Book III. coincide. The fum is taken from the one as a fort of punishment for his fault, and is beftowed on the other to make up the lofs he has fuftained. But in numberlefs cafes where mifchief done cannot be compenfated with money, reparation is in its nature a fort of punishment. Defamation, contemptuous treatment, perfonal restraint, the breaking one's peace of mind, are injuries that cannot be repaired by money; and the pecuniary reparation decreed against the wrong doer, can only be a fort of punishment, in order to deter him from reiterating fuch injuries: the fum, it is true, is awarded to the perfon injured; but not as fufficient to make up his lofs, which money cannot do, but only as a folatium for what he has fuffered.

Hitherto it is fuppofed, that the man who intends a wrong action, is, at the fame time, confcious of its being fo.

But a man may intend a wrong action, thinking erroneously that it is right; or a right action, thinking erroneously that it is wrong; and the question is, What fhall be the confequence of fuch errors with refpect to reparation. The latter cafe is clear: the, perfon who occafionally fuffers lofs by a right action, has not a claim for reparation, because he has no juft caufe of complaint. On the other hand, if the action be wrong, the innocence of the author, for which he is indebted to an error in judgment, will not relieve him from reparation. When he is made fenfible of his error, he feels himself bound in confcience to repair the harm he has done by a wrong action and others, fenfible of his error from the beginning, have the fame feeling: nor will his obftinacy in refifting conviction, or his dullnefs in not apprehending his error, mend the matter! it is well that thefe defects relieve him from punifhment, without wronging others by denying a claim for reparation. A man's errors

ought to affect himself only, and not those who have not erred. Hence in general, reparation always follows wrong; and is not affected by any erroneous opinion of a wrong action being right, more than of a right action be ing wrong.

But this doctrine fuffers an exception with refpe&t to a man, who having undertaken a truit, is bound in duty to

act. A judge is in that fituation: it is his duty to pronounce fentence in every cafe that comes before him; and if he judge according to the beft of his knowledge he is not liable for confequences. A judge cannot be fubjected to reparation, unlefs it can be verified, that the judgment he gave was intentionally wrong. An officer of the revenue is in the fame predicament. Led by a doubtful clause in a statute, he makes a feizure of goods as forfeited to the crown, which afterwards, in the proper court, are found not to be feizable. The officer ought not to be fubjected to reparation, if he has acted to the beft of his judgment. This rule however must be taken with a limitation; a public officer who is grofsly erroneous, will not be excufed; for he ought to know

better.

Reparation is due, though the immediate act be involuntary, provided it be connected with a preceding voluntary act. Example: "If A ride an unruly horfe in "Lincolns-inn fields, to tame him, and the horse break❝ing from A, run over B, and grievously hurt him; B "shall have an action against A: for though the mifchief "was done against the will of A, yet fince it was his

fault to bring a wild horfe into a frequented place, "where mischief might ensue, he must answer for the "confequences." Gaius feems to carry this rule ftill farther, holding in general, that if a horfe, by the weaknefs or unskilfulness of the rider, break away and do mischief, the rider is liable (a). But Gaius probably had in his eye a frequented place, where the mifchief might have been forefeen. Thus in general a man is made liable for the mifchief occafioned by his voluntary deed, though the immediate act that occafioned the mif chief be involuntary.

SECT. VII.

FINAL CAUSES OF THE FOREGOING LAWS OF NATURE.

Several final causes have been occafionally mentioned in preceding parts of this effay, which could not con

(a) 1. 8. $1, ad leg. Aquil.

Book III. veniently be referved for the present section, being ne ceffary to explain the fubjects to which they relate, the final caufe for inftance of erecting a ftandard of morals upon the common fenfe of mankind. I proceed now to what have not been mentioned, or but flightly mentioned. The final caufe that presents itself first to view, respects man confidered as an accountable being. The sense of being accountable, is one of the molt vigilant guards against the filent attacks of vice. When a temptation moves me, it immediately occurs, What will the world fay? I imagine my friends expoftulating, my enemies reviling-I dare not diffemble my pirits fink-the temp. tation vanishes. 2dly, Praife and blame, efpecially from those we regard, are ftrong incentives to virtue: but if we were not accountable for our conduct, praise and blame would be feldom well directed; for how should a man's intentions be known without calling him to account? And praise or blame, frequently ill directed, would lofe their influence 3dly. This branch of our nature. is the corner ftone of the criminal law. Did not a man think himself accountable to all the world, and to his judge in a peculiar manner, it would be natural for him to think, that the jufteft fentence pronounced againft, him, is oppreffion, not juftice. 4thly, This branch is a ftrong cement to fociety. If we were not accountable beings, thofe connected by blood or by country, would be no lefs fhy and reserved, than if they were mere strangers to each other.

