A crime against any primary virtue is attended with fevere and never-failing punishment, more efficacious than any that have been invented to enforce municipal laws: on the other hand, the preferving primary virtues inviolate, is attended with little merit. The fecondary virtues are directly opposite: the neglecting them is not attended with any punishment; but the practice of them is attended with illuftrious rewards. Offices of undeferved kindness, returns of good tor ill, generous toils and sufferings for our friends or for our country, are attended with conscioufnefs of felf-merit, and with univerfal praise and admiration; the higheft rewards human nature is fufceptible of.

From what is faid, the following obfervation will occur: The pain of tranfgreffing juftice, fidelity, or any duty, is much greater than the pleasure of performing; but the pain of neglecting a generous action, or any fecondary virtue, is as nothing compared with the pleasure of performing. Among the vices oppofite to the primary virtues, the most ftriking moral deformity is found; among the fecondary virtues, the moft ftriking moral beauty.

SECT. VI.

LAWS RESPECTING REPARATION.

The principle of reparation is made a branch of the moral fyftem for accomplishing two ends ; which are, to reprefs wrongs that are not criminal, and to make up the lofs fuftained by wrongs of whatever kind. With ref. pect to the former, reparation is a fpecies of punishment: with respect to the latter, it is an act of justice. These ends will be better understood, after afcertaining the na

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"flaughter at least, as the circumftances of the cafe happen." And Fofter, in his Crown law, teaches the fame doctrine, never once fufpecting in it the leaft deviation from moral principles. "fhooteth at the poultry of B, and by accident killeth a man: if "his intention was to fteal the poultry, which must be collected "from circumftances, it will be murder by reafon of that felonious "intent; but if it was done wantonly, and without that intention, "it will be barely manslaughter." (p. 259)

Book III. ture and foundation of reparation; to which the following division of actions is neceffary. First, actions that we are bound to perform. Second, actions that we perform in profecution of a right or privilege. Third, indifferent actions, defcribed above. Actions of the first kind fubject not a man to reparation, whatever damage enfues: because it is his duty to perform them, and it would be inconfiftent with morality that a man fhould be subjected to reparation for doing his duty. The laws of reparation that concern actions of the fecond kind, are more complex. The focial ftate, highly beneficial by affording opportunity for mutual good offices, is attended with fome inconveniencies; as where a perfon happens to be in a fituation of neceffarily harming others by exercising a right or privilege. If the forefight of harming another, reftrain me not from exercising my right, the intereft of that other is made fubfervient to mine: on the other hand, if fuch forefight reftrain me from exercifing my right, my intereft is made fubfervient to his. What doth the mo ral fenfe provide in that cafe? To preferve as far as poffible an equality among perfons born free, and by nature equal in rank, the moral fenfe lays down a rule, no less beautiful than falutary; which is, That the exercifing a right will not justify me for doing direct mifchief; but will justify me, though I foresee that mifchief may possibly happen. The first branch of the rule refolves into a propofition established above, viz. That no interelt of mine, not even life itself, will authorise me to hurt an innocent perfon. The other branch is fupported by expediency for if the bare poffibility of hurting others were fufficient to reftrain a man from profecuting his rights and priviledges, men would be too much cramped in action or rather would be reduced to a state of abfolute inactivity. With respect to the first branch, I am criminal, and liable even to punishment: with refpect to the other, I am not even culpable, nor bound to repair the mifchief that happens to enfue.

With respect to the third kind, viz. indifferent actions, the moral fenfe dictates, that we ought carefully to avoid. mifchief, either direct or confequential. As we fuffer no

lofs by forbearing actions that are done for paftime marely, fuch an action is culpable or faulty, if the confequent mischief was foreseen or might have been forefeen; and the actor of course is fubjected to reparation. As this is a cardinal point in the doctrine of reparation, I shall endeavour to explain it more fully. Without intending any harm, a man may forefee, that what he is about to do will probably or poffibly produce mischief; and fometimes mifchief follows that which was neither intended nor forefeen. The action in the former cafe is not criminal; becaufe ill intention is effential to a crime: but it is culpable or faulty; and if mischief enfue, the actor blames himself, and is blamed by others, for having done what he ought not to have done Thus a man who throws a large ftone among a croud of people, is highly culpable; because he must forefee that mifchief will probably enfue, though he has no intention to hurt any perfon. As to the latter cafe, though mischief was neither intended nor foreseen, yet if it might have been forefeen, the action is rash or uncautious, and confequently culpable or faulty in fome degree. Thus, if a man in pulling down an old houfe, happen to wound one paffing accidentally, without calling aloud to keep out of the way, the action is in fome degree culpable, becaufe the mischief might have been foreseen. But though mifchief enfue, an action is not culpable or faulty if all reasonable precautions have been adhibited: the moral fenfe declares the author to be innocent and blameless; the mischief is accidental, and the action may be termed unlucky, but comes not under the denomination of either right or wrong. In general, when we act merely for amusement, our nature makes us answerable for the harm that enfues, if it was either forefeen, or might with due attention have been foreseen. But our rights and priveleges would profit us little, if their exercife were put under the fame reftraint: it is more wifely ordered, that the probability of mifchief,

