SKETCHES OF THE HISTORY OF MAN. SKETCH II. PRINCIPLES AND PROGRESS OF THE feience of morals, like other fciences, is in a very imperfect ftate among Savages; and arrives at maturity among enlightened nations by very flow degrees. This progrefs points out the hiftorical part, as firft in order: but as that history would give little fatisfaction, without a rule for comparing the morals of different ages, and of different nations, I begin with the principles of morality, fuch as ought to govern at all times, and in all nations. The present sketch accordingly is divided into two parts. In the firft, the principles are unfolded; and the fecond is altogether hiftorical. PART I. PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. SECT. I. HUMAN ACTIONS ANALYSED. THE hand of God is no where more visible, than in the nice adjustment of our internal frame to our situation in this world. An animal is endued with a power of selfmotion; and in performing animal functions, requires not VOL. IV. A any external aid. This more efpecially is the cafe of man, the nobleft of terreftrial beings. His heart beats, his blood circulates, his ftomach digefts, evacuations pro ceed, &c. &c. By what means? Not furely by the laws of mechanifm, which are far from being adequate to fuch operations. The operations mentioned are effects of an internal power, beftowed on man for preferving life. The power is exerted uniformly, and without interruption, independent of will, and without confcioufness. Man is a being fufceptible of pleasure and pain: thefe generate defire to attain what is agreeable, and to fhun what is difagreeable; and he is enabled by other powers to gratify his defires. One power, termed inftin&t, is exerted indeed with confcioufnefs; but blindly, without will, and without intention to produce any effect. Brute animals act for the most part by inftinet: hunger prompts them to eat, and cold to take fhelter; knowing. ly indeed, but without exerting any act of will, and without forefight of what will happen. Infants of the human fpecies, little fuperior to brutes, are, like brutes, governed by inftin&t: they lay hold of the nipple, without knowing that fucking will fatisfy their hunger; and they weep when pained, without any view of relief*. Another power is governed by intention and will. In the progrefs from infancy to maturity, the mind opens to objects, without end, of defire and of averfion, the attaining or thurning of which depend more or lefs on our own will. We are placed in a wide world, left to our own conduct; and we are by nature provided with a proper power for performing what we intend and will, Akin to thefe, are certain habitual ads done without thought, fuch as fnuffing or grinning. Cuftom enables one to move the fingers on an inftrument of mufic, without being directed by will: the motion is often too quick for an act of will. Some arrive at great perfection in the art of balancing: the flightest deviation from the juft balance is inftantly redreffed: were a preceding act of will neceffary, it would be too late. An unexpected hollow in walking, occafions a violent fhock is not this evidence, that external motion is governed by the mind, frequently without confciousness; and that in walking, the body is adjusted before» hand to what is expected The actions we perform by this power are termed voluntary. There ftill remain another fpecies of actions, termed involuntary; as where we act by fome irresistible motive against our will. An action may be voluntary, though done with reluctance; as where a man, to free himfelf from torture, reveals the fecrets of his friend: his confeffion is voluntary, though drawn from him with great reluctance. But let us fuppose, that after the firmeft refolution to reveal nothing, his mind is unhinged by exquifite torture; the discovery he makes may be juftly termed involuntary: he fpeaks indeed; but he is compelled to it abfolutely against his will. Man is by his nature an accountable being, anfwerable for his conduct to God and man. In doing any action that wears a double face, he is prompted by his nature to explain the fame to his relations, his friends, his acquaintance and above all, to those who have authority over him. He hopes for praise for every right action, and dreads blame for every one that is wrong. But for what fort of actions does he hold himself accountable? Not furely for an inftinctive action, which is done blindly, without intention and without will: neither for an involuntary action, because it it is extorted from him against his will and leaft of all, for actions done without confciousness, such as those which preferve life. What only remain are voluntary actions, which are either right or wrong. Such actions are done wittingly and willingly: for thefe we must answer, if at all accountable; and