or purpose in view, should kill his neighbour, I fee not that he would be more accountable, than if he had acted in his fleep, or were mad.

Human punishments are perfectly confiftent with the neceffary influence of motives, without fuppofing a power to withstand them. If it be urged, That a man ought not to be panifhed for committing a crime when he could not refift; the anfwer is, That as he committed the crime intentionally, and with his eyes open, he is guilty in his own opinion, and in the opinion of all men; and he justly fuffers punishment, to prevent him or others from doing the like in time to come. The dread of punifhment is a weight in the scale on the fide of virtue, to counterbalance vicious motives.

The final caufe of this branch of our nature is admirarable. If the neceffary influence of motives had the effect either to leffen the merit of a virtuous action, or the demerit of a crime, morality would be totally unhinged. The most virtuous action would of all be the leaft worthy of praise; and the most vicious be of all the leaft worthy of blame. Nor would the evil ftop there: inftead of curbing inordinate paffions, we fhould be encouraged to indulge them, as an excellent excufe for doing wrong. Thus, the moral fentiments of approbation and difapprobation, of praife and blame, are found perfectly confiftent with the laws above mentioned that govern human actions, without having recourfe to an imaginary power of acting againft motives.

The only plaufible objection I have met with against the foregoing theory, is the remorfe a man feels for a crime he fuddenly commits, and as fuddenly repents of. During a fit of bitter remorse for having flain my favourite fervant in a violent paffion, without juft provocation, I accufe myself for having given way to paffion; and acknowledge that I could and ought to have restrained it. Here we find remorfe founded on a fyftem directly oppofite to that above laid down; a system that acknowledges no neceffary connection between an action and the motive that produced it, but, on the contrary, fuppofes that it is in a man's power to refift his paffion, and that he

ftantly to rage.

ought to refift it. What shall be faid upon this point? Can a man be a neceffary agent, when he is confcious of the contrary, and is fenfible that he can act in contradiction to motives? This objection is strong in appearance; and would be invincible, were we not happily relieved of it by a doctrine laid down in Elements of Criticifm (a) concerning the irregular influence of paffion on our opi nions and fentiments. Upon examination it will be found, that the prefent cafe may be added to the many examples there given of this irregular influence. In a peevish fit, I take exception at fome flight word or gefture of my friend, which I interpret as if he doubted of my veracity. I am inftantly in a flame: in vain he protests that he had no meaning, for impatience will not fuffer me to liften. I bid him draw, which he does with reluctance; and before he is well prepared, I give him a mortal wound. Bitter remorfe and anguish fucceed in"What have I done? why did I not "abstain? I was not mad, and yet I have murdered my "innocent friend; there is the hand that did the horrid "deed; why did not I rather turn it against my own "heart?" Here every impreffion of neceffity vanithes my mind tells me that I was abfolutely free, and that I ought to have fmothered my paffion. I put an oppofite cafe. A brutal fellow treats me with great indignity, and proceeds even to a blow. My paffion rifes beyond the poffibility of reftraint. I can fcarce forbear fo long as to bid him draw; and that, moment I ftab him to the heart. I am forry for having been engaged with a ruf fian, but have no contrstion nor remorfe. In this cafe my fentiments are very different from what they are in the other. I never once dream that I could have refifted the impulfe of paffion; on the contrary, my thoughts and words are, "That flesh and blood could not bear the af "front; and that I must have been branded for a coward, "had I not done what I did." In-reality, both the actions were equally neceffary. Whence then opinions and fentiments fo opposite to each other? The irregular influence of paffion on our opinions and fentiments, willfolve (a) Chap. 2. part 5.

the question. All violent paffions are prone to their own gratification. A man affected with deep remorfe abhors himfelf, and is odious in his own eyes; and it gratifies the paffion, to indulge the thought that his guilt is beyond the poffibility of excufe. In the first cafe accordingly, remorse forces upon me a conviction that I might have restrained my paffion, and ought to have restrained it. I will not give way to any excufe; because in a fit of remorse it gives me pain to be excufed. In the other cafe, there being no remorfe, there is no disguise; and things appear in their true light. To illuftrate this reafoning, I obferve, that paffion warps my judgment of the actions of others, as well as of my own. Many examples are given in the chapter above quoted: join to thefe the following. My fervant aiming at a partridge, happens to fhoot a favourite fpaniel croffing the way unfeen. Inflamed with anger, I ftorm at his rafhness, pronounce him guilty, and will liften to no excufe. When my paffion is spent, I become fenfible that it was merely accidental, and that the man is abfolutely innocent. The nurfe overlays my only child, the long-expected heir to a great eftate. It is with difficulty that I refrain from putting her to death: "The wretch has murdered my in"fant, and deferves to be torn to pieces.' 22 When my paffion fubfides, I fee the matter in a very different light. The poor woman is inconfolable, and can fearce believe that the is innocent: fhe bitterly reproaches herself for want of care and concern. But, upon cool reflection, both the and I are fenfible, that no perfon in found fleep bas any felf-command; and that we cannot be anfwerable for any action of which we are not confcious. Thus, upon the whole, we fmd, that any impreffion we may occafionally have of being able to act in contradiction to motives, is the refult of paffion, not of found judgment.

