SECT. VIII.

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY CONSIDERED WITH RESPECT TO MORALITY.

Having, in the foregoing fections, afcertained the reality of a moral fenfe, with its fentiments of approbation and difapprobation, praife and blame; the purpose of the prefent fection is, to fhew, that thefe fentiments are confiftent with the laws that govern the actions of man as a rational being. In order to which it is first neceffary to explain these laws; for there has been much controversy about them, especially among divines of the Arminian and Calvinist fects.

Human actions, as laid down in the firft fection, are of three kinds: one, where we act by inftinct, without any view to confequences; one, where we act by will in order to produce fome effect; and one, where we act against will. With refpect to the firft, the agent acts blindly, without deliberation or choice; and the external act follows neceffarily from the inftinctive impufe*. Actions done with a view to an end, are in a very different condition in these, deliberation, choice, will, enter: the intention to accomplish the end goes firft; the will to act in order to accomplish the end is next; and the external act follows of course. It is the will then that governs every action done as means to an end; and it is defire to accomplish the end that puts the will in motion; defire in this view being commonly termed the motive to act. Thus, hearing that my friend is in the hands of

A ftonechatter makes its neft on the ground or near it; and the young, as foon as they can fhift for themfelves, leave the neft inflinctively. An egg of that bird was laid in a fwallows neft, fixed to the roof of a church. The fwallow fed all the young equally without diftinction. The young fonechatter left the neft at the ufual time before it could fly; and falling to the ground it was taken up dead. Here is inftine in purity, exerting itself blindly without regard to variation of circumftances. The fame is obfervable in our dunghill-fowl. They feed on worms, corn, and other feeds dropt on the ground. In order to difcover their food, nature has provided them with an inftinct to fcrape with the foot, and the inftinct is fo regularly exercifed, that they fcrape even when they are fet upon a heap of corn.

robbers, I burn with defire to free him: defire influences my will to arm my fervants, and to fly to his relief. Actions done againft will come in afterward.

But what is it that raises defire? The answer is at hand it is the profpect of attaining fome agreeable end, or of avoiding one that is difagreeable. And if it be again enquired, What makes an object agreeable or difagreeable, the answer is equally ready, that our nature makes it fo; and more we cannot fay. Certain vifible objects are agreeable, certain founds, and certain smells: other objects of these fenfes are disagreeable. But there we muft ftop; for we are far from being fo intimately acquainted with our own nature as to affign the causes. These hints are fufficient for my prefent purpose; if one be curious to know more, the theory of defire, and of agreeablenefs and difagreeablenefs, will be found in Eliments of Criticism (a).

With refpect to inftinctive actions, no perfon, I prefume, thinks that there is any freedom, more than in acts done againft will: an infant applies to the nipple; and a bird builds its neft, no lefs neceffarily than a ftone falls to the ground. With refpect to voluntary actions, fuch as are done with a view to an end, the neceffity is the fame, though lefs apparent at firft view. The external action is determined by the will: the will is determined by defire and defire by what is agreeable or difagreeable. Here is a chain of caufes and effects, not one link of which is arbitrary, or under command of the agent: he cannot will but according to his defire: he cannot defire but according to what is agreeable or difagreeable in the objects perceived; nor do thefe qualities depend on his inclination or fancy; he has no power to make a beautiful woman ugly, nor to make a rotten carcase sweet.

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Many good men apprehending danger to morality from holding our actions to be neceffary, endeavour to break the chain of caufes and effects above mentioned, maintaining, "That whatever influence defire or motives may "have, it is the agent himself who is the cause of every "action; that defire may devife, but cannot command; (a) Chap. 2.

Book III. "and therefore that a man is ftill free to act in contradic❝tion to defire and to the ftrongest motives." That a being may exit, which in every cafe acts blindly and arbitrarily, without having any end in view, I can make a fhift to conceive; but it is difficult for me even to imagine a thinking and rational being, that has affections and paffions, that has a desirable end in view, that can easily accomplish this end; and yet, after all, can fly off, or remain at reft, without any caufe, reafon, or motive, to fway it. If fuch a whimfical being can poffibly exist, I am certain that man is not fuch a being. There is perhaps not a perfon above the condition of a changeling, but can fay why he did fo and so, what moved him, what he intended. Nor is a fingle fact stated to make us believe, that ever a man acted against his own will or defire, who was not compelled by external violence. On the contrary, conftant and univerfal experience proves, that human actions are governed by certain inflexible laws; and that a man cannot exert his felf-motive power, but in pursuance of fome defire or motive.