for these every man in confcience holds himself bound to anfwer. And now more particularly upon voluntary actions. To intend and to will, though commonly held fynony. mous, fignify different acts of the mind. Intenfion ref. pects the effect: Will refpects the action that is exerted for producing the effect. It is my intention, for exam. ple, to relieve my friend from diftrefs: upon feeing him, it is my will to give him a fum for his relief: the external act of giving follows; and my friend is relieved, which is the effect intended. But these internal acts, though in their nature different, are always united: I cannot will the means, without intending the effect; and I cannot intend the effect, without willing the means * Some effects of voluntary, action-follow neceffarily. A wound is an effect that neceffarily follows the ftabbing a perfon with a dagger; death is a neceffary effect of throwing one down from the battlements of a high tower. Some effects are probable only: I labour in order to provide for my family; fight for my country to rescue it from oppreffors; take phyfic for my health. In fuch cafes, the event intended does not neceffarily nor always follow. A man when he wills to act, muft intend the neceffary effect a perfon who ftabs, certainly intends to wound. But where the effect is probable only, a man may a& without intending the effect that follows: a flone thrown by me at random into the market place, may happen to wound a man without my intending it. One acts by instinct, without either will or intention: voluntary actions that neceffarily produce their effect, imply intention voluntary actions, when the effect is probable only, are fometimes intended, fometimes not. Human actions are diftinguished from each other by certain qualities, termed right and wrong. But as thefe make the corner ftone of morality, they are reserved to the following fection. SECT. II. DIVISION OF HUMAN ACTIONS INTO RIGHT, Wrong, AND INDIFFERENT. The qualities of right and wrong in voluntary actions, are univerfally acknowledged as the foundation of morality and yet philofophes have been ftrangely per plexed about them. The hiftory of their various opinions, would fignify little but to darken the fubject: the reader will have more fatisfaction in feeing thefe qualities explained, without entering at all into controverty. To incline, to refolve, to interd, to will, are ads of the mind relative to external action. Thef feveral acts are well underfood; though they cannot be defr ed, being perfectly simple. No perfon is ignorant of primary and fecondary qualities, a diftinction much infifted on by philofophers. Pri mary qualities, fuch as figure, cohefion, weight, are permanent qualities that exift in a fubject whether per ceived or not. Secondary qualities, fuch as colour, talle, fmell, depend on the percipient as much as on the subject, being nothing when not perceived. Beauty and uglinefs are qualities of the latter fort: they have no existence but when perceived; and, like all other fecondary qua. lities, they are perceived intuitively; having no dependence on reafon nor on judgment, more than colour has, or fmell or talte (a). The qualities of right and wrong in voluntary actions, are fecondary, like beauty and ugliness, and the other fecondary qualities mentioned. Like them, they are objects of intuitive perception, and depend not in any de. gree on reafon or on judgment. No argument is requi fite to prove, that to rescue an innocent babe from the jaws of a wolf, to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, are right actions: they are perceived to be fo intuitively. As little is an argument requifite to prove, that murder, deceit, perjury, are wrong actions: they are perceived intuitively to be fo. The Deity has bestowed on man, different faculties for different purpofes. Truth and falfehood are investigated by the reafoning faculty. Beauty and uglinefs are objects of a sense, known by the name of tafle. Right and wrong are objects of a fenfe termed the moral fenfe or confcience. And fuppofing these qualities to be hid from our perception, in vain would we try to dif cover them by any argument, or procefs of reafoning; the attempt would be abfurd; no lefs fo than an attempt to difcover colour, by reafoning, or tafte, or fmell *. (a) Elements of Criticism, vol. 1, p 207. edit. 5. * Every perception must proceed from fome faculty or power of perception, termed fenfe. The moral fenfe, by which we perceive the qualities of right and wrong, may be confidered either as a branch of the fenfe of feeing, by which we perceive the actions to which thefe qualities belong, or as a fenfe diftinct from all others. The fenfes by which objects are perceived, are not feparated from each other by diftin&t boundaries,; and the forting or claffing them |