tional creatures by the prospect of good, however erroneous our judgment may fometimes be.

Confidering that man is the only terreftrial being formed to know his Maker, and to worship him, will it not found harshly, while all other animals are fubjected to divine government, and unerringly fufil their deftination, that man alone fhould be withdrawn from divine govern ment, and be fo framed, that neither his Maker, nor he himself, can foresee what he will do the next moment? The power of refifting the ftrongeft motives, whether of religion or morality, would render him independent of the Deity.

This reafoning is too diffufe: may it not be comprehended in a fingle view? it will make the deeper impreffion. There may be conceived different fyftems for governing man as a thinking and rational being. One is, That virtuous motives fhould always prevail over every other motive. This, in appearance, would be the most perfect government. But man is not fo conftituted: and there is reafon to doubt, whether fuch perfection would in his prefent ftate correfpond to the other branches of his nature (a). Another fyftem is, That virtuous motives fometimes prevail, fometimes vicious; and that we are always determined by the prevailing motive. This is the true fyftem of nature; and hence great variety of character and of conduct among men. A third fyftem is, That motives have influence; but that one can act in contradiction to every motive. This is the fyftem I have been combating. Obferve only what it refolves into. How is an action to be accounted for that is done in contradiction to every motive? It wanders from the region of common fense into that of mere chance. If fuch were the nature of man, no one could rely upon another: a promife or an oath would be a rope of fand: the utmost cordiality between my friend and me, would be no fecuri ty against his ftabbing me with the first weapon that comes Would any man wifh to have been formed according to fuch a fyftem? He would probably wish to

in his way,

(a) bee book 2. ketch r. at the end.

Book III. have been formed according to the fyftem first mentioned : but that is denied him, virtuous motives fometimes prevailing, fometimes vicious; and from the wifdom of Providence we have reason to believe, that this law is of all the best fitted for man in his present state.

To conclude this branch of the fubject: In none of the works of Providence, fo far as we can penetrate, is there difplayed a deeper reach of art and wisdom, than in the laws of action peculiar to man as a thinking and rational being. Were he left loofe, to act in contradiction to motives, there would be no place for prudence, forefight, nor for adjufting means to an end: it could not be forefeen by others what a man will do the next hour; nay it could not be forefeen, even by himself. Man could not be capable of rewards or punishments: he could not be fitted, either for divine or for human government: he would be a creature that has no resemblance to the human race. But man is not left loose: for though he is, at liberty to act according to his own will, yet his will is regulated by defire, and defire by what pleafes and difpleafes. This connection preferves uniformity of conduct, and confines human actions within the great chain-of causes and effects. By this admirable fyftem, liberty and neceffity, feemingly incompatible, are made perfectly concordant, fitting us for fociety, and for government both human and divine.

Having explained the laws that govern human actions, we proceed to what is chiefly intended in the prefent fection, which is, to examine, how far the moral fentiments handled in the foregoing fections are confiftent with these laws. Let it be kept in view, that our moral fentiments and feelings are founded entirely upon the moral fenfe; which unfolds to us a right and wrong in actions. From the fame fenfe are derived the fentiments of approbation and praise when a man does right, and of difapprobation and blame when he does wrong. Were we destitute of the moral fenfe, right and wrong, praise and blame, would be as little understood as colours are by one born blind *.

In an intricate fubject like the prefent, great care fhould be taken to avoid ambiguities. The term praife has two different fignifications: none fenfe it is oppofed to blame; in another ot

The formidable argument that is urged, to prove that our moral fentiments are inconfiftent with the fuppofed neceffary influence of motives is what follows. "If mo"tives have à neceffary influence on our actions, there can be no good reason to praise a man for doing right, "nor to blame him for doing wrong. What foundation ❝ can there be, either for praise or blame, when it was "not in a man's power to have acted otherwife? A man "commits murder irigated by a fudden fit of revenge : why fhould he be punished, if he acted neceffarily and "could not refift the violence of the paffion?" Here it is fuppofed, that a power of refiftance is effential to praife or blame. But upon examination it will be found, that this fuppofition has not any fupport in the moral fenfe, nor in reafon, nor in the common fenfe of mankind.