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* Innocent here is opposed to culpable: in a broader fense it is oppofed to criminal. With refpect to punishment, an action tho' culpable is innocent, if it be not criminal; with refpect to reparation, it is not innocent if it be culpable.

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Book III. even forefeen, fhould not reftrain a man from profecuting his concerns which may often be of confequence to him. He proceeds accordingly with a fafe confcience, and is not afraid of being blamed either by God or man.

With respect to rafh or uncautious actions, where the mifchief might have been forefeen though not actually foreseen, it is not fufficient to escape blame, that a man, naturally rash or inattentive, acts according to his character a degree of precaution is required, both by himfelf and by others, fu h as is natural to the generality of men he perceives that he might and ought to have acted more cautiously; and his confcienee reproaches him for his inattention, no lefs than if he were naturally more fedate and attentive. Thus the circumfpection natural to mankind in general, is applied as a ftandard to every individual; and if they fall fhort of that ftandard, they are culpable and blameable, however unforeseen by them the mifchief may have been.

What is faid upon culpable actions is equally applicable to culpable omiffions; for by these also mischief may be occafioned, entitling the fufferer to reparation. If we forbear to do our duty with an intention to occafion mifchief, the forbearance is criminal. The only queftion is, how far forbearance without such intention is culpable. Suppofing the probability of mifchief to have been forefeen, though not intended, the omiffion is highly culpable and though neither intended nor forefeen, yet the omiffion is culpable in a lower degree, if there have been lefs care and attention than are proper for performing the duty required. But fuppofing all due care, the omiffion of extreme care and diligence is not culpable.

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By afcertaining what acts and omiffions are culpable or faulty, the doctrine of reparation is rendered extremely fimple; for it may be laid down as a rule without a fin-. gle excepton, That every culpable act, and every culpable omiffion, binds us in confcience to repair the mifchief occafioned by it. The moral fenfe binds us no farther; for it loads not with reparation the man who is blameless and innocent: the harm is accidental; and we are fo conftituted as not to be refponfible in confcience

for what happens by accident. But here it is requifite, that the man be in every refpect innocent: for if he intend harm, though not what he has done, he will find himself bound in confcience to repair the accidental harm he has done; as, for example, when aiming a blow unjuftly at one in the dark, he happens to wound another whom he did not fufpect to be there. And hence it is a

rule in all municipal laws, That one verfans in illicito is liable to repair every confequent damage. That these par ticulars are wifely ordered by the Author of our nature for the good of fociety, will appear afterwards (a). In general, the rules above mentioned are dictated by the moral fenfe; and we are compelled to obey them by the prin ciple of reparation

We are now prepared for a more particular inspection of the two ends of reparation above mentioned, viz. the repreffing wrongs that are not criminal, and the making up what lofs is fuftained by wrongs of whatever kind, With refpect to the firft, it is clear, that punishment, in its proper fenfe, cannot be inflicted for a wrong that is culpable only; and if nature did not provide fome means for repreffing fuch wrongs, fociety would icarce be a comfortable ftate. Laying confcience afide, pecuniary repa ration is the only remedy that can be provided against culpable omiffions: and with refpect to culpable commiffions, the neceffity of reparation is ftill more apparent; for confcience alone, without the fanction of reparation, would feldom have authority fufficient to reftrain us from` acting rafhly or uncautioufly, even where the poffibility of mischief is forefeen, and far lefs where it is not foreseen.

With respect to the fecond end of reparation, my conscience dictates to me, that if a man fuffer by my fault, whether the mischief was forefeen or not foreseen, it is my duty to make up his lofs: and I perceive intuitively, that the lofs ought to reft ultimately upon me, and not upon the lufferer, who has not been culpable in any de gree.

In every cafe where the mischief done can be estimated by a pecuniary compenfation, the two ends of reparation (a) Sect. 7.

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