Divine commission, is apparent. "Such predictions, whether in the form of declaration, description, or representation of things future," as Mr. Boyle justly observes, " are supernatural things, and may properly be ranked among miracles." (1). For when, for instance, the events are distant many years or ages from the uttering of the prediction itself, depending on causes not so much as existing when the prophecy was spoken and recorded, and likewise upon various circumstances and a long arbitrary series of things, and the fluctuating uncertainties of human volitions, and especially when they depend not at all upon any external circumstances nor upon any created being, but arise merely from the counsels and appointment of God himself, such events can be foreknown only by that Being one of whose attributes is Omniscience, and can be foretold by him only to whom the "Father of Lights" shall reveal them: so that whoever is manifestly endued with that (1) BOYLE'S Christian Virtuoso. predictive power, must, in that instance, speak and act by Divine inspiration, and what he pronounces of that kind must be received as the word of God; nothing more being necessary to assure us of this, than credible testimony that such predictions were uttered before the event, or conclusive evidence that the records which contain them are of the antiquity to which they pretend. (2) CHAPTER X. The Evidences necessary to authenticate a Revelation continued.Internal Evidence. - Collateral Evidence. THE Second kind of evidence, usually considered as necessary for the attestation of a divine revelation, is called Internal Evidence. This kind of evidence has been already described to be that which arises from the consideration of the doctrines taught, as being consistent with the character of God, and tending to promote the virtue and happiness of man, the ends for which a revelation of the will of God was needed, and for which it must have been given, if it be considered as an act of grace and mercy. This subject, like the two branches of the External Evidence, miracles and prophecy, involves important general principles; and it may require to be the more carefully considered, as opinions have run into extremes. By some it has been doubted, whether what is called "the Internal Evidence," that is, the excellence of the doctrines and tendency of a revelation, ought to be ranked with the leading evidence of miracles and prophecy, seeing that the proof from miracles and from prophecy is decisive and absolute. For the same reason, however, prophecy might be excluded from the rank of leading evidence, inasmuch as miracles of themselves are, in their evidence, decisive and absolute. If, however, it were contended, that proofs from miracles, prophecy, and internal Evidence, are jointly necessary to constitute sufficient proof of the truth of a revelation, there would be reason to dispute the position, understanding by "sufficient evidence" that degree of proof which would (2) Vide CHAPMAN'S Eusebius, p. 158; CUDWORTH'S Intellect. Syst. p. 866; VITRINGA in Isa. cap. 41. render it highly unreasonable, perverse, and culpable, in any one to reject the authority of the revelation. This evidence is afforded by miracles alone; for if there be any force at all in the argument from miracles, it goes to the full length of rational proof of a divine attestation, and that both to him who personally witnesses the performance of a real miracle, and to him to whom it is credibly testified; and nothing more is absolutely necessary to enforce a rational conviction. But if it should please the Divine Author of a revelation to superadd the further evidence of prophecy, and also that of the obvious truth, and beneficial tendency, of many parts of this revelation, circumstances which must necessarily be often apparent, it ought not to be disregarded in the argument in its favour, nor thought of trifling import; since, though it may not be necessary to establish a rational and sufficient proof, it may have a secondary necessity to arouse attention, to leave objectors more obviously without excuse, and also to accommodate the revelation to that variety which exists in the mental constitutions of men, one mind being excited to attention, and disposed to conviction, more forcibly by one species of proof than by another. In strict propriety, therefore, miracles may be considered as the primary evidence of the truth of a revelation, and every other species of proof as confirmatory. Prophecy and the Internal Evidence are leading evidences, but neither of them stand in the foremost place. The same abundance of proof we perceive in nature, for the demonstration of the being and attributes of God. Proofs of the existence of a First Cause, almighty and infinitely wise, more than what is logically sufficient, surround us every where ; but who can doubt, that if half the instances of infinite power and wisdom which are seen in the material universe were annihilated, there would not be sufficient evidence to demonstrate both these, as perfections of the Maker of the universe? On the other hand, the proof drawn from the Internal Evidence by others has been placed first in order, and the force of the evidence from miracles and prophecy is by them made to depend upon the excellence of the doctrine which they are brought forward to confirm, and which ought first to be ascertained. Nothing, say they, is to be received as a revelation from God which does not contain doctrines worthy of the divine character, and tending to promote the good of mankind."A necessary mark of a religion coming from God is, that the duties it enjoins are all such as are agreeable to our natural |