fcene fuggefts to us, that there must be fome article ftill wanting, to complete the moral fyftem. The means provided for directing us in the road of duty have been explained: but as in deviating from the road wrongs are committed, nothing hitherto has been faid, about redreffing fuch wrongs, nor about preventing the reiteration of them. To accomplish thefe important ends, there are added to the moral fyftem, laws relative to rewards and punishments, and to reparation; of which in their order.

Many animals are qualified for fociety by inftin&t merely; fuch as beavers, fheep, monkeys, bees, rooks. But men are feldom led by instinct: their actions are commonly prompted by paffions; of which there is an endless variety, focial and felfifh, benevolent and malevolent. And were every paffion equally intitled to gratification, man would be utterly unqualified for fociety: he would be a fhip without a rudder, obedient to every wind, and moving at random, without any ultimate deftination. The faculty of reafon would make no oppofition: for were there no fenfe of wrong, it would be reasonable to gratify every defire that harms not ourselves: and to talk of punishment would be abfurd; for punishment, in its very idea, implies fome wrong that ought to be redreffed. Hence the neceffity of the moral fenfe, to qualify us for fociety by inftructing us in our duty, it renders us accountable for our conduct, and makes us fufceptible of rewards and punishments. The moral fenfe fulfils -another valuable purpofe: it erects in man an unerring ftandard for the application and measure of rewards and punishments.

To complete the fyftem of rewards and punishments, it is neceflary that a provifion be made, both of power and of willingness to reward and punish. The Author of our nature hath provided amply for the former, by entitling every man to reward and punish as his native pri vilege. And he has provided for the latter, by a noted principle in our nature, prompting us to exercife the power. Impelled by that principle, we reward the virtuous with approbation and efteem, and punifh the vicious

with difapprobation and contempt. So prevalent is the principle, that we have great fatisfaction in rewarding, and no lefs in punishing.

As to punishment in particular, an action done intentionally to produce mifchief, is criminal, and merits punifhment. Such an action, being difagreeable, raifes my resentment, even where I have no connection with the perfon injured; and the principle under confideration impels me to chaftife the delinquent with indignation and hatred. An injury done to myself raises my refentment to a higher tone: I am not fatisfied with fo flight a punishment as indignation and hatred: the author muft by my hand fuffer mischief, as great as he has made me fuffer.

Even the moft fecret crimes efcapes not punishment. The delinquent is tortured with remorfe: he even defires to be punished; fometimes fo ardently, as himself to be the executioner. There cannot be imagined a contrivance more effectual, to deter one from vice; for remorse is itfelf a grievous punishment. Self punishment goes ftill farther: every criminal, fenfible that he ought to be punifhed, dreads punishment from others; and this dread, however fmothered during profperity, breaks out in adverfity, or in depreffion of mind; his crime ftares him in the face, and every accidental misfortune is in his disturbed imagination interpreted to be a punishment. "And "they faid one to another, We are verily guilty con"cerning our brother, in that we faw the anguifh of his "foul, when he befought us; and we would not hear: "therefore is this diftrefs come upon us. And Reuben “answered them, faying, fpake I not unto you faying, "do not fin against the child, and ye would not hear? "therefore behold also his blood is required (a).”*.

*

(a) Genefis xlii. 21.

John Duke of Britany, commonly termed the Good Duke, illuftrious for generofity, clemency, and piety, reigned forty-three years wholly employed about the good of his fubjects. He was fucceeded by his eldet fan Francis, a prince weak and fufpicious, and confequently fit to be governed. Arthur of Montauban, in love with the wife of Gilles, brother to the Duke, perfuaded the

No tranfgreffion of felf-duty efcapes punishment, more than tranfgreffion of duty to others. The punishments, though not the fame, differ in degree more than in kind. Injustice is punifhed with remorfe: impropriety with fhame, which is remorfe in a lower degree. Injuftice raifes indignation in the beholder, and fo doth every flagrant impropriety: flighter improprieties receive a milder punishment, being rebuked with fome degree of contempt, and commonly with derifion' (a).

So far we have been led in a beaten track; but in attempting to proceed, we are entangled in mazes and intricacies. An action well intended, may happen to produce no good; and an action ill intended, may happen to produce no mifchief: a man over-awed by fear, may be led to do mifchief against his will; and a perfon, mistaking the ftandard of right and wrong, may be innocently