The final caufe that next occurs, being fimple and obvious, is mentioned only that it may not feem to have been overlooked. All right actions are agreeable, all wrong actions disagreeable. This is a wife appointment of Providence. We meet with fo many temptations against duty, that it is not always an easy task to perse. vere in the right path: would we perfevere, were duty difagreeable? And were acts of pure benevolence dif agreeable, they would be extremely rare, however worthy of praise.

Another final caufe refpects duty, in contradiftinction to pure benevolence, All the moral laws are founded on

intuitive perception; and are fo fimple and plain, as to be perfectly apprehended by the most ignorant. Were they in any degree complex or obfcure, they would be perverted by felfifhnefs and prejudice. No conviction inferior to what is afforded by intuitive perception, could produce in mankind a common fenfe with refpect to moral duties. Reafon would afford no general conviction; because that faculty is diftributed in portions fo unequal, as to bar all hopes from it of uniformity either in practice or in opinion. At the fame time, we are taught by woeful experience, that reafon has little influence over the greater part of men. Reafon, it is true, aided by experience, fupports morality, by convincing us, that we cannot be happy if we abandon duty for any other intereft.

But conviction feldom weighs much againft imperious paffion; to control which the vigorous and commanding principles of duty is requifite, directed by the fhining light of intuition.

A propofition laid down above appears to be a fort of mystery in the moral fyftem, viz. That though evidently all moral-duties are contrived for promoting the general good, yet that choice is not permitted among different goods, or between good and ill; and that we are strictly tied down to perform or forbear certain particular acts, without regard to confequences; or, in other words, that we muft not do wrong, whatever good it may produce. The final caufe, which I am about to unfold, will clear this mystery, and fet the beauty of the moral fyftem in a confpicuous light. I begin with obferving, that as the general good of mankind, or even of the fociety we live in, refults from many and various circumltances intricately combined, it is far above the capacity of man, to judge in every inftance what particular actions will tend the most to that end. The authorifing therefore a man to trace out his duty, by weighing endless circumftances good and ill, would open a wide door to partiality and paffion, and often lead him unwittingly to prefer the preponderating ill, under a falfe appearance of being the greater good. At that rate, the opinions of men about right and wrong, would be as various as their faces; which, as observed a

Book III. bove, would totally unhinge fociety. It is better ordered by Providence, even for the general good, that, avoiding, complex and obfcure objects, we are directed by the moral fenfe to perform certain plain and fimple acts, which are obvious to us by intuitive perception.

In the next place, To permit ill in order to produce greater good, may fuit a being of univerfal benevolence; but is repugnant to the nature of man, composed of selfish and benevolent principles. We have seen above, that the true moral balance depends on a subordination of felf-love to duty, and of arbitrary benevolence to felf love; and accordingly every man is fenfible of injuftice when he is hurt in order to benefit another. Were it a rule in fociety, That a greater good to any other would make it an act of juftice to deprive me of my life, of my reputation, or of my property, I fhould renounce the fociety of men, and affociate with more harmless animals.

Thirdly, The true moral fyftem, that which is difplayed above, is not only better fuited to the nature of man, and to his limited capacity and intelligence, but contributes more to the general good, which I now proceed to demonftrate. It would be lofing time to prove, that a man entirely felfish is ill fitted for fociety; and we have seen (a), that univerfal benevolence, were it a duty, would contribute to the general good perhaps lefs than an absolute selfishness. Man is too limited in capacity and in power for univerfal benevolence. Even the greatest monarch has not power to exercise his benevolence but within a very fmall compafs; and if fo, how unfit would such a duty be for private perfons, who have very little power? Serving only to diftrefs them by inability of performance, they would endeavour to fmother it altogether, and give full fcope to felfifhnefs. Man is much better qualified for doing good, by a conftitution in which benevolence is duly blended with felf-love. Benevolence, as a duty, takes place of felf-love; a regulation effential to fociety. Benevolence, as a virtue, not a duty, gives place to felflove; because as every man has more power, knowledge and opportunity, to promote his own good than that of others, a greater quantity of good is produced, than if be(a) Set 4.