Had a motive always the fame influence, actions pro'ceeded from it would appear no lefs neceffary than the actions of matter. The various degrees of influence that motives have on different men at the fame time, and on the fame man at different times, occafion a doubt by sug. gesting a notion of chance. Some motives however have fuch influence, as to leave no doubt: a timid female has a phyfical power to throw herself into the mouth of a lion, roaring for food; but fhe is withheld by terror no lefs effectually than by cords; if fhe fhould rufh upon the lion, would not every one conclude that she was frantic? A man though in a deep fleep, retains a phyfical power to act, but he cannot exert it. A man, though defperately in love, retains a phyfical power to rescue the hand of his miftrefs; but he cannot exert that power in contradiction to his own ardent defire, more than if he were faft afleep. Now if a ftrong motive have a neceffary influence, there is no reason for doubting, but that a weak motive must also have its influence, the fame in kind, tho' not in degree. Some actions indeed are ftrangely irregu

lar; but let the wildest action be fcrutinized, there will always be discovered some motive or defire, which, however whimsical or capricious, was what influenced the perfon to act. Of two contending motives is it not natural to expect, that the ftronger will prevail, however little its excefs may be? If there be any doubt, it must be from a fuppofition that a weak motive can be refifted arbitrarily. Where then are we to fix the boundary between a weak and a ftrong motive? If a weak motive can be refifted, why not one a little stronger, and why not the ftrongeft? In Elements of Criticism (a) the reader will find many examples of contrary motives weighing against each other. Let him ponder these with the ftricteft attention; his conclufion will be, that between two motives, however nearly balanced, a man has not an arbitrary choice, but must yield to the ftronger. The mind indeed fluctuates for fome time, and feels itself in a meafure loofe; at laft, however, it is determined by the more powerful motive, as a balance is by the greater weight after many vibrations.

Such then are the laws that govern our voluntary actions. A man is abfolutely free to act according to his own will; greater freedom than which, is not conceiveable. At the fame time, as man is made accountable for his conduct, to his Maker, to his fellow-creatures, and to himfelf, he is not left to act arbitrarily; for at that rate he would be altogether unaccountable: his will is regulated by defire; and defire by what pleafes or difpleases him. Where we are fubjected to the will of another, would it be our wifh, that his will fhould be under no regulation? And where we are guided by our own will, would it be reasonable to wifh, that it should be under no regulation, but be exerted without reafon, without any motive, and contrary to common fenfe? Thus, with regard to human conduct, there is a chain of laws established by nature, not one link of which is left arbitrary. By that wife fyftem, man is rendered accountable: by it, he is made a fit fubject for divine and human government: by it perfons of fagacity forefee the conduct of others; and by (a) Chap. 2. part. 4.

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Book III. it, the prefcience of the Deity with respect to human actions, is firmly established.

The abfurd figure men would make if they could act contrary to motives, fhould be fufficient, one may think, to open our eyes without an argument. What a defpicable figure does a perfon make, upon whom the fame motive has great influence at one time, and very little at another? He is a bad member of fociety, and cannot be relied on as a friend or as an affociate. But how highly rational is this fuppofed perfon, compared with one who can act in contradiction to every motive? The former may be termed whimsical or capricious: the latter is worse; he is abfolutely unaccountable, and cannot be the subject of government, more than a lump of matter unconfcious of its own motion.

Let the faculty of acting be compared with that of reafoning; the comparison will tend to foften our reluctance to the neceffary influence of motives. A man sometimes blunders in reafoning; but he is tied by his nature, to form conclufions upon what appears to him true at the time. If he could arbitrarily form a different conclufion, what an abfurd reafoner would he be! Would a man be lefs abfurd, if he had a power of acting against motives, and contrary to what he thinks right or eligible? To act in that manner, is inconfiftent with any notion we can form of a fenfible being. Nor do we fuppofe that man is fuch a being in accounting for any action, however whimfical, we always afcribe it to fome motive, never once dreaming that there was no motive.

And after all, where would be the advantage of fuch an arbitrary power? Can a rational man wish feriouЛly to have fuch a power? or can he feriously think, that God would make man fo whimfical a being? To endue man with a degree of felf-command fufficient to refift every vicious motive, without any power to refift those that are virtuous, would indeed be a gift of value; but too great for man, because it would exalt him to an angel. But fuch felf-command as to refift both equally, which is the prefent fuppofition, would unqualify us for being governed either by God or by man. Better far to be led as ra