86

With refpect to the first, the moral fenfe, as we have feen above, places innocence and guilt, and confequently praise and blame, entirely upon will and intention. The connection between the motive and the action, so far from diminishing, enhances the praife or blame. The greater influence a virtuous motive has, the greater is the virtue of the agent, and the more warm our praife. On the other hand, the greater influence a vicious motive has, the greater is the vice of the agent, and the more violently do we blame him. As this is the cardinal point, I wish to have it confidered in a general view. It is ef sential both to human and divine government, that the influence of motives fhould be neceffary. It is equally effential, that that neceffary influence should not have the effect to leffen guilt in the estimation of men. To full both ends, guilt is placed by the moral fenfe entirely upon will and intention: a man accordingly blames himself for doing mischief willingly and intentionally, without difpraife. In the former fenfe it expreffes a moral fentinent: in the latter it expreffes only the approving any object that pleafes I praife one man for his candour, and blame another for being a double dealer. Thefe, both of them, imply will and intention. I praise a man for being acute; but for being dull, I only difpraife him. I praife a woman for her beauty, but blame not any for uglinefs, I only difpraife them. None of these particulars imply will or intention.

me.

Book III. once confidering whether he acted neceffarily or not. And his fentiments are adopted by all the world; they pronounce the fame fentence of condemnation that he himfelf does. A man put to the torture, yields to the pain, and with bitter reluctance reveals the fecret of his party; another does the fame, yielding to a tempting bribe. The latter only is blamed as guilty of a crime, and yet the bribe perhaps operated as ftrongly on the latter, as torture did on the former. But the one was compelled against his will to reveal the fecrets of his party, and therefore is innocent; the other acted willingly, in order to procure a great fum of money; and therefore is guilty.

With refpect to reafon, I obferve, that the argumenɛ I am combating, is an appeal to a wrong tribunal: the moral fenfe is the only judge in this controverfy, not the faculty of reafon. At the fame time, I should have no fear of a sentence against me were reason to be the judge. For would not reafon dictate, that the lefs a man wavers about his duty; or, in other words, the less influence vicious motives have, the more praife-worthy he is; and the more blameable, the lefs influence virtuous motives have?

Nor are we led by common sense to differ from reafon and the moral fenfe. A man commits murder, overcome by a fudden fit of revenge which he could not refift; will not one be led to reflect, even at first view, that the man did not wish to refift; on the contrary that he would have committed the murder, though he had not been under any neceffity? A perfon of plain understanding will fay, What fignifies it whether the criminal could refift or not, when he committed the murder wittingly and willingly? A man gives poifon privately out of revenge. Does any one doubt of his guilt, when he never once repented; though after adminiftering the poifon it no longer was in his power to draw back? A man may be guilty and blame-worthy, even where there is external compulfion that he cannot refift. With fword in hand I run to attack an enemy: my foot flipping, I fall headlong upon him, and by that accident the fword is pushed into his

body. The external act was not the effect of will, but of accident; but my intention was to commit murder, and I am guilty. All men acknowledge, that the Deity is neceffarily good. Does that circumftance detract from his praise in common apprehenfion? On the contrary, he merits from us the highest praise on that very account. It is commonly faid, that there can be no virtue where there is no ftruggle. Virtue, it is true, is beft known from a ftruggle: a man who has never met with a temptation, can be little confident of his virtue. But the obfervation taken in a strict fense is undoubtedly erroneous. A man tempted to betray his truft, wavers; but, after much doubting, refufes at last the bribe: another hefitates not a moment, but rejects the bribe with disdain: duty is obftinate, and will not fuffer him even to deliberate. Is there no virtue in the latter? Undoubtedly. more than in the former.

Upon the whole, it appears that praife and blame reft ultimately upon the difpofition or frame of mind. Nor is it obvious, that a power to act against motives, couid vary in any degree thefe moral fentiments. When a man commits a crime, let it be fuppofed, that he could have refifted the prevailing motive. Why then did he not refift, inftead of bringing upon himself shame and mifery? The answer muft be, for no other can be given, that his difpofition is vicious, and that he is a deteftable creature. Further, it is not a little difficult to conceive, how a man can refift a prevailing motive, without having any thing in his mind that should engage him to refift it. But letting that pass, I make the following fuppofition. A man is tempted by avarice to accept a bribe; if he refift upon the principle of duty, he is led by the prevailing motive; if he refift without having any reafon or motive for refifting, I cannot difcover any merit in fuch resistance; it feems to refolve into a matter of chance or accident, whether he refift or do not refift. Where can the merit lie of refifting a vicious motive, when refiftance happens by mere chance? and where the demerit of refifting a virtuðus motive, when it is owing to the fame chance? If a man, actuated by no principle good or bad, and having no end