The reader will obferve, that this fection is copied from Effays on Morality and Natural Religion. The ground-work is the fame: the alterations are only in the fuperftructure; and the fubject is abridged in order to adapt it to its prefent place. Part of the abridgment was published in the second edition of the Principles of

Equity. But as law-books have little currency, the publifhing the whole in one effay, will not, I hope, be thought improper.

APPENDIX.

UPON CHANCE AND CONTINGENCY.

I hold it to be an intuitive propofition, That the Deity is the primary caufe of all things; that with confummate wifdom he formed the great plan of government, which he carries on by laws fuited to the different natures of animate and inanimate beings; and that thefe laws produce a regular chain of caufes and effects in the moral as well as the material world, admitting no events but what are comprehended in the original plan (a). Hence it clearly follows, that chance is excluded out of this world, that nothing can happen by accident, and that no event is arbitrary or contingent. This is the doctrine of the effay quoted; and, in my apprehenfion, well founded. But I must fubfcribe to what follows, viz. "That we "have an impreffion of chance and contingency, which "confequently must be detufive." I would not willingly admit any delusion in the nature of man, where it is not made evident beyond contradiction; and I now fee clearly, that the impreffion we have of chance and contingency, is not delufive, but perfectly confiftent with the established plan.

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The explanation of chance and contingency in the faid effay, fhall be given in the author's own words, as a proper text to reafon upon. "In our ordinary train of thinking, it is certain that all events appear not to us as neceffary. A multitude of events feem to be under ❝our power to cause or to prevent ; and we readily make a distinction betwixt events that are neceffary, i. e. that "must be; and events that are contingent, i. e. that may "be, or may not be. This diftinction is void of truth: "for all things that fall out either in the material or mo"ral world, are, as we have feen, alike neceffary, and "alike the refult of fixed laws. Yet, whatever convic“tion a philofopher may have of this, the diftinction be

(a) See Effays on Morality and Natural Religion, Part 1 Effay 3

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"twixt things neceffary and things contingent, poffeffes "his common train of thought, as much as it poffeffes "the most illiterate. We act univerfally upon that dif"tinction: nay it is in truth the caufe of all the labour, 66 care, and industry, of mankind. I illuftrate this doc"trine by an example. Conftant experience has taught us, that death is a neceffary event. The human frame ❝is not made to laft for ever in its prefent condition; and no man thinks of more than a temporary existence upon this globe. But the particular time of our death appears a contingent event. However certain it be, that the time and manner of the death of each indivi"dual is determined by a train of preceding causes, and “is no lefs fixed than the hour of the fun's rifing or set"ting; yet no perfon is affected by this doctrine. "the care of prolonging life, we are directed by the fuppofed contingency of the time of death, which, to a "certain term of years, we confider as depending in a great measure on ourselves, by caution against accidents, due ufe of food, exercife, &c. Thefe means are "profecuted with the fame diligence as if there were in "fact no neceffary train of causes to fix the period of "life. In fhort, whoever attends to his own practical

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ideas, whoever reflects upon the meaning of the fol"lowing words which occur in all languages, of things poffible, contingent, that are in our power to caufe or pre"vent; whoever, I fay, reflects upon these words, will "clearly fee, that they fuggeft certain perceptions or "notions repugnant to the doctrine above cftablished of univerfal neceffity.'

In order to fhew that there is no repugnance, I begin with defming chance and contingency. The former is applied to events that have happened; the latter to future events. When we fay a thing has happened by chance, we do not mean that chance was the caufe; for no perfor ever thought that chance is a thing that can act, and by acting produce everts: we only mean, that we are ignorant of the caufe, and that, for aught we fee, it might have happened or not happened, or have happened difiérently. Aiming at a bird, I fhoot by chance a favourite