Duke that his brother was laying plots to dethrone him. Gilles being imprifoned, the Duke's best friends conjured him to pity his unhappy brother, who might be imprudent, but affured was innocent; but in vain. Gilles being profecuted before the three eftates for high treafon, was unanimously abfolved; which irritated the Duke more and more. Arthur of Montauban artfully 'fuggefted to his mafter to try poifon; which having miscarried, they next refolved to ftarve the prifoner to death. The unfortunate Prince, through the bars of a window, cried aloud for bread but the paffengers durft not fupply him. One poor woman only had courage more than once to flip fome bread within the window. He charged a priest, who had received his confeffion, to declare to the Duke, "That seeing juftice was refufed him in this world, "he appealed to Heaven, and called upon the Duke to appear "before the judgment feat of God in forty days." The Duke and his favourite, amazed that the Prince lived fo long without nourifhment, employed affaffins to fmother him with his bed cloaths. The priest, in obedience to the orders he had received, presented himfelf before the Duke, and with a loud voice cited him in the name of the deceafed Lord Gilles to appear before God in forty days. Shame and remorse verified the prediction. The Duke was feized with a fudden terror; and the image of his brother, expiring by his orders, haunted him day and night. He decayed daily without any marks of a regular difeafe, and died within the 'forty days in frightful agony.

See this fubject further illustrated in the Sketch, Principles and Progrefs of Theology, chap 1.

(a) See Elements of Criticifm, chap, 10.

led to do acts of injuftice. By what rule, in fuch cafes, are rewards and punishments to be applied? Ought a man to be rewarded when he does no good, or punished when he does no mifchief: ought he to be punished for doing mischief against his will, or for doing mischief when he thinks he is acting innocently? Thefe questions fuggeft a doubt, whether the ftandard of right and wrong be applicable to rewards and punishments.

We have feen that there is an invariable standard of right and wrong, which depends not in any degree on private opinion or conviction. By that ftandard, all pecuniary claims are judged, all claims of property, and, in a word, every demand founded on intereft, not excepting reparation, as will afterward appear. But with respect to the moral characters of men, and with refpe&t to rewards and punishments, a different ftandard is erected in the common fenfe of mankind, neither rigid nor inflexible; which is, the opinion that men have of their own actions. It is mentioned above, that a man is efteemed innocent in doing what he himself thinks right, and guilty in doing what he himfelf thinks wrong. In applying this ftandard to rewards and punishments, we reward those who in doing wrong are however convinced that they are innocent; and punish those who in doing right are however convinced that they are guilty*. Some it is true, are fo perverted by bad education, or by fuper ftition, as to efpoufe numberlefs abfurd tenets, contradic-. tory to the ftandard of right and wrong; and yet fuch men are no exception from the general rule: if they act according to confcience, they are innocent, and fafe against punishment, however wrong the action may be; and if they act against confcience, they are guilty and punishable, however right the action may be: it is abhorrent to every moral perception, that a guilty perfon be rewarded, or an innocent perfon punished. Further, if

Virtuous and vicious, innocent and guilty, fignify qualities both of men and of their actions. Approbation and difapprobation, praife and blame, fignify certain emotions or fentiments of thofe who fee or contemplate men and their actions.

Book III. mischief be done contrary to will, as where a man is compelled by fear, or by torture, to reveal the fecrets of his party; he may be grieved for yielding to the weakness of his nature, contrary to his firmeft refolves; but he has no check of confcience, and upon that account is not liable to punishment. And, laftly, in order that perfonal merit and demerit may not in any measure depend on chance, we are fo conftituted as to place innocence and guilt, not on the event, but on the intention of doing right or wrong; and accordingly, whatever be the event, a man is praised for an action well intended, and condemned for an action ill intended.

But what if a man intending a certain wrong, happen by accident to do a wrong he did not intend; as, for example, intending to rob a warren by fhooting the rab. bits, he accidentally wounds a child unseen behind a bush? The delinquent ought to be punished for intending to rob; and he is alfo fubjected to repair the hurt done to the child; but he cannot be punished for the accidental wound, because our nature regulates punishment by the intention, and not by the event*.

During the infancy of nations, pecuniary compofitions for crimes were univerfal; and during that long period, very little weight was laid upon intention. This proceeded from the cloudinefs and obfcurity of moral perceptions among barbarians, joined with the refemblance of pecuniary punishment to reparation. Where a man does mifchief intentionally, or is verfans in illicito, as expreffed in the Roman law, he is juftly bound to repair all the harm that enfues, however accidentally; and from the resemblance of pecuniary punishment to reparation, the rule was childishly extended to punishment. But this rule, fo little confiftent with moral principles, could not long fubfift after pecuniary compofitions gave place to corporal punishment; and accordingly, among civilized nations, the law of nature is restored, which prohibits punishment for any mifchief that is not intentional. The English must be excepted, who, remarkably tenacious of their original laws and customs, preferve in force, even as to capital punishment, the above-mentioned rule that obtained among barbarians, when pecuniary compofitions were in vigour. The following paflage is from Hales (Pleas of the Crown, chap. 39.) "Regularly he that voluntarily and knowingly intends hurt to the perfon of a man, "as for example to beat him, though he intend not death, yet if "death enfues, it excufeth not from the guilt of murder, or man