but here the waters divide, and, contrary to their nature, stand up on each side, leaving a passage for the Host of Israel. It is in the nature of clouds to be carried about by the wind; but the cloud which went before the Israelites in the wilderness, rested on their tabernacle, moved when they were commanded to march, and directed their course; rested when they were to pitch their tents, and was a pillar of direction by day; and, by night, when it is the nature of clouds to become dark, the rays of the sun no longer permeating them, this cloud shone with the brightness of fire. In all these cases, if the facts be established, there can be no doubt as to their miraculous character. "Were a physician instantly to give sight to a blind man, by anointing his eyes with a chemical preparation, to the nature and qualities of which we were absolute strangers, the cure would to us, undoubtedly, be wonderful; but we could not pronounce it miraculous, because it might be the physical effect of the operation of the unguent upon the eye. But were he to give sight to his patient, merely by commanding him to receive it, or by anointing his eyes with spittle, we should, with the utmost confidence, pronounce the cure to be a miracle; because we know perfectly, that neither the human voice nor human spittle has, by the established constitution of things, any such power over the diseases of the eye. No one is ignorant, that persons, apparently dead, are often restored to their families and friends, by being treated, during suspended animation, in the manner recommended by the Humane Society. To the vulgar, and sometimes even to men of science, these resuscitations appear very wonderful; but as they are known to be effected by physical agency, they cannot be considered as miraculous deviations from the laws of nature. On the other hand, no one could doubt of his having witnessed a real miracle, who had seen a person, that had been four days dead, come alive out of the grave at the call of another, or who had even beheld a person exhibiting all the common evidences of death, instantly resuscitated, merely by being desired to live." (4) In all such instances, the common course of nature is sufficiently known to support the conclusion, that the power which thus interferes with, and controls it, and produces effects, to which the visible natural causes are known not to be adequate, is God.(5) (4) Gleig's edition of Stackhouse's History of the Bible. Vol. iii. p. 241. (5) It is observable, that no miracles appear to have been wrought by human agency before the time of Moses and Aaron, in whose days, not only had the world But it is also necessary, in order to prove that even these miraculous events are authentications of a divine mission, that a direct connection between the power of God, exerted in a miraculous act, and the messenger, and his message, should be established. The following circumstances would appear sufficiently to establish such a connection:-1. When the miracles occur at the time when he, who professes to have a Divine mission from God, is engaged in making known the will of God to mankind, by communicating the revelation he has received, and performing other acts connected with his office. 2. When, though they are works above human power, they are wrought by the messenger himself, or follow his volitions. The force of this argument may be thus exhibited : When such unequivocal miracles as those we have pointed out occur only in connection with an actual profession by certain persons, that they have a divine authority to teach and command mankind, this is a strong presumption, that the works are wrought by God in order to authenticate this pretension; but when they are performed mediately by these persons themselves, by their own will, and for the express purpose of establishing their mission, inasmuclı as they are allowed to be real miracles, which no power, but that of God, can effect, it is then clear that God is with them, and that his co-operation is an authenticating and visible seal upon their commission. It is not necessary, in this stage, to specify the rules by which real and pretended miracles are to be distinguished; nor to enquire, whether the Scriptures allow that, in some cases, miracles have been wrought in support of falsehood. Both these subjects will be examined when we come to speak of the miracles of Scripture. The ground established is, that miracles are possible; and that, when real miracles occur under the circumstances we have mentioned, they are satisfactory evidences of a divine mission. But though this should be allowed, and also that the eyewitnesses of such miracles would be bound to admit the proof, it has been made a question, whether their testimony affords sufficient reason to others to admit the fact that such events actually took place, and consequently whether we are bound to acknowledge the authority of that mission, in attestation of which the miracles are said to have been wrought. long existed, but consequently the course of nature had been observed for a long period; and further, these first miracles were wrought among a refined and observant people, who had their philosophers, to whom the course of nature, and the operation of physical causes, were subjects of keen investigation. If this be admitted, the benefits of a revelation must be confined to those who witnessed its attestation by miracle, or similar attestations must be afforded to every individual; for, as no revelation can be a benefit unless it possess divine authority, which alone can infallibly mark the distinction between truth and error, should the authentication be partial, the benefit of the communication of an infallible doctrine must also be partial. We are all so much interested in this, because no religious system can plead the authentication of perpetual miracle, that it deserves special consideration. Either this principle is unsound, or we must abandon all hope of discovering a religion of divine authority. As miracles are facts, they, like other facts, may be reported to others; and, as in the case of the miracles in question, bearing the characters which have been described, the competency of any man of ordinary understanding to determine whether they were actually wrought cannot be doubted; if the witnesses are credible, it is reasonable that their testimony should be admitted: for if the testimony be such as in matters of the greatest moment to us in the affairs of common life we should uot hesitate to act upon;-if it be such, that in the most important affairs men do uniformly act upon similar or even weaker testimony, it would be mere perverseness to reject it in the case in question; and would argue rather a disinclination to the doctrine which is thus proved, than any rational doubt of the sufficiency of the proof itself. The objection is put in its strongest form by Mr. Hume, in his Essays, and the substance of it is: Experience is the ground of the credit we give to human testimony; but this experience is by no means constant, for we often find men prevaricate and deceive. On the other hand, it is experience, in like manner, which assures us of those laws of nature, in the violation of which the notion of a miracle consists; but this experience is constant and uniform. A miracle is an event which, from its nature, is inconsistent with our experience; but the falsehood of testimony is not inconsistent with experience; it is contrary to experience that miracles should be true, but not contrary to experience that testimony should be false; and, therefore, no human testimony can, in any case, render them credible. This argument has been met by many authors, (6) but the following extracts afford ample refutation : (6) See Campbell's Dissertation on Miracles; Price's Four Dissertations, Diss. 4; Paley's Evidences; Adam's Essay on Miracles; Bishop Douglas's VOL. I. G "The principle of this objection is, that it is contrary to experience that a miracle should be true; but not contrary to experience that testimony should be false. "Now there appears a small ambiguity in the term 'experience,' and in the phrases 'contrary to experience,' or 'contradicting experience,' which it may be necessary to remove in the first place. Strictly speaking, the narrative of a fact is then only contrary to experience, when the fact is related to have existed at a time and place; at which time and place, we, being present, did not perceive it to exist; as if it should be asserted, that, in a particular room, and at a particular hour of a certain day, a man was raised from the dead; in which room, and at the time specified, we, being present and looking on, perceived no such event to have taken place. " Here the assertion is contrary to experience, properly so called; and this is a contrariety which no evidence can surmount. It matters nothing whether the fact be of a miraculous nature or not. But although this be the experience and the contrariety, which Archbishop Tillotson alleged in the quotation with which Mr. Hume opens his Essay, it is certainly not that experience, nor that contrariety, which Mr. Hume himself intended to object. And, short of this, I know no intelligible signification which can be affixed to the term 'contrary to experience, but one, viz. that of not having ourselves experienced any thing similar to the thing related, or such things not being generally experienced by others. I say, 'not generally;' for to state, concerning the fact in question, that no such thing was ever experienced, or that universal experience is against it, is to assume the subject of the controversy. "Now the improbability which arises from the want (for this properly is a want, not a contradiction) of experience, is only equal to the probability there is, that, if the thing were true, we should experience things similar to it, or that such things would be generally experienced. Suppose it then to be true, that miracles were wrought upon the first promulgation of Christianity, when nothing but miracles could decide its authority, is it certain that such miracles would be repeated so often, and in so many places, as to become objects of general experience? Is it a probability approaching to certainty? Is it a probability of any great strength or force? Is it such as no evidence can encounter? And yet this probability is the exact Criterion; Dwight's Theology, Vol. ii; Dr. Hey's Norrisian Lectures, Vol.i; Van Mildert's Boyle's Lectures, Vol. i. converse, and therefore the exact measure of the improbability which arises from the want of experience, and which Mr. Hume represents as invincible by human testimony. " It is not like alleging a new law of nature, or a new experiment in natural philosophy; because when these are related, it is expected that, under the same circumstances, the same effect will follow universally; and in proportion as this expectation is justly entertained, the want of a corresponding experience negatives the history. But to expect concerning a miracle, that it should succeed upon a repetition, is to expect that which would make it cease to be a miracle, which is contrary to its nature as such, and would totally destroy the use and purpose for which it was wrought. "The force of experience, as an objection to miracles, is founded in the presumption, either that the course of nature is invariable, or that, if it be ever varied, variations will be frequent and general. Has the necessity of this alternative been demonstrated? Permit us to call the course of nature the agency of an intelligent Being; and is there any good reason for judging this state of the case to be probable? Ought we not rather to expect, that such a Being, on occasions of peculiar importance, may interrupt the order which he had appointed, yet, that such occasions should return seldom; that these interruptions, consequently, should be confined to the experience of a few; that the want of it, therefore, in many, should be matter neither of surprise nor objection ? " But as a continuation of the argument from experience, it is said, that when we advance accounts of miracles, we assign effects without causes, or we attribute effects to causes inadequate to the purpose, or to causes, of the operation of which we have no experience. Of what causes, we may ask, and of what effects does the objection speak? If it be answered, that when we ascribe the cure of the palsy to a touch, of blindness to the anointing of the eyes with clay, or the raising of the dead to a word, we lay ourselves open to this imputation; we reply, that we ascribe no such effects to such causes. We perceive no virtue or energy in these things more than in other things of the same kind. They are merely signs, to connect the miracle with its end. The effect we ascribe simply to the volition of the Deity; of whose existence and power, not to say of whose presence and agency, we have previous and independent proof. We have, therefore, all we seek for in the works